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GB v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Ors (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a judgment of Judge O'Regan delivered 18 December 2025 concerning an application for judicial review by the Applicant challenging a decision of the first-named Respondent dated 2 July 2025 refusing to extend time under Regulation 4(4) of the International Protection Act 2015 (Procedures and Periods for Appeals) Regulations 2017 (the "2017 Regulations"). A prior written judgment of 20 October 2025 refused the Applicant's quashing application. Costs of the earlier proceedings were awarded to the Respondents on 25 November 2025 to be adjudicated in default of agreement. This judgment addresses whether s.5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 ("the 2000 Act") applies to the Regulation 4(4) determination such that a certificate for leave to appeal is required and, if so, whether such a certificate should be granted.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether s.5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 applies to a refusal to extend time under Regulation 4(4) of the 2017 Regulations (i.e. whether the Regulation 4(4) determination is subject to the certificate/leave regime in s.5).
- If s.5 does apply, whether a certificate for leave to appeal should be granted in the circumstances of this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The Applicant submits that s.5 of the 2000 Act does not apply to Regulation 4(4) because that provision is not enumerated in s.5(1) and the Supreme Court decision in AWK is distinguishable (AWK concerned a single section of the 2015 Act).
- The Applicant notes the Minister may prescribe additional matters under s.5(9) of the 2000 Act but has not prescribed Regulation 4(4); had it been intended, it could have been included since 2017.
- The Applicant contends the Regulation 4(4) decision deals solely with an application to extend time and is separate from any international protection decision on the merits.
Respondents' Arguments
- The Respondents accept Regulation 4(4) is not explicitly enumerated in s.5(1) but argue it is subject to s.5 by implication or is absorbed into s.5 as part of the suite of decisions occurring in an international protection application.
- The Respondents rely on the logic of AWK and on contextual and consequentialist considerations (including consistency with time limits for appeals and the scheme of the 2015 Act).
- The Respondents also rely on MYM v Minister for Justice Home Affairs and Migration [2025] IEHC 611 where the court treated a challenge to a s.50 decision together with a s.51 order as governed by s.5.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AWK v Minister for Justice [2024] 1 IR 539 | Consideration whether a review decision falls within s.49(4)(b) of the 2015 Act such that s.5 of the 2000 Act applies; applied a literal interpretation of s.49; ratio contained in paras 32–45. | The Court analysed AWK and concluded AWK's reasoning rested on a literal interpretation of s.49 and did not support extending s.5 by implication to Regulation 4(4). The Court found AWK insufficient authority to imply s.5 applies to the Regulation 4(4) refusal to extend time. |
| MYM v Minister for Justice Home Affairs and Migration [2025] IEHC 611 | Held a challenge to a s.50 refoulement decision taken at the same time as a challenge to a s.51 deportation order were both governed by s.5 of the 2000 Act, though only s.51 was referenced in s.5(1); context can be critical. | The Court cited MYM but treated it as not dispositive here because the statutory context differed (s.51 is included in s.5(1) whereas s.50 is not), so MYM did not compel a finding that s.5 applies to Regulation 4(4). |
| Kadri v Governor of Wheatfield Prison [2012] IESC 27 | Quoted for the principle (Clarke J) that under s.5 of the Interpretation Act 2005 the court should engage in constructive interpretation rather than rewriting legislation. | The Court cited Kadri to note the limits of interpretation but held that extending s.5 to Regulation 4(4) would require rewriting the Regulations rather than permissible constructive interpretation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court set out a series of determinative points (summarised):
- The Supreme Court in AWK reached its conclusion by literal interpretation of s.49 of the 2015 Act rather than by implication or absorption; AWK did not rely on s.5(9) or a purposive expansion beyond the statutory text.
- The Regulation 4(4) decision concerns only an application to extend time under Regulation 4 and is focused on Regulation 4(5) grounds for delay; it is separate and distinct from IPO or IPAT decisions on the substantive international protection application.
- There is no prescribed time limit in the Regulations for when an application to extend time must be made; the availability of an extension under Regulation 4(5) means the simple existence of a ten-day appeal period for IPO decisions does not automatically render extension determinations subject to s.5.
- MYM was considered but its context (s.51 included in s.5(1) while s.50 was not) meant it was not determinative here; context matters but does not mandate treating Regulation 4(4) as within s.5.
- Implying or absorbing Regulation 4(4) into s.5 would require looking beyond permissible interpretative aids and would amount to rewriting the 2017 Regulations rather than engaging in constructive interpretation per the authorities cited.
- The Regulation's text is not obscure, ambiguous or absurd; there is no evident conflict with the Minister's intention such that a purposive override of the literal meaning is warranted.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that s.5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 does not apply to the determination made under Regulation 4(4) in the present proceedings such that a certificate for leave to appeal from this Court to the Court of Appeal is required.
Implications: The direct consequence is that the Regulation 4(4) refusal to extend time is not subject to the s.5 certificate/leave regime in this case. The Court ordered that costs in respect of this portion of the matter be awarded in favour of the Applicant to be adjudicated upon in default of agreement. The judgment did not purport to create a broader new precedent beyond the rationale expressly given.
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