Summary of Judgment — Company A v Respondent (Notice Party A; Notice Party B)

Factual and Procedural Background

Company A commenced proceedings by ex parte, in camera application to the High Court on 19 November 2025 under section 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Acts seeking an interim restraint against Respondent in relation to a residential property in The City (the "Property") and certain designer goods. The Property was registered in the joint names of Notice Party A and Notice Party B. Company A obtained extracts from the Family Law (Divorce) proceedings between Notice Party A and Notice Party B on foot of an ex parte Circuit Court order dated 2 May 2024; those family law proceedings had been subject to the statutory in camera rule. Company A relied on those extracts at the section 2 hearing; the High Court granted a section 2 order on 19 November 2025 and gave Company A liberty to issue a section 3 motion. Notice Party A sought to be joined as a notice party and challenged the proposal to rely on family law materials. Directions were given and an in camera hearing was held on 19 December 2025. Judge Quinn delivered the judgment on 13 January 2026.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Circuit Court Order of 2 May 2024 (providing Company A with family law materials) was lawfully made.
2. Whether the family law materials obtained by Company A may lawfully be relied upon in the section 2/section 3 proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Acts.
3. Whether the High Court can, either under section 40(8) of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 or by inherent jurisdiction, permit disclosure of in camera family law materials to Company A or otherwise authorize their use in these proceedings.
4. Whether principles relating to exclusion of illegally or unconstitutionally obtained material (as discussed in the authorities, notably CAB v Murphy) require exclusion or other remedies affecting the section 2 order and the continuation of these proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant (Company A) — submissions

• Characterised its application as seeking relaxation/lifting of the in camera rule in aid of prosecution of POC proceedings.
• Conceded section 41 of the Data Protection Act did not provide a legal basis for the Circuit Court order but contended the Circuit Court (or alternatively the High Court) had inherent jurisdiction; ultimately conceded the Circuit Court likely lacked such inherent jurisdiction.
• Relied on the High Court's inherent jurisdiction or section 40(8) of the 2004 Act (notably section 40(8) and section 40(8)'s interaction with subsections (6)/(7)/(7A)) to justify disclosure; relied on CAB v Murphy for the approach to unlawfully obtained material.
• Submitted the material was relevant, that ongoing in camera protection could be ordered in the High Court, and that legitimate privacy interests could be protected while permitting use of the material.

Notice Party A (and Notice Party B) — submissions

• Contended there was no proper legal basis for the ex parte Circuit Court application; Company A had no express or inherent power to obtain in camera family law files in that way.
• Argued lack of urgency and absence of justification for ex parte relief; reliance on belief evidence in that context was inappropriate.
• Invoked constitutional and ECHR rights to privacy/family life and the statutory in camera protection; sought damages in counterclaim but adduced no evidential support and did not give oral evidence.
• Submitted Company A could proceed without the family law material and that disclosure would be disproportionate and prejudicial to Notice Party A and Notice Party B.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages.

1. Lawfulness of the Circuit Court Order: the Order purported to be made under section 41 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The Court found section 41 did not permit overriding the statutory in camera rule in section 38(5) of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996. No authority was advanced for an inherent jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to override the in camera rule. The Circuit Court Order of 2 May 2024 was therefore not lawfully made and should be set aside.
2. Whether disclosure could be validated by the High Court: the Court analysed section 40(6), (7), (7A) and (8) of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 and the authorities SM v SL and AX v BX. It concluded subsections (6)/(7) are self-executing in limited contexts and that section 40(8) confers a discretion on the court hearing the in camera proceedings (here the Circuit Family Court) either on its own motion or on application by one of the parties to order disclosure where required to protect legitimate interests. It was difficult to see how such an order could properly be made without notice to the parties; section 40(8) does not clearly authorise third-party, speculative, ex parte applications by a statutory body such as Company A. The Court was not persuaded to exercise an assumed or inherent High Court jurisdiction to permit release in the circumstances presented.
3. Impact on the section 2 Order and use of the family law material: the Court acknowledged that extracts from the family law file had been relied upon by Company A and by the High Court in granting the section 2 order of 19 November 2025 and formed part of the belief evidence. Given the defective basis on which those materials were obtained, the Court applied the principles from CAB v Murphy and related authorities concerning unlawfully obtained material and the integrity of the administration of justice. The Court found it appropriate to discharge the section 2 Order and related orders rather than simply exclude references to the family law materials, because those materials had contributed to the formation of the belief relied upon and because allowing the proceedings to continue would risk significant procedural and substantive complications.
4. Remedies and ancillary matters: accordingly the Circuit Court Order was set aside, Company A's application to refer to the family law materials in these proceedings was refused, and the section 2 Order (and related liberty to issue a section 3 motion) was discharged. The Court refused the counterclaim for damages for lack of evidential support. The Court left open Company A's future entitlement to seek family law material properly under section 40 and its ability to continue investigation or to make a further section 2 application.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

• The Circuit Court Order dated 2 May 2024 is SET ASIDE.
• Company A's application to refer to the Family Law Proceedings materials in these POC proceedings is REFUSED.
• The Section 2 Order and related orders made on 19 November 2025 are DISCHARGED.
• The counterclaim for damages is refused for want of evidence.

Implications:

• The family law materials obtained on foot of the defective Circuit Court Order cannot be relied upon in these proceedings.
• Company A retains the ability to seek family law material in future but must do so in accordance with section 40 of the 2004 Act (and in conformity with procedural and constitutional protections) or by properly grounded application to the trial court; ex parte speculative applications to obtain in camera family law files are condemned in the factual circumstances of this case.
• Direct effect: the immediate orders in the proceedings are vacated and the parties are to be heard on the form of final orders and any costs consequences.

Judge: Judge Quinn