- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
M v M (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
This Supreme Court opinion concerns an appeal in which the underlying facts and procedural history were stated to have been comprehensively set out in a separate judgment of Judge Dunne, but those details were not included in the provided text. The appeal required the Court to determine the existence and territorial reach of the power of the Circuit Court and the District Court to make an Isaac Wunder order restraining abusive litigation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Circuit Court and the District Court have jurisdiction to grant an Isaac Wunder order to prevent abusive litigation by a particular litigant.
- If such jurisdiction exists, whether either court can make an Isaac Wunder order that takes effect throughout the State and outside the territorial limits of that court’s ordinary jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kirwan v. Connors [2025] IESC 21 | Article 34.1 designates the judiciary as custodian of the administration of justice, including ensuring the process is not used for oblique or abusive purposes. | Used to support the constitutional basis for courts restraining abusive litigation and to ground the Isaac Wunder jurisdiction in Article 34.1. |
| Murphy v. Greene [1990] 2 IR 566 (at 578) | Recognition/description of the Isaac Wunder jurisdiction (as referred to by McCarthy J.). | Invoked as authority illustrating the established nature of the jurisdiction and its relationship to the constitutional right of access to the courts. |
| O'Malley v. Company A, High Court, 21st January 1984 | Observation that such restraining orders would be made only in “very rare circumstances” (Costello J.). | Cited to contrast past practice with the Court’s view that oppressive litigation has become more common, supporting the practical necessity of the jurisdiction. |
| Norris v. Notice Party [1984] IR 36 (at 91) | Historical observation that court records disclosed few, if any, instances of the kind of abusive interference at which such orders are aimed (McCarthy J.). | Used to illustrate that circumstances have changed since the mid-1980s, with oppressive litigation now said to be more common. |
| Grimes v. Owners of SS Bangor Bay [1948] IR 350 | Authority for the proposition that the Circuit Court is “one Court.” | Noted as part of the jurisprudence, while emphasizing that the Circuit Court remains a court of “local and limited” jurisdiction under the Constitution. |
| The State (Boyle) v. Neylon [1986] IR 551 | Also cited for the observation that the Circuit Court is “one Court.” | Considered alongside constitutional limits, reinforcing that unity of the Circuit Court does not eliminate its local and limited character. |
| Permanent TSB plc v. Langan [2017] IESC 71, [2018] 1 IR 375 (at 397) | A “real meaning” must be given to the constitutional requirement that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is limited. | Relied upon to frame the analysis that the “local and limited” constitutional constraint must have substantive effect when assessing nationwide orders. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
(1) Existence of jurisdiction to make Isaac Wunder orders
Judge Hogan agreed with Judge Dunne that both the Circuit Court and the District Court have jurisdiction in principle to grant Isaac Wunder orders. The analysis grounded this power in Article 34.1 of the Constitution, which vests the administration of justice in the courts and obliges each court to ensure that judicial processes function efficiently and fairly and are not used abusively. The judgment treated such orders as a constitutionally permissible regulation of the right of access to the courts (also linked to Article 40.3 where necessary), aimed at preventing harassment or oppression through repeated, fruitless litigation.
The Court further considered that the increased prevalence of oppressive litigation since the mid-1980s underlines the necessity of this jurisdiction as an “indispensable feature” of the administration of justice. The judgment also endorsed the desirability of regulating the parameters of this jurisdiction by law, at minimum through rules of court (and potentially by statute).
(2) Territorial reach: local and limited jurisdiction, and the in personam / in rem distinction
Judge Hogan identified as the more difficult issue whether the Circuit Court or District Court can make an Isaac Wunder order with nationwide effect, noting that this question does not arise for the High Court given its full original jurisdiction under Article 34.3.1°. While acknowledging case law describing the Circuit Court as “one Court,” the judgment emphasized that it remains a court of “local and limited jurisdiction” for constitutional purposes (Article 34.3.4°), meaning that its jurisdiction must be bounded in some way by geography and cannot become “a localised replica of the High Court.”
The judgment reasoned that once the Circuit Court validly acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant (for example, under the allocation rules referenced in the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961), it may make in personam orders against that party that can have effect outside the court’s geographical area. This was illustrated by analogy: a court making a monetary award could, in principle, make consequential in personam restraining relief affecting assets anywhere in the State, provided the substantive criteria for such relief are met.
However, the judgment drew a sharp line against in rem orders taking effect outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction. An in rem order was characterized as one that operates generally and may affect the rights of persons not otherwise amenable to that court’s jurisdiction; permitting such an order beyond territorial limits would effectively grant the court a substantive jurisdiction it does not possess.
Applied to Isaac Wunder orders, the Circuit Court (and by extension the District Court) may make an in personam order against an offending litigant in relation to litigation of which it is properly seised and over a party within its personal jurisdiction. On the example given, if the court has jurisdiction over a defendant in the proceedings, it can restrain the plaintiff from suing that defendant anywhere in the State without prior leave. But it cannot make a general, effectively in rem-type order restraining that plaintiff from suing other persons in other circuits without leave, because that would extend to parties and matters beyond its jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court (per Judge Hogan, agreeing with Judge Dunne) affirmed that the Circuit Court and District Court have jurisdiction in principle to make Isaac Wunder orders derived from their constitutional duty under Article 34.1 to protect the administration of justice. The practical effect is that such courts may, where they have personal jurisdiction over the litigant and are seised of the relevant proceedings, make in personam restraining orders that can operate outside the court’s local area in relation to that litigant and the opposing party. The decision also clarifies that these courts cannot issue a broadly framed, general order restraining the litigant from suing other parties outside the circuit/district, as that would exceed the “local and limited” constitutional character of their jurisdiction. The opinion indicated that regulation of the jurisdiction’s parameters by rules of court (and potentially statute) would be desirable.
Alert