Anonymised Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent is a serving police officer in Company C. Multiple allegations were made against the Respondent concerning events between 2007 and 2022, including three allegations of rape from two complainants. None of the allegations produced criminal convictions or findings of misconduct under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020; investigators recorded either "no case to answer" or that the allegation had not been proved. The Respondent's Management and Recruitment Vetting clearance was withdrawn on 15 September 2023. The Respondent's internal appeal of that withdrawal was dismissed on 13 February 2024. The Respondent was referred under the Police (Performance) Regulations 2020 to a third stage meeting on 1 March 2024. The Respondent obtained judicial review in the Administrative Court, where the claim succeeded on Grounds 1–4 and the decision to withdraw vetting and to refer to a third stage meeting was quashed. The Appellant (the police commissioner) appealed. Permission to appeal was granted; two other grounds were withdrawn in light of the Police (Vetting) Regulations 2025 ("the 2025 Regulations"), leaving a single live issue concerning the interpretation of the Vetting Code's "vetting test" where prior Conduct Regulations investigations resulted in "no case to answer" or an allegation not being proved.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, when a police officer has been investigated under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 and found to have "no case to answer" or the allegation has not been proved, a subsequent vetting review under the Vetting Code may nonetheless conclude there are reasonable grounds to suspect the same conduct occurred, absent exceptional circumstances.
2. Whether this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against aspects of the Administrative Court judgment and, if so, whether it should exercise its discretion to hear the appeal given intervening regulatory changes and the passage of time.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Vetting Code's test is different in purpose and standard from misconduct proceedings: vetting is a multifactorial risk assessment, uses the "reasonable grounds for suspicion" standard, and may rely on material not admissible in misconduct proceedings.
• The Administrative Court's para 170 conclusion (that a vetting review should not, save in exceptional cases, find reasonable grounds where misconduct proceedings found no case to answer) was incorrect because it would nullify vetting reviews mandated by adverse information.
• Misconduct proceedings have temporal priority only; they do not have substantive primacy to preclude vetting consideration where reasonable suspicion may still exist.
• Specific conduct admitted by the Respondent (e.g., sexual activity in a public place) could properly be considered in vetting because it was admitted and did not require new misconduct findings.

First Interested Party (Company A) Arguments

• Vetting and misconduct decisions are taken by different decision-makers for different purposes; Company A supports the Appellant's submission that substantive primacy should not be given to misconduct findings over vetting assessments.

Second Interested Party (Company B) Position

• Company B agreed with the Appellant and Company A submissions and drew an analogy to the Supreme Court authority allowing inclusion of disputed allegations in enhanced criminal record certificates, indicating that non-proved allegations can remain relevant in other statutory schemes.

Respondent's Arguments

• The statutory misconduct procedures are the proper route to determine allegations of misconduct and provide procedural safeguards; a finding of "no case to answer" indicates insufficient evidence such that reasonable suspicion is not met.
• Where a matter has been determined under the Conduct Regulations as requiring no sanction, a vetting review should not normally reach a contrary conclusion unless there is significant new evidence, aggregation of matters not considered, or a distinct vetting-specific rationale.
• The Judge's approach allowed for exceptional cases but properly protected the primacy of misconduct findings and the associated procedural safeguards.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lake v Lake [1955] P 336	Appeal lies against a judgment or order, not merely reasons; limits to appealing findings of fact or reasons.	Used to consider whether the Appellant was seeking to appeal only reasons; Court concluded jurisdiction existed because part of the order (allowing Ground 3) was challenged.
Re B (A Child) (Split Hearings: Jurisdiction) [2000] 1 WLR 790	Whether findings could have a significant effect on parties' rights even if not in formal order.	Applied in combination with other authorities to assess appellate jurisdiction in the present case.
Cie Noga d'Importation et d'Exportation SA v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd and others ("Noga 3") [2002] EWCA Civ 1142; [2003] 1 WLR 307	If a decision could or should have been recorded in a formal order, there may be no jurisdiction to appeal separate findings.	Relied upon in the Court's assessment of whether the Appellant's challenge fell within permissible appellate scope.
Braceurself Ltd v NHS England [2023] EWCA Civ 837; [2024] 1 WLR 669	Summary of principles on appeals against reasons versus orders; factors relevant to jurisdiction.	Cited (Coulson LJ para 30) and applied to conclude this Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v Jervis [1944] AC 111	House of Lords declined to hear academic appeals where there was no issue between the parties.	Considered in deciding whether the Court should exercise discretion to hear the appeal despite intervening events.
Ainsbury v Millington [1987] 1 WLR 379	Refusal to hear academic matters on appeal.	Referenced on the discretion to decline hearing academic appeals; contrasted with public law exceptions.
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Salem [1999] 1 AC 450	Court may, in public law, hear appeals that are academic if good reason in public interest exists (subject to caution).	Authorised the Court to exercise discretion to hear the present appeal in the public interest.
R (Dolan and others) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and another [2020] EWCA Civ 1605; [2021] 1 WLR 2326	Example of Court exercising discretion to hear an academic challenge on a point of statutory construction in the public interest.	Used to support the decision to exercise discretion to hear the present appeal despite the matter's partial academic nature.
Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166	Explanation of the civil standard: in determining past events, the balance of probabilities treats more probable-than-not events as certain.	Contrasted with the lower "reasonable grounds for suspicion" standard applicable in vetting.
Shaaban bin Hussein and Others v Chong Fook Kam and another [1970] AC 942	Reasonable suspicion is not equivalent to prima facie proof; suspicion may take into account matters not admissible in evidence.	Supported the proposition that vetting's suspicion standard is different and broader than misconduct/proof standards.
Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140; [2007] QB 415	Reasonable grounds for suspicion may be based on a matrix of facts with varying probative weight; differs from deciding facts on a specified standard of proof.	Applied to show that vetting may rely on a cumulative assessment including matters not proved on balance of probabilities.
R (R) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] UKSC 47; [2018] 1 WLR 4079	It can be lawful to disclose as part of an enhanced criminal record certificate information constituting allegations of which an applicant was acquitted.	Cited by Company B to illustrate that non-proved allegations may remain relevant in other statutory contexts; Court noted its limited analogy.
R (Victor) v Chief Constable of West Mercia Police [2023] EWHC 2119; [2024] ICR 109	Held that a vetting review lawfully could result in dismissal even where misconduct proceedings had not led to dismissal.	Distinguished by the Court as not binding and factually different from the present appeal.
R (Pearce) v Parole Board [2023] UKSC 13; [2023] AC 807	When assessing future risk, a decision-maker is not compelled to rely only on facts proved on the balance of probabilities; unproven allegations may be weighed in an overall risk assessment.	Adopted as a relevant approach to risk assessment applicable to vetting's evaluative exercise.
U3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 19; [2025] AC 1510	In national security risk assessments, a matrix of items of varying probative force can justify reasonable grounds to apprehend risk without each item being proved on the balance of probabilities.	Applied analogically to support that vetting risk assessment may lawfully rely on cumulative material not proven on balance of probabilities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed jurisdiction and discretion. Applying authorities on appellate scope (including Lake v Lake and Braceurself Ltd), the Court concluded it had jurisdiction because the Appellant sought to challenge the part of the Administrative Court's order allowing Ground 3. The Court then exercised its discretion to hear the appeal as the issue raised a discrete point of statutory construction in the public interest, and was likely to affect other cases.

On the merits, the Court analysed the Vetting Code's "vetting test" and the nature of the Conduct Regulations. It emphasised the textual requirement of "reasonable grounds for suspecting" in the Vetting Code and distinguished that standard from the civil standard applied in misconduct proceedings (balance of probabilities). The Court drew on authorities (e.g. Mallett; Shaaban bin Hussein; MB; Pearce; U3) to demonstrate that reasonable suspicion is a lower and differently structured evidential inquiry than a finding of misconduct on the balance of probabilities, and that risk assessments can permissibly take account of a matrix of unproven or differently proved material.

The Court concluded that the Judge erred at para 170 by treating findings of "no case to answer" or that misconduct was not proved as generally precluding a vetting reviewer from finding reasonable grounds for suspicion except in exceptional cases. The Court explained that neither a "no case to answer" conclusion nor a finding that misconduct has not been proved is equivalent to the absence of reasonable grounds for suspicion, because the vetting exercise is evaluative, risk-focused, and may legitimately have regard to cumulative and diverse information. The Court further held that it is not necessary in principle to "pause" a vetting review whenever new matters arise so long as the vetting authority appropriately assesses risk and provides reasons; vetting and misconduct proceedings are distinct in purpose and process.

The Court took care to note the temporal and regulatory context: the 2025 Regulations were enacted after the Administrative Court judgment and introduce express provisions about withdrawal assessments and the scope for vetting authorities to consider matters previously considered under other regimes. The Court declined to pronounce on the meaning or effect of the 2025 Regulations.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED

Holding: The Court allowed the appeal, concluding that the Administrative Court Judge erred in para 170 by treating outcomes under the Conduct Regulations as generally precluding a subsequent vetting reviewer from concluding there are reasonable grounds to suspect the same conduct occurred.

Implications:

• The Court confirmed it had jurisdiction and that it was appropriate to decide the point in the public interest.
• The decision clarifies that the Vetting Code's "reasonable grounds for suspicion" test is a distinct, lower, evaluative, risk-focused standard than the balance of probabilities applied in misconduct proceedings; findings of "no case to answer" do not automatically preclude vetting consideration.
• Vetting authorities may take into account cumulative or differently admissible material in assessing risk and are not, in principle, required to pause vetting reviews to await misconduct findings, provided proper reasoned assessment is given.
• The quashing order made by the Administrative Court (withdrawal of vetting and referral to a third stage meeting) remains unaffected in practical terms by other parts of the Administrative Court's order; the Court noted the Respondent's vetting status has expired and that the 2025 Regulations now provide statutory procedural safeguards. The Court did not pronounce on the 2025 Regulations' meaning or effect.

This summary is based exclusively on the provided opinion and has been fully anonymised in accordance with the instructions.