Summary of High Court Family Law Opinion (Ex Tempore, 30 July 2025)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application under section 54 of the Adoption Act 2010 (as amended) in respect of a minor born November 2007 (the Child). The application was brought by an Applicant Agency and Applicants for adoption seeking an adoption order in favour of the Applicants for adoption and an order dispensing with any required consents. The Adoption Authority was the First Named Respondent. A Second Named Respondent was identified in the record. The Third Named Respondent, the birth father, attended the hearing and opposed the dispensing of his consent.

Proceedings were issued on 25 June with an early return date; the ex tempore judgment was delivered on 30 July 2025. The Child is due to turn 18 in November following the judgment, a fact which the Court noted as relevant to timing and fairness. The birth mother had signed an earlier form of consent that contained an error; a fresh affidavit of consent from the birth mother dated 24 July was before the Court.

The Court recorded that the Applicants for adoption had had day-to-day care of the Child since infancy and that a full care order after a contested hearing was previously granted in July 2014. The Judge also noted late affidavits filed and served the day before the hearing which he disregarded for being late.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, under section 54(2) of the Adoption Act 2010 (as amended), the Court should authorise the First Named Respondent to make an adoption order in favour of the Applicants for adoption and dispense with the consent of any person whose consent is required.
2. Whether the statutory preconditions in section 54(2A) are satisfied, namely the matters specified in subsections (a)–(f) concerning failure in parental duty over a continuous period of not less than 36 months, absence of reasonable prospect that the parents can care for the child without prejudicing safety or welfare, abandonment of parental rights, the State supplying the place of parents, custody/home requirements and proportionality of adoption as a means to supply the place of parents.
3. How to apply the best interests principle (section 19 of the Adoption Act 2010) and section 54(3) factors, including giving due weight to the views of the Child who is capable of forming them.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the matter by reference to statutory duties and the child's best interests, principally under section 19 of the Adoption Act 2010 and the statutory tests in section 54(2A) and section 54(3). The Judge stated the paramountcy of the Child's best interests while acknowledging that other factors in the statutory scheme must also be considered.

Key elements of the Court's stepwise analysis were:

• Section 19: The Court examined the Child's age and maturity (the Child is nearly 18 and described as mature but with anxiety and disengagement from formal education), physical/psychological/emotional needs (anxiety; benefits from therapies and improvement noted), the likely effect of adoption (the Child expressed a wish to be adopted and the Court found adoption likely to have a positive effect), the Child's views (two letters from the Child requesting the adoption proceed were given weight), social/intellectual/educational needs (the Child has been at home with the Applicants for adoption her whole life), upbringing and care (Applicants for adoption provided day-to-day care since infancy) and relationships with birth parents (contact with the birth father was difficult and "not working out").
• Section 54(2A)(a): The Court was satisfied on the evidence that, for a continuous period of not less than 36 months immediately preceding the application, the parents had failed in their duty towards the Child to such extent that safety or welfare was likely to be prejudicially affected. The Judge relied on a substantial file of affidavits and exhibits (approximately 160 pages) to reach this conclusion and disregarded affidavits served very late.
• Section 54(2A)(b): The Court adopted the approach from the B case that this limb concerns the concrete welfare of the particular child rather than parental capacity abstractly. Given the Child's circumstances and long-term residence with the Applicants for adoption, the Court found there was no reasonable prospect that the birth father could care for the Child without prejudicial effect to her safety or welfare; an abrupt change would be fraught with risk.
• Section 54(2A)(c): On the question of "abandonment of parental rights," the Court explained the term has a specific legal meaning (citing the cited authorities) and found that the Applicants for adoption had exercised parental rights throughout the Child's life, such that the statutory test was satisfied.
• Section 54(2A)(d) and (f): The Court held that, by reason of the failure identified, the State should supply the place of parents and that adoption by the Applicants for adoption was a proportionate means to supply that place, noting the long-term stability and status conferred by adoption and the Court's reliance on the explanatory guidance in the B case about adoption's lifelong effects.
• Section 54(2A)(e): The factual requirement that the Child was in the custody of and had a home with the Applicants for a continuous period of not less than 18 months immediately preceding the application was established on the evidence.
• Section 54(3): The Court observed it had regard to constitutional rights of the persons concerned (in particular the Third Named Respondent and the Child) and to other relevant matters. The Court gave due weight to the Child's views, having regard to age and maturity, and noted the necessity to avoid treating the hearing as a mere formality.
• Timing and fairness: The Court criticised the late timing of the application (on the cusp of the Child's majority) as undesirable and potentially unfair to an opposing parent, but found that timing did not outweigh the statutory tests and the Child's best interests in this case.
• Human considerations: The Court acknowledged conflicts of fact between the supporting affidavits and the birth father's replying affidavit and emphasised the avoidance of findings of blame. The Judge addressed the birth father directly, explaining reasons for the decision and expressing that hope remained for future improvement in the relationship between the birth father and the Child.
• ECHR and constitutional considerations: The Court noted it had regard to the jurisprudence under Article 8 ECHR and stated its view aligned with the Supreme Court's discussion in the B case (paras. 86–94). The Court also referred to Articles 37.2 and 42A of the Constitution as underpinning the legislative approach to adoption.

Holding and Implications

ORDER GRANTED: The Court authorised the making of an adoption order and dispensed with required parental consent.

Specifically, the Court made an order pursuant to section 54(2) of the Adoption Act 2010 (as amended) authorising the First Named Respondent to make an adoption order in relation to the Child (born 10 November 2007) in favour of the Applicants for adoption, and dispensed with the consent of any person whose consent was required to the making of that adoption order.

Consequences: The immediate effect is that the Applicants for adoption will be able to be regarded as the Child's legal parents for all purposes under the adoption order; the birth father remains the Child's birth father as a factual matter but his consent was dispensed with under the statutory scheme. The Court did not purport to establish novel legal precedent but applied the Supreme Court's guidance in the B case and prior authority on the meaning of "abandonment." No new, broader legal principle was announced beyond the application of existing authorities to the facts of this case.

Prepared from the ex tempore judgment delivered by Judge Jordan on 30 July 2025. This summary is strictly derived from the content of that judgment.