Anonymised Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns two consolidated appeals brought by the Appellant, a US-headquartered developer and manufacturer of two-way radio equipment (the Appellant), against the Respondent group, a foreign corporate group and two of its US subsidiaries (the Respondents). The Appellant obtained multiple judgments in a US District Court (the US Court) following jury findings of intellectual property infringement and trade-secret misappropriation. The US Court's awards included compensatory awards under two US statutes (one for copyright-related relief and one under the Defend Trade Secrets Act ("DTSA")), punitive (multiple) damages under the DTSA (twice the compensatory DTSA award), pre- and post-judgment interest, attorney fees and costs.

The Appellant commenced enforcement proceedings in the Commercial Court in England and Wales in April 2022 seeking recognition and enforcement of most of the US awards. The English court entered judgment by consent for the copyright compensatory award (the English Judgment) but stayed enforcement on terms that required the Respondent to lodge US$25 million in court. The US Court of Appeals (the USCA) partially reversed the copyright award and remanded for reassessment (the Assessment). Following the USCA decision, the Respondent applied to the English court to revoke the English Judgment (the revocation application), initially under CPR Part 3.1(7). While the revocation application was pending, a Commercial Court judge tried the Appellant's claims to enforce the US awards for interest, fees and costs and decided that the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (PTIA) section 5 precluded recovery of certain awards.

Two appeals followed: (1) the Appellant appealed the Commercial Court judge's construction of section 5 (the first appeal); (2) the Appellant appealed the deputy judge's order revoking the English Judgment under CPR Part 3.1(7) and ordering return (subject to a stay) of part of the lodged security (the second appeal). The appellate court heard argument and remade the deputy judge's decisions under CPR Part 40.8A.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether section 5 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 precludes enforcement in England and Wales of only the additional (multiple/punitive) element of a foreign judgment for "multiple damages", or whether it precludes enforcement of the entire award (including the compensatory element and related ancillary sums such as interest, attorney fees and costs).
2. Whether the English court has power to revoke or vary a final English judgment entered to enforce a foreign judgment where the foreign judgment has been overturned or varied on appeal, and specifically whether such an application should properly be made under CPR Part 3.1(7) (case management power) or CPR Part 40.8A (modern analogue of auditâ querelâ), and how any revocation or stay should be ordered in the interim while foreign proceedings remain ongoing.
3. Whether the Appellant should be permitted to amend its claim on appeal to seek enforcement of the DTSA compensatory award it had not pursued below.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant argued that section 5 of the PTIA should be construed so as to bar enforcement only of the multiple/punitive element of a foreign multiple damages award, but not the compensatory element. On that construction, related ancillary awards (interest, fees and costs) could be enforced to the extent attributable to the compensatory element.
• The Appellant challenged the deputy judge's use of CPR Part 3.1(7) to revoke the English Judgment and argued that revocation was a rare step inconsistent with finality; if revocation were permissible, it should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and not routinely whenever a foreign judgment was overturned on appeal.
• Procedurally, the Appellant argued (in the first appeal context) that it should be permitted to amend on appeal to seek enforcement of the DTSA compensatory award that it had not pursued at trial in the Commercial Court.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent contended that section 5 precluded enforcement of the whole of the DTSA award (both the compensatory and punitive elements) and that ancillary awards (interest, fees and costs) awarded as part of or ancillary to a section 5(3) multiple damages judgment were likewise unenforceable because they were "any sum payable under" such a judgment.
• On the revocation application, the Respondent submitted that it was appropriate to set aside the English Judgment given the USCA decision that substantially reduced and remitted part of the US award to the US Court for reassessment, and that revocation could be justified under CPR Part 3.1(7). In any event, the Respondent argued that relief could be obtained under the relevant CPR powers and that revocation did not offend finality on these facts.
• The Respondent also sought the return of the security lodged under the earlier stay order (subject to any stay pending appeal) and maintained that keeping substantial sums in court was not necessary once the underlying foreign award had been overturned in part.

Table of Precedents Cited

The opinion cites multiple authorities. Each precedent below is anonymised and summarises the aspect of the authority relied upon or its treatment in the opinion. (Where the opinion did not extract a specific rule or did not meaningfully apply the authority, the table records that limitation rather than inventing analysis.)

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Company A v. Company B ([2018] EWHC 3452) (referred to as "SAS")	Authority where Cockerill J analysed section 5 and concluded that enforcement of a multiple damages judgment was precluded in the manner adopted there.	The court treated Cockerill J's conclusion in that decision as persuasive and followed SAS as a template for construing section 5, while noting it would not endorse every aspect of Cockerill J's reasoning.
Company C v. Company D ([2008] EWHC 1878) (referred to as "Lucasfilm")	Mann J's obiter analysis that interpreted section 5 as not depriving enforcement of the compensatory element of a multiple damages award.	The court identified Mann J's view as out of line with the majority of authorities and rejected that obiter reasoning, preferring the contrary construction.
Company E v. Company F ([1984] QB 142 / [1985] AC 58) (referred to as "British Airways")	Parker J (and approval in the House of Lords) as authority discussing the scope of section 5 and the rationale for barring enforcement of certain foreign multiple damages judgments.	The court cited this authority as supporting a broad construction of section 5 and the policy rationale against enforcing certain foreign punitive or multiple awards.
Company G v. Company H ([2013] CSOH 162) (referred to as "Service Temps")	Outer House dicta (Lord Hodge) on the rationale similar to British Airways regarding enforcement and penal character.	The court cited the passage as additional support for the statutory purpose underpinning section 5.
Person I v. Person J ([2003] EWCA Civ 1758 / [2004] 1 WLR 692) (referred to as "Lewis")	Court of Appeal treatment on whether a separate compensatory award can be enforced where a multiple damages award is present, and the approach to identifying separable constituents.	The court described Lewis as not supporting the Appellant's construction; Lewis allows enforceability of a separately identifiable compensatory award but does not assist when the components cannot be separably identified.
Company K v. Person L ([2022] EWHC 3265) (referred to as "Hangzhou Juidang")	Deputy judge's earlier discussion relevant to section 5.	The court noted the decision as consistent with the broader line of authority supporting the construction adopted here.
Person M v. Person N ([1911] 2 KB 93) (referred to as "Raulin")	Authority where an English court enforced civil compensatory relief pronounced in criminal proceedings abroad.	The court considered Raulin but concluded it did not assist the present statutory construction issue.
Person O v. Person P ((1843) 3 Hare 100) (referred to as "Henderson v Henderson")	Principles about abuse of process and finality relevant to late amendments and related procedural objections.	The court noted the Appellant's amendment request would be barred by section 5 irrespective of Henderson principles, so it did not decide the abuse question.
Person Q v. Person R (15 App Cas 1) (referred to as "Nouvion")	House of Lords authority addressing historic writ of auditâ querelâ and enforcement of foreign judgments not finally settled abroad.	The court relied on the historical discussion to explain CPR Part 40.8A as the modern analogue permitting post-judgment relief where matters have arisen since the original order.
Person S v. Entity T ([2009] EWCA Civ 444 / [2010] 1 WLR 487) (referred to as "Roult")	Court of Appeal guidance that CPR Part 3.1(7) cannot be a power to rehear or hear an appeal from a judge's own final order and that final orders should remain unless proper appeal grounds exist.	The court cited Roult to support the proposition that CPR Part 3.1(7) is limited and should not routinely be used to revoke final orders where a specific statutory route exists.
Person U v. Company V ([2012] EWCA Civ 518 / [2012] 1 WLR 2591) (referred to as "Tibbles")	Authority showing CPR Part 3.1(7) is broad but subject to principles of finality and rare use to vary final orders.	The court relied on Tibbles to emphasise that CPR Part 3.1(7) should rarely be used to reopen final orders and to identify typical circumstances permitting its use.
Person W v. Company X ([2018] EWCA Civ 2422) (referred to as "Terry")	Further Court of Appeal guidance limiting CPR Part 3.1(7) and noting that finality normally precludes variation of final orders.	The opinion cited Terry as emphasising that setting aside final judgments under CPR Part 3.1(7) is "wholly exceptional".
Company Y v. Company Z ([2023] EWCA Civ 113 / [2023] RPC 10) (referred to as "Vodafone")	Court of Appeal decision that CPR Part 3.1(7) should not be used to discharge sealed final orders where a specific CPR route exists.	The court cited Vodafone to reinforce that CPR Part 3.1(7) is not an appropriate substitute where other specific powers (e.g. under Part 52 or Part 40.8A) apply.
Company AA v. Company BB ([2025] EWCA Civ 99 / [2025] 1 WLR 2321) (referred to as "UniCredit")	Recent Court of Appeal discussion about when CPR Part 3.1(7) can be used to vary or revoke final anti-suit injunctions; noted the limited circumstances for such use.	The court observed UniCredit but distinguished on the facts; UniCredit involved an applicant seeking to revoke an order it had obtained, and so did not displace the primacy of Part 40.8A in the present context.
Company CC v. Person DD ([2017] EWCA Civ 55 / [2017] 1 WLR 3069) (referred to as "Michael Wilson")	Illustration of the appropriate CPR rule for stays and the relevance of CPR Part 83.7.	The court referred to Michael Wilson in discussing the proper rules for seeking and granting stays (distinguishing Part 3.1 powers from Part 83.7 and Part 40.8A).
Person EE v. Person FF ([2018] EWHC 3261) (referred to as "Raja")	Case cited in notes to CPR Part 40.8A; the opinion recorded it but said it provided limited assistance.	The court noted Raja had been cited but derived little assistance from it for the present issues.
Company GG v. Entity HH ([2022] UKSC 16 / [2022] 1 WLR 3223) (referred to as "AIC")	Supreme Court consideration of finality and CPR Part 3.1(7) in the context of staying enforcement of a foreign arbitration award; emphasised the weight of finality but recognised scope for revocation in particular circumstances.	The court relied on AIC for the proposition that judges should give significant weight to finality but must evaluate contextually; AIC supported careful scrutiny before revoking final orders.
Person II v. Person JJ ([2022] EWHC 3258) (referred to as "Moss")	Commercial Court analysis of interplay between various CPR powers for stay/revocation where foreign proceedings are ongoing.	The court referenced Moss to note the judge's awareness of CPR Parts 40.8A and 83.7 and differing outcomes based on material facts; Moss did not determine the present points.
Company KK v. Person LL (Pace Europe) ([2012] EWHC 852) (referred to as "Pace Europe")	Deputy judge (HHJ Purle) described Mann J's Lucasfilm reasoning as compelling though not applied.	The opinion recorded Pace Europe as having endorsed Mann J's obiter reasoning, but the appellate court in the present case declined to follow that line.
Entity MM v. Person NN (Hackney LBC v Findlay) (referred to in authorities)	Example where CPR-like powers may be invoked to set aside orders made where a defendant did not attend.	The court cited the example as illustrating rare circumstances where finality yields, consistent with other authorities cautioning against routine use of Part 3.1(7).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court divided its analysis between the two appeals and proceeded to explain its reasoning under a number of heads. The analysis is confined to the material and legal reasoning expressed in the opinion.

Construction of section 5 PTIA (First Appeal)

1. Statutory language and context: The court analysed section 5(1)-(3) and section 6 of the PTIA. It emphasised that section 5 broadly bars enforcement in the United Kingdom of "any sum payable" under a qualifying overseas judgment (including judgments defined as "an amount arrived at by doubling, trebling or otherwise multiplying a sum assessed as compensation"). The court held that the statutory language plainly treats the whole "amount arrived at" as the judgment for multiple damages.
2. Interaction with section 6: The court relied on section 6(2) to show that Parliament contemplated the compensatory element being part of the multiple damages judgment for some purposes (section 6 provides a limited clawback entitlement to qualifying defendants as to the part attributable to compensation). The court reasoned that the structure of sections 5 and 6 indicates that the compensatory multiplicand is considered part of the multiple damages judgment and that section 5 should therefore bar enforcement of the whole award.
3. Policy and purpose: The court rejected the Appellant's submission that section 5 was aimed only at enforcement of penal or punitive elements. It held that a total bar (including compensatory parts) furthers the statutory purpose by discouraging claimants from seeking multiple damages and by ensuring English courts do not assist enforcement that would permit recovery of the punitive element abroad via piecemeal enforcement.
4. Authorities: The court reviewed authorities and textbooks and concluded that the weight of authority and commentary supported treatment of the entire amount as unrecoverable under section 5. It considered and rejected Mann J's obiter reasoning in Lucasfilm as inconsistent with the statutory text and supporting authorities.
5. Ancillary sums: The court held that ancillary awards (interest, attorney fees and costs) that were awarded as part of, or ancillary to, a multiple damages judgment covered by section 5 were likewise barred because section 5(1) precludes recovery of "any sum payable under" a qualifying judgment and because the awards could not be separated out as referable only to a claim not caught by section 5.

Revocation / Stay of the English Judgment (Second Appeal)

1. Correct procedural route: The court determined that the revocation application should have been made under CPR Part 40.8A (the modern analogue of auditâ querelâ), which expressly permits a party "against whom a judgment has been given or an order made" to apply for a stay or other relief on the ground of matters occurring since the judgment. CPR Part 3.1(7) is a case-management power and should not normally be used to revoke final orders where Part 40.8A is applicable.
2. Deputy judge's error: Because the deputy judge had exercised the wrong power (CPR Part 3.1(7)), his revocation of the English Judgment could not stand. The court explained that Part 3.1(7) can rarely be invoked to reopen final orders and should not be treated as interchangeable with Part 40.8A.
3. Remaking the decision: The court considered whether to remit or to remake the deputy judge's decision. The parties were neutral and the appellate court had the materials to decide. The court remade the decision under CPR Part 40.8A.
4. Substantive outcome under Part 40.8A: The court concluded that revocation of the English Judgment was not appropriate at the present interim stage while the Assessment in the US remained outstanding. The court explained that (a) revocation would be premature pending the outcome of the remand/Assessment and any potential further appeals; (b) repeated grant and revocation of final judgments would be undesirable; and (c) English law ordinarily allows enforcement of a foreign final first-instance judgment while that judgment is under appeal abroad, subject to appropriate stays.
5. Security and stay terms: The court considered the deputy judge's reasoning for retaining a reduced security sum of US$20 million in court and concluded that, on the material available and given the expected size of any reassessed copyright award, it was appropriate to continue the stay with US$20 million remaining in court pending the Assessment and any future changes in circumstances. The court granted liberty to apply for variation after the Assessment or upon changed circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

• First Appeal: The appellate court dismissed the first appeal and upheld the Commercial Court judge's construction of section 5 PTIA: section 5 precludes enforcement in the UK of the whole of a foreign judgment for multiple damages as defined in section 5(3), including the compensatory element, and accordingly bars enforcement of ancillary awards (interest, attorney fees and costs) that are "sums payable under" such a judgment where they cannot be apportioned to amounts outside section 5.
• Second Appeal: The court allowed the second appeal, reversed the deputy judge's revocation of the English Judgment made under CPR Part 3.1(7), and remade the decision under CPR Part 40.8A by declining to revoke the English Judgment at this stage but continuing a stay of execution with US$20 million to remain in court pending the Assessment and with liberty to apply on changed circumstances.

Implications

• Direct effect on the parties: The Appellant cannot, as matters stand, enforce the DTSA compensatory and punitive awards or the ancillary sums (interest, fees and costs) in England because section 5 bars enforcement of the entire multiple damages judgment and those ancillary sums are sums payable under it and were not separably attributable to an unenjoined claim. The English Judgment for the copyright award is not revoked at present; it remains stayed on terms that US$20 million remains in court pending the Assessment.
• Procedure on revocation: Applications to set aside or vary final English judgments entered to enforce foreign judgments where events have occurred since the English order ought ordinarily to be made under CPR Part 40.8A rather than under CPR Part 3.1(7). Part 3.1(7) is a residual case-management power that should not be used as a substitute for Part 40.8A where the latter is available.
• Wider precedent: The court reached its statutory construction by reference to the statutory text, purpose and supporting authorities. The decision clarifies the court's approach to section 5 in the presented circumstances; the summary above states the direct consequences for the parties in this case based on the opinion's reasoning.

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Note on anonymisation: All personal names and corporate party names from the original opinion have been replaced with generic placeholders (e.g., "Appellant", "Respondent", "Judge [Last Name]", "Attorney [Last Name]", "Company A", "Company B") throughout this summary in order to comply with the requirement for systematic anonymisation and to preserve consistency.