Anonymized Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment concerns two appellants who appealed (with leave) against their joint conviction by a jury on Count 1 of an indictment alleging: holding a person in slavery or servitude contrary to section 1(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The factual core is that between January 2016 and September 2020 the two appellants were alleged to have held a vulnerable adult (the victim) in slavery or servitude. The victim had significant physical disabilities and required close personal care.

The appellants were convicted on Count 1 and of a number of other offences arising from the same facts. Verdicts were returned on 12 May 2023 and sentencing took place on 14 July 2023. On Count 1 each appellant was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment (concurrent to other counts); other convictions produced a total term of 9 years for each appellant, ordered to run concurrently with the 11-year term. The appellants sought leave to appeal the convictions and applications for leave to appeal against sentence. The single judge referred the leave applications against sentence to the full court; the present judgment deals with the appeal against conviction on Count 1 and the leave applications against sentence.

At trial there were pre-trial and mid-trial submissions: an application to dismiss Count 1, a submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution case, and submissions that the count was duplicitous and should be split. Two trial judges considered the submissions at different stages and gave reasoned decisions which are referred to in this judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether it was lawful to leave to the jury the possibility of convicting if they were not satisfied that the prosecution had established "slavery" but were sure that they had established "servitude", particularly where the victim did not perform work or services for the accused.
2. Whether section 1(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 creates one offence (capable of being committed in closely related ways) or two distinct offences (one of slavery and one of servitude) for the purposes of duplicity and jury directions.
3. What is the proper legal definition of "in slavery" for the purposes of section 1(1)(a) of the 2015 Act?
4. Whether there was evidence of slavery, as properly defined, fit to go to the jury.
5. If leaving servitude as an alternative to slavery was wrong, whether the evidence of slavery was so overwhelming that any error was harmless.
6. Whether, independently of the above, there was a technical defect (duplicity) in Count 1 that requires quashing.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant 1's Arguments

• The evidence did not establish that the victim was held in slavery or servitude.
• The trial judge wrongly directed the jury on the legal definitions of slavery and servitude.
• The count was duplicitous and should have been split into separate counts for slavery and servitude.
• The central factual question is what is meant by "slavery" and "servitude" when the victim performed no work or services.

Appellant 2's Arguments

• The application to dismiss Count 1 should have succeeded.
• The submission of no case to answer on Count 1 should have succeeded.
• The judge's directions to the jury on Count 1 were flawed.
• Unlike Appellant 1, duplicity was not pleaded as a ground by Appellant 2, but the other challenges were advanced.

Prosecution Case (as summarised in the judgment)

• The prosecution alleged that the appellants coerced and controlled the victim, isolated him from family, manipulated his communications with carers and social services, and thereby deprived him of autonomy so that they could preserve the continued employment of the carer, provide a home to one appellant and use the victim's money to fund their lifestyle.
• The prosecution relied on the Modern Slavery Act 2015's definitions and factors and on a body of messages and witness evidence to link the conduct to the statutory concepts of slavery and servitude.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court in this Judgment
R v Appellant (Brown) (1983) 79 Cr App R 115	Origin of the "Brown direction" — a direction to ensure juror unanimity where alternative factual bases are pleaded within a single count.	The judge had given a Brown direction; the court analysed whether that direction was appropriate in the present context and concluded it was not required here.
R v Appellant K [2011] EWCA Crim 1691	Domestic Court of Appeal analysis adopting definitions from the ECtHR (Siliadin) about slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour.	The court treated K as authoritative for construing Article 4 concepts and followed its incorporation of Siliadin definitions when analysing the meanings of slavery and servitude under the 2015 Act.
Individual v The State (Siliadin) (2006) 43 EHRR 16	ECtHR definitions: "slavery" as the status where powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised; "servitude" as an obligation to provide services imposed by coercion.	The court relied on Siliadin (as applied in K) to explain the hierarchy between slavery, servitude and forced labour and to inform the construction of the 2015 Act in accordance with Article 4.
Rantsev v The State and The State [2010] ECHR 22	Reinforcement of distinctions: servitude/forced labour may exist where slavery does not; forced labour involves constraint and overriding of will.	Cited as a restatement of the Siliadin approach and to show that servitude/forced labour can be found where slavery is not established.
Van Droogenbroeck v The State (Commission report 1980)	Servitude can include obligation to live on another's property and impossibility of changing status; helps define servitude's elements.	Referenced via K as part of the European jurisprudential material explaining servitude.
Seguin v The State	Linked to concept of servitude in ECtHR jurisprudence.	Referenced in discussion of servitude as part of Article 4 case law.
Van der Mussele v The State (23 November 1983)	Forced or compulsory labour requires some physical or mental constraint and an overriding of the person's will.	Cited to clarify the lower end of the hierarchy (forced labour) and its distinguishing features.
R v Rooney and others [2019] EWCA Crim 681	Consideration of section 3 of the 2015 Act and clarification that new provisions were intended to clarify rather than change the law.	Used to support the view that section 3 clarifies circumstances relevant to exploitation but does not expand "servitude" beyond cases involving services.
R v Grout [2011] EWCA Crim 299	Illustrates the rule against duplicity where one count pleaded multiple different offences/facts leading to unsafe conviction.	Used to explain when multiple allegations in one count can render a conviction unsafe and to contrast that with how section 1(1)(a) should be treated.
DPP v Merriman [1973] AC 584	Principles concerning the rule against duplicity and charging of connected acts in one count.	Cited for the practical approach to duplicity and to contextualise whether section 1(1)(a) creates one or two offences for indictment purposes.
R v Mitchell [1994] Crim LR 66	Authority discussed in relation to when a Brown direction is appropriate.	Referenced among cases that consider the limited circumstances for giving Brown directions.
R v Chilvers [2021] EWCA Crim 1311	Sets out the narrow circumstances in which a Brown direction should be given; emphasises that such directions are comparatively rare.	The court followed Chilvers in concluding that a Brown direction was not required in the present case.
Giannetto (Kennedy LJ cited)	Cited in Chilvers as part of the jurisprudence about jury unanimity and Brown directions.	Referred to as authority supporting the limited circumstances for Brown directions; relied upon indirectly via Chilvers.
Other cases cited in Chilvers (Smith; Boreman; Carr; D)	Examples of cases where Brown directions have been considered or given.	Listed as examples in Chilvers to illustrate situations warranting a Brown direction; used to show that those situations are comparatively rare.
Guide on Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Court publication)	Authoritative exposition of Article 4 and ECtHR case law (including Siliadin and related authorities).	Referenced as a source that sets out the definitions and approach to Article 4 which the court considered relevant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed a sequence of interrelated legal points which it had reformulated into six questions (see Legal Issues Presented). The analysis proceeded by reference to the statutory text, the requirement in section 1(2) of the 2015 Act to construe section 1(1) in accordance with Article 4 ECHR, and relevant authorities (principally the ECtHR in Siliadin and domestic authority in R v K and later decisions).

1. Servitude and the requirement of services: The court held that the trial judge erred in leaving servitude as an alternative basis on which the jury might convict where there was no evidence that the victim had provided work or services. The judge at trial relied on section 1(4)(b) and section 3(5)/(6) to treat benefits flowing to the appellants as if they could amount to "services". The court concluded that those provisions only apply where work or services are being provided and that servitude, as understood in ECtHR case law and adopted in domestic authority, requires the provision of services under coercion. Accordingly, paragraph 26 of the trial judge's directions (which suggested services could be established by the provision of benefits alone) was a misdirection and unclear.

2. Whether section 1(1)(a) creates one or two offences and the Brown direction: The court preferred to treat section 1(1)(a) as creating a single offence (holding a person in slavery or servitude) that may be committed in closely related ways rather than two separate offences. The court rejected the trial judge's decision to give a Brown direction in this case, following the restrictive approach set out in Chilvers. Because servitude required services and there was no evidence of services here, leaving servitude in play risked a conviction on a basis for which there was no evidence.

3. Definition of slavery: The court engaged with the difficulty of applying the "classic" definition from the 1927 Slavery Convention and Siliadin (which speaks of powers attaching to the right of ownership) to domestic criminal law where legal ownership of a person cannot exist. The court concluded that the essence of slavery, for the purposes of the 2015 Act, should be expressed as the domination of another person's life such that they are deprived of any real personal autonomy. Slavery is a change in the victim's status from being free to exercise choice to being subject in important matters to the will of another. The court recommended that jury directions should emphasise the effect on personal autonomy and tailor the definition to the facts of the case.

4. Application to the facts and safety of the conviction: The court considered the evidence and concluded that, although there was evidence on which a properly directed jury could have found slavery, the errors in the judge's directions (both in relation to servitude and the definition of slavery) meant the convictions on Count 1 were unsafe. The court was not satisfied that the evidence of slavery was so overwhelming as to render harmless the errors that had been made. Consequently, the convictions on Count 1 would be quashed.

5. Duplicity: Having concluded that section 1(1)(a) should be treated as creating a single offence, and given the other defects, the court held that no separate duplicity ruling was required to determine the outcome. Even if duplicity had been arguable, the substantial misdirection concerning servitude made the point academic.

6. Sentencing and retrial: The court examined the consequences of quashing Count 1 for sentencing. With Count 1 quashed, the remaining convictions produced aggregate sentences of nine years in each appellant's case. The court dismissed the leave applications against those sentences: it found the nine-year totals were not manifestly excessive on the facts. It also refused the prosecution's application under section 7 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 for a retrial on Count 1, concluding that (a) Count 1 added little materially to the factual basis of sentence already reflected in the remaining convictions, (b) the evidence of slavery, while sufficient for a jury to consider, was not overwhelming, and (c) the prosecution had ample opportunity to present its case at trial and to assist the trial judge with directions but failed to prevent the errors. In the circumstances the court concluded the interests of justice did not require a retrial.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that the convictions on Count 1 (holding a person in slavery or servitude contrary to section 1(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015) are unsafe and will be quashed. Applications for leave to appeal against the remaining sentences (total 9 years in each case) were dismissed. The court refused an order for retrial on Count 1.

Implications:

• Direct effect on the parties: The convictions on Count 1 will be quashed, reducing the sentences that remain in force to a total of nine years' imprisonment for each appellant (these sentences were dismissed on leave to appeal against sentence). No retrial on Count 1 will be ordered in the circumstances of this case.
• Legal guidance: The judgment clarifies that "servitude" in the relevant Article 4 sense requires the provision of services under coercion and that section 3(5)/(6) of the 2015 Act do not expand "servitude" to cover cases where no services are provided. The court emphasised that "slavery" for the statute should be directed in terms of domination and deprivation of personal autonomy, tailored to the facts of the case, rather than focusing only on metaphors of ownership.
• Precedential effect: The court did not suggest a novel rule that departs from authoritative ECtHR and domestic authority; rather it reconciled the statutory text with Article 4 jurisprudence and provided guidance about jury directions and the narrow circumstances for Brown directions. The court noted that the 2015 Act intended to clarify the law but that care is required when applying servitude to facts where no work or services are provided.

Note: All personal names and identifying details in this summary have been replaced with generic placeholders to preserve anonymity in accordance with the instruction set. This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.