Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, a general practitioner working in a medical practice in The City during the 1980s and 1990s, was the subject of complaints relating to conduct during examinations of female patients. Company A issued a press release after those complaints. The Appellant first stood trial in February 2023 on an eight-count indictment alleging indecent assault against six women; the jury returned one not guilty verdict, were unable to agree on seven counts and were discharged. Following a further press release by Company A, the Appellant was retried in October 2024 on a sixteen-count indictment alleging indecent assault contrary to section 14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (the law in force at the dates of the alleged conduct).

The counts alleged misconduct against seven women (identified in the trial as C1–C7), spanning a variety of acts including touching of breasts and nipples, digital penetration (counts that would be charged today as assault by penetration), rubbing an alleged victim's back and thigh (one victim aged no more than 14), and pressing an erect penis against a complainant's hand (allegedly through clothing in some instances). At trial the Prosecution relied on the complainants' evidence (live and by ABE interview), family members' evidence and expert evidence from a GP about the nature of medical examinations. The defence denied the allegations, relied on an alibi for one charge, led expert evidence broadly aligned with aspects of the Prosecution expert's evidence, and the Appellant gave evidence.

At the end of the October 2024 trial the Appellant was convicted on counts 4–8 and 10–16 and acquitted on counts 1–3 and 9. At sentencing the trial judge (Judge Thornton) imposed a total sentence of 22 years' imprisonment for twelve counts of indecent assault. The Appellant was represented by Attorney Rawlinson on the appeal against sentence and conducted his own renewal application for leave to appeal convictions. Leave to appeal sentence was granted by the single judge; leave to appeal conviction was refused by the single judge and that refusal was renewed before the court in these proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the total sentence of 22 years was just and proportionate, including (a) whether the judge erred in imposing consecutive sentences (in particular making the sentence on count 6 consecutive to count 4) and (b) whether the starting points adopted were excessive given the maximum sentence at the time of the offending and the current guidelines.
2. Whether the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of totality adequately in arriving at the aggregate sentence.
3. Whether leave to appeal the convictions should be granted — specifically whether the convictions were unsafe because the jury allegedly failed to follow directions, applied an incorrect standard of proof, or ignored explanations raising reasonable doubt.
4. Whether an extension of time should be allowed for renewing the application to appeal conviction (raised but not required to be decided given the court's view on the merits).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (via Attorney Rawlinson) Arguments on Sentence

• Where consecutive sentences are imposed there should be a downward adjustment; no such downward adjustment was made here.
• The judge applied the current guideline starting points too mechanically and should have scaled down the starting points for counts 4 and 16 to reflect the lower maximum sentence applicable at the time of the offending.
• Imposing consecutive sentences for multiple offences against the same victim (C1) was wrong in principle because they were similar offences against the same complainant and the starting point for the most serious offence against that complainant was already inflated.
• The judge failed to give sufficient weight to the undisputed fact that C1 continued to attend the Appellant's practice for many years, suggesting the encounters were not wholly improper.
• Some incidents were brief and resembled genuine medical examinations; the judge double-counted breach of trust already reflected in categorisation; overall the sentence was manifestly excessive and a sentence around 15 years would have been just and proportionate.

Appellant's Arguments on Conviction (Renewed Application for Leave)

• The jury did not follow the judge's directions in assessing evidence for each count and may have applied a civil standard of proof rather than the criminal standard.
• Some events could not have occurred on dates when the Appellant was present (alibi issues) or there was a probability of confusion of consultations, undermining certain complainants' accounts.
• The presence of not guilty verdicts on some counts undermines the reliability of complainants and demonstrates inconsistent verdicts.
• Convictions relied on testimony alone that was said to be unreliable, contradicted or not supported by contemporaneous records.

Prosecution's Trial Case (as described in the opinion)

• The Appellant used his position as a GP to sexually assault seven patients under the guise of routine medical examinations.
• Evidence relied upon included the complainants' live and ABE interview evidence, family members' evidence, and expert evidence from a GP about the conduct of breast and vaginal examinations and assessment of the complainants' accounts.

Defence Case at Trial (as described)

• Denial that the events complained of occurred; alibi for one count; expert evidence broadly aligned with prosecution expert on the appropriate conduct of examinations; Appellant gave evidence in his defence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v H and Others [2011] EWCA Crim 2753	Guidance that where the maximum sentence at the time of offending was lower than the current maximum, starting points and category ranges should be adjusted in a measured way for historic offences.	The court applied this authority to confirm that sentencing must reflect the maximum sentence at the time of offending and that any scaling down of modern guideline starting points must be measured. The judge's decision not to reduce the starting point was analysed against this principle and found not to be an error of principle given the circumstances.
R v Forbes [2016] EWCA Crim 1388	Support for the approach to adjusting modern guideline starting points and ranges for historic offences.	Used alongside R v H to justify the court's approach to assessing whether the trial judge had properly adjusted starting points for offences committed when a lower maximum sentence applied.
R v Bailey [2020] EWCA Crim 1719	Principles on totality: when sentencing for multiple offences the overall sentence should be just and proportionate; whether totality has been applied is a question of substance not form.	The court relied on this authority in assessing whether the sentencing judge had achieved a just and proportionate aggregate sentence and in explaining how appellate review should identify whether totality has been properly applied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by restating the governing approach for historic sexual offending: the offender must be sentenced within the sentencing regime and maximum penalty applicable at the date of the offence, while allowing measured reference to modern guidelines. Where the modern maximum exceeds the historic maximum, modern starting points and ranges may be adjusted downwards in a measured way (R v H; R v Forbes).

The court analysed the sentencing judge's categorisation of offences. Counts 4 and 16 were treated as the most serious (assault by penetration) and appropriately placed in category 2A under the current guidelines with a starting point of 8 years and a range of 5–13 years. The Appellant submitted the judge should have scaled down that 8-year starting point to reflect the lower historic maximum; the judge had, however, expressly considered scaling down and declined to do so because the high degree of trust in a doctor-patient relationship justified an increased starting point. The court found no error of principle in that approach.

The court considered whether consecutive sentences were justified. Counts 4 and 16 were committed 7–9 years apart and against different women; the judge was therefore entitled to order consecutive sentences for those counts, and each sentence remained below the 10-year maximum applicable at the time of offending. The court also addressed the complaint that count 6 should not have been made consecutive to count 4 because they were similar offences against the same victim (C1). The sentencing judge had concluded that the count 4 offence required an uplift to reflect contemporaneous conduct and the Appellant's repeated conduct over a period; the court accepted that different structuring options were possible but identified the core appellate issue as whether the aggregate sentence was just and proportionate.

On totality, the court observed that this is a question of substance. The sentencing judge had presided over two trials and was well placed to assess the appropriate sentence. The court recognised the length of the sentence but concluded it was not manifestly excessive given the repeated nature of the offending over nearly a decade, the breach of trust, vulnerability of complainants (including one aged no more than 14), the two instances of digital penetration and the overall serious impacts on victims.

Regarding the renewed application for leave to appeal conviction, the court adopted the single judge's reasoning. The single judge had found no basis to conclude the jury had misapplied the burden of proof, had been unjustifiably inconsistent, or had failed to follow directions. The jury were entitled to accept the complainants' evidence and reject the Appellant's account; their mixed verdicts were not of themselves an indication of unsafety. The court agreed with the single judge and added nothing further.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSITION: The appeal against sentence is dismissed; the renewed application for leave to appeal the convictions is refused; the application for an extension of time to renew the application is refused.

Implications:

• The Appellant's aggregate sentence of 22 years' imprisonment stands as imposed by the trial judge.
• The court affirmed that historic sexual offences must be sentenced within the maximum penalties applicable at the time of commission, with measured reference to modern guidelines and appropriate adjustment where necessary; no new legal principle was established beyond the application of existing authorities cited in the opinion.
• No leave to appeal conviction was granted; the jury's verdicts were held to be within the ambit of reasonable evaluative choices based on the evidence.

This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion and contains no information beyond that source.