Muldoon, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by the Attorney General for leave to refer a sentence as unduly lenient. The Defendant, aged 24, was prosecuted for murder and attempted murder arising from an incident on 26 November 2024 in which the Defendant drove a vehicle (Vehicle A) into or in pursuit of an e-motorbike being ridden by Victim B with Victim A as a passenger. At the start of trial the Defendant pleaded guilty to causing death by dangerous driving and causing serious injury by dangerous driving; the Defendant had already pleaded guilty at a preliminary hearing to driving whilst disqualified. On 19 June 2025 the Defendant was acquitted by the jury of murder and attempted murder. On 22 August 2025 the Defendant was sentenced for the guilty pleas: for causing death by dangerous driving (count 2) 5 years and 3 months' imprisonment; for causing serious injury by dangerous driving (count 5) 27 months' imprisonment concurrent; and for driving whilst disqualified (count 6) 1 month concurrent. The overall custodial term was therefore 5 years and 3 months. The Defendant was disqualified from driving for a total of 12 years and 6 months (a discretionary period of 10 years and an extension period of 2 years and 6 months pursuant to section 35A of the Road Traffick Act 1988), with concurrent disqualifications on the other counts.

Factual findings made by the trial judge (after hearing four weeks of evidence and some limited CCTV and expert evidence) were that: the e-motorbikes were not road-legal and were not designed for two persons; the Defendant was parked in a lay-by on a rural lane and, after lights were shone into Vehicle A, drove out, followed the e-motorbikes over dark, narrow country roads for just over one mile in a pursuit lasting 2 minutes 20 seconds, and repeatedly drove close to the e-motorbike ridden by Victim B in order to frighten the riders. The trial judge found that the Defendant carried out a dangerous undertaking manoeuvre on a narrow country lane in darkness and that this caused Victim B to lose control of the e-motorbike, resulting in Victim A's fatal injuries and Victim B sustaining life-changing injuries. The trial judge also found that the Defendant left the scene knowing there had been a collision, attempted to avoid capture by arranging disposal of Vehicle A and by seeking to implicate a relative, and made false statements to police. The trial judge found a diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality disorder but rejected that it reduced culpability.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether leave should be granted under section 36 Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer the sentence as unduly lenient.
2. Whether, for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving, the Defendant's culpability should be categorised as category A (highest culpability) rather than category B, given the trial judge's factual findings.
3. Whether the trial judge erred in law or fell into gross error in applying the offence-specific sentencing guideline starting points and adjustments (including aggravating and mitigating factors and the guilty plea reduction) to reach the sentence imposed.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney General's Arguments

• The trial judge erred in placing the offending in culpability category B when, on his own factual findings, the offending exhibited factors characteristic of category A: a deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard the risk of danger to others; a prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of dangerous driving; and an obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre.
• The identified aggravating factors warranted an upward adjustment in seriousness; although there were mitigating factors they could not reduce the sentence below the category A range.
• On the facts found by the trial judge, the appropriate starting point should have been 12 years (the guideline starting point for category A) rather than 6 years (category B).

Defendant's Arguments

• The jury's acquittal of murder and attempted murder and the evidence heard required the trial judge to assess carefully what he could be sure of; the judge was entitled to reach the factual findings he did and to place the offending in category B.
• The elements of dangerous driving proven were limited in extent within the period and distance travelled; the manoeuvre was dangerous but not necessarily an "obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre".
• The judge appropriately considered the possibility of a catastrophic mechanical failure of the e-motorbike and properly evaluated the evidence over a substantial trial before reaching his conclusions about culpability and sentencing.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court applied a deferential standard to the trial judge's factual findings and sentencing exercise. The decision emphasised several legal principles:

• The trial judge is particularly well placed to assess the weight of competing factors after hearing the evidence, and an appellate court should allow a reference only where a sentence is outside the range of sentences which the trial judge might properly regard as appropriate.
• Leave under section 36 Criminal Justice Act 1988 is designed to address cases of gross error; interference is warranted only where findings of fact are without foundation, internally inconsistent, inconsistent with incontrovertible facts, or otherwise irrational.

Applying those principles, the court reviewed the trial judge's findings (the length and nature of the pursuit, the proximity and dangerous conduct, the final undertaking manoeuvre on a narrow lane in darkness, the speed findings, the judge's rejection of deliberate intent to injure, and the defendant's conduct after the collision). The trial judge had considered and rejected both category C and category A culpability and concluded that category B was appropriate. The appellate court noted that, although a literal reading of the category A factor "deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard for the risk of danger to others" might capture many forms of deliberate minor rule-breaking, the authority and prior case examples show that more is required to establish category A (for example racing, prolonged driving on the wrong side, or extended reversing on a main road). The court found that the trial judge's factual findings about speed (approximately 25 mph), proximity, and the nature of the final manoeuvre did not support categorising the offending as category A.

The court also observed that the trial judge had the advantage of hearing four weeks of evidence, CCTV showing headlights at stages of the journey, and expert evidence on speeds, and had made careful determinations to the appropriate standard of proof. Because the judge rejected the prosecution's submission that the conduct amounted to a prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of dangerous driving and an obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre, the appellate court concluded that it was not open to it, on the material before it, to overturn that considered assessment.

Holding and Implications

Decision: The court refused to grant leave to refer the sentence and refused the Reference.

Implications:

• The trial judge's sentencing categorisation (category B) and resulting sentence of 5 years and 3 months' imprisonment for causing death by dangerous driving was upheld.
• The appellate court emphasised the narrow scope for intervention on reference under section 36 CJA 1988 and affirmed that no gross error or irrationality in the trial judge's factual findings or categorisation was shown on the materials before the court.
• No new legal precedent was established by this refusal; the decision affirms deference to detailed trial findings and the established statutory test for references.

The court expressed thanks to Attorney Oakley and Attorney Langdale for their submissions.