Anonymised Summary of Court of Appeal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Attorney Solicitor-General applied for leave to refer a sentence as unduly lenient following sentencing at The Crown Court on 28 July 2025. The Defendant was convicted at a retrial of four offences: kidnapping (Count 1), sexual assault (Count 3), assault occasioning actual bodily harm (Count 4) and possession of a bladed article (Count 5). At an earlier trial the Defendant had been convicted only on Count 5, with juries unable to agree on the other counts.

The Crown Court sentence imposed by Judge Aaronberg was: Count 1 — 3 years 9 months' imprisonment; Count 3 — 1 year (concurrent); Count 4 — 1 year (concurrent); Count 5 — 6 months (consecutive, mandatory minimum under section 315 of the Sentencing Act 2020 due to an historic conviction). The aggregate sentence was therefore 4 years 3 months' imprisonment.

The factual background, as found by the trial judge and summarised on appeal, was that on the night in question the Victim left a friend's gathering in The City in the early hours, was approached by the Defendant offering a lift, entered the Defendant's van and was driven to the Defendant's home rather than to her address. While at the Defendant's home the Victim was sexually assaulted and suffered a head injury; she sent messages to friends and the police attended and arrested the Defendant. A knife was found on the Defendant and various items (condoms, medication) were found in the van. The Victim later provided victim personal statements describing severe psychological harm and a PTSD diagnosis.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, for the purposes of the kidnapping sentencing guideline, the Victim was "particularly vulnerable" at the time of the kidnapping.
2. If the Victim was "particularly vulnerable", whether the Defendant "deliberately targeted" the Victim because of that vulnerability, thereby increasing culpability under the kidnapping guideline.
3. Whether the categorisation and resulting sentence for Count 1 (kidnapping) was materially wrong such that the reference should be allowed and the sentence increased.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Solicitor-General's Submissions

• Submitted that the Victim was "particularly vulnerable" when kidnapped due to intoxication, isolation and lack of means of transport.
• Submitted that the Defendant deliberately targeted a particularly vulnerable victim, which should have placed the kidnapping in a higher culpability category (moving the case towards a Starting Point of 5–7 years depending on precise categorisation).
• Argued that, at minimum, the Judge failed to give adequate weight to vulnerability as an aggravating factor.

Defendant's Submissions

• Submitted that being near a bar at closing time did not establish deliberate targeting of someone particularly vulnerable.
• Accepted the case involved limited planning and duration; contended the judge was correct to treat the kidnapping as Category 2C (limited planning, harm category 2).
• Argued that, even if the case were Category 2B, the sentence fell within the applicable range and was not unduly lenient.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Precedent 1 [2025] EWCA Crim 207	Guidance that Sentencing Council guidelines are to be given their ordinary meaning; an intoxicated lone female can be "particularly vulnerable" depending on circumstances; review standard for appellate interference with evaluative findings (interfere only when judge fails to reflect uncontroverted facts).	The court relied on this authority to explain the high threshold for a finding of "particular vulnerability" and to underline that such findings require close attention to the circumstances. It used the precedent to justify careful scrutiny of whether the judge had reflected relevant facts in his findings.
Precedent 2 [2021] EWCA Crim 1250	Example of an extreme vulnerability context: where a victim is so intoxicated as to be incapable of resisting, supporting a a finding of particular vulnerability.	The court cited this case as illustrating the upper end of the vulnerability spectrum and to support the proposition that intoxication to the point of being "powerless to resist" is an extreme example of particular vulnerability. This informed the comparative assessment of the Victim's vulnerability in the present case.
Precedent 3 [2021] EWCA Crim 940	Example where the Court of Appeal reversed a trial judge who had found "deliberate targeting" of a particularly vulnerable victim; emphasises that vulnerability is fact-specific and that not all intoxicated persons are "particularly vulnerable".	The court treated this decision as demonstrating the lower end of the spectrum and a cautionary example: intoxication and isolation do not automatically amount to "particular vulnerability". It compared the facts of that case to the present facts to assist in determining whether the high threshold was met here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the resolution of the reference around two discrete questions: (1) was the Victim "particularly vulnerable" at the time of the kidnapping; and (2) if so, did the Defendant deliberately target her because of that vulnerability?

Step 1 — Nature of the threshold for "particular vulnerability": The Court emphasised that "particular vulnerability" sits at the higher end of a spectrum and is subject to a high threshold. It relied on Precedent 1 to assert that guidelines be read in their ordinary meaning, and that appellate courts will generally not disturb evaluative findings unless the judge failed to reflect uncontroverted facts.

Step 2 — Comparative examples and their limits: The Court reviewed illustrative authorities (Precedent 2 and Precedent 3) to show examples where particular vulnerability was found (extreme intoxication/incapacity) and where it was not (a victim who, though vulnerable, was still able to look after herself). The Court stressed each case is fact-specific.

Step 3 — Application to the facts found by the trial judge: The Court confined its enquiry to the Victim's state at the moment of the kidnapping (not later vulnerability when isolated in the Defendant's home). The trial judge had accepted that the Defendant described the Victim as "heavily intoxicated" when he offered a lift. The Court considered additional factors that increase vulnerability: the Victim was alone, isolated, and had no means of transport in the early hours. Balancing these factors and comparing them to the authorities, the Court concluded the high threshold for "particular vulnerability" was met.

Step 4 — Deliberate targeting: The Court interpreted the guideline's concept of "deliberate targeting" as requiring a causal nexus between the offender's appreciation of the victim's particular vulnerability and the decision to target them. The Court acknowledged the trial judge had found limited planning and respected the jury's acquittal on Count 2 (which alleged a specific purpose to commit a sexual offence). Nevertheless, the Court identified a passage in the sentencing remarks where the trial judge found the Defendant was "aware that she was somebody who might be willing to succumb" to a fraudulent offer of a lift. The Court held that this amounted to a finding that the Defendant targeted the Victim because of her intoxicated state and concluded that deliberate targeting was established, albeit in a less serious form than many Category A examples.

Step 5 — Sentencing consequences: Because deliberate targeting and particular vulnerability were made out, the Court concluded the kidnapping should have been placed at a higher culpability (moving the case into a category resulting in a higher Starting Point). The Court undertook a balancing exercise, observed that the case was not among the most serious examples of deliberate targeting, and identified the least sentence that could properly be imposed on Count 1 as 4 years when viewed alone. After replicating the sentencing adjustments the trial judge had made for other counts (and applying the same totality and consecutive sentence principles), the Court concluded that an aggregate custodial sentence of 5 years 9 months was the lowest permissible overall sentence for the Defendant's criminality.

Holding and Implications

REFERENCE ALLOWED IN PART — SENTENCE VARIED

Holding: The Court quashed the sentence on Count 1 (kidnapping) and substituted a sentence of 5 years and 3 months' imprisonment on that count. The sentences for the other offences remain unchanged. The resulting aggregate sentence is 5 years and 9 months' imprisonment.

Implications: The direct consequence is an increased custodial term for the Defendant as above; no other sentences imposed by the Crown Court were disturbed. The opinion explains and applies the high threshold for finding "particular vulnerability" and for concluding that an offender "deliberately targeted" a victim because of that vulnerability. The Court emphasised that such findings are fact-specific and require close attention to circumstances (intoxication, isolation, absence of means of transport, and any evidence that the offender deliberately sought out a vulnerable victim). The decision adjusts the individual sentence but does not announce a novel legal principle beyond applying and clarifying existing guideline interpretation and authority.