Summary of Court of Appeal Opinion (Anonymized)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 13 January 2025 at The Crown Court in The City, Judge Vinson sentenced the Appellant to 4 years' imprisonment following convictions for: assault by beating (spitting) contrary to section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988; two breaches of a non-molestation order contrary to section 42A of the Family Law Act 1996; and two offences of racially aggravated stalking involving fear of violence contrary to section 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. A restraining order and a victim surcharge were also imposed. The Appellant appealed the sentence with leave granted by Judge Davis.

The underlying facts disclosed that the Appellant and the Complainant had been in a long relationship which ended in August 2022 and they shared children. A Family Court judge had made a non-molestation order on 24 September 2024 prohibiting the Appellant from contacting the Complainant. In October 2024 the Appellant breached that order on multiple occasions: approaching the Complainant while she was with her child and partner (the Partner), shouting racist and threatening abuse, opening his car door and spitting in the Complainant's face, and sending repeated threatening and racially abusive messages to the Complainant and to third parties. The Appellant had extensive previous convictions, including multiple breaches of court orders. The Appellant pleaded guilty and received total credit in sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the judge was correct to categorise the breach of the non-molestation order as causing "very serious harm" (category 1 / A1) rather than "serious harm" (category 2 / A2) under the Sentencing Council guidelines.
2. Whether, in light of any miscategorisation, the aggregate sentence (a notional 6 years after trial and 4 years after allowing plea credit) was manifestly excessive.
3. If error is found, what the appropriate re-sentencing outcome should be taking account of totality and guilty plea credit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Attorney Fireman submitted that the judge erred in finding category 1 (very serious) harm for the breach offences; at most the offences merited a finding of serious harm.
• Attorney Fireman accepted that the court might properly find serious harm but contended that a notional sentence of 6 years after trial was manifestly excessive on the facts of this case.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate judge (Judge Pepperall) reviewed the sentencing judge's application of the Sentencing Council guidelines and the factual findings underpinning categorisation and quantum.

First, the court accepted the sentencing judge's assessment of high culpability for the breach offences given the seriousness and persistence of the breaches, the Appellant's considerable prior record (notably repeated breaches of court orders), and aggravating features such as the offences occurring shortly after the non-molestation order, persistence despite being reminded of the order, the presence of a child as a witness to the car incident, the domestic-abuse context, and pronounced racial abuse of the Partner.

Second, the court scrutinised the judge's finding on harm. While accepting that harm in domestic-abuse contexts can be underestimated, the appellate court concluded the evidence did not satisfy the criminal standard that the breaches caused or were intended to cause "very serious" harm. The victim's personal statement described ongoing fear and distress, but did not establish very serious harm to the required standard. The only actual physical contact was spitting, which the court characterised as abhorrent but limited in physical violence.

Accordingly, the court concluded the breach offences were miscategorised: they should have been placed in the next lower harm category (A2 — serious harm), with a corresponding change to the appropriate guideline starting point and range. Applying the correct categorisation and considering the numerous aggravating factors, the court determined the judge could properly impose up to the top of the A2 range for a single breach offence, and that a combined notional sentence for both breach offences after trial of 3 years was justified.

The court then applied the principle of totality to consider all offences. It found that, after correcting the categorisation error, a just aggregate sentence for the Appellant's total criminality in this case would have been in the region of 4 years after trial. Allowing full credit for the Appellant's guilty pleas reduced that to an effective term of 32 months. The court therefore concluded the original sentence was manifestly excessive because of the categorisation error and the consequential effect on the total sentence.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED — SENTENCE QUASHED IN PART AND SUBSTITUTED

Holding: The court allowed the appeal against sentence. It quashed the sentence of 4 years' imprisonment imposed in respect of the first breach offence and substituted a sentence of 32 months' imprisonment for that offence. That substituted sentence was ordered to run concurrently with the other sentences imposed by the sentencing judge, resulting in a reduced total sentence to be served of 2 years and 8 months.

Implications: The direct effect is a reduction in the Appellant's custodial exposure through re-categorisation of the breach offences from A1 to A2 and consequent recalibration of the total sentence after credit for guilty pleas. The opinion emphasises careful application of harm categories in domestic-abuse-related breaches and the need to meet the criminal standard when assessing "very serious" harm. The judgment did not purport to establish any new legal principle beyond applying established guidelines and the totality principle; it corrected a sentencing miscategorisation on the facts of this case.

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Note on anonymization: All personal names and specific location identifiers in the original opinion have been replaced with consistent generic placeholders to preserve confidentiality in this summary.