Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against the minimum term imposed for an offence of murder. Leave to appeal was granted by the Full Court on 23 May 2025. On 22 April 2024, in the Crown Court in The City, the Appellant (then aged 24) was convicted after a trial of conspiracy to rob and murder. On 26 April 2024 the Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term set at 30 years less the time spent on remand, resulting in a stated minimum term of 29 years and 142 days.

The factual matrix found by the sentencing judge (adopted in the opinion and summarised below) concerned an incident on 22 September 2022. The Victim was stabbed and killed while seated in a car in Underwood Close in The City, an area described as a busy shopping and residential area near The Hospital. At the relevant time the Victim was driving for a person described in the trial as the Targeted Individual, a local drug seller. The judge's summary (adopted by the court in this opinion) describes an agreed plan between four men to lure and rob the Targeted Individual, the Appellant being one of those four. The plan involved the use of a knife; the Appellant was armed and, during the incident, a single, forceful stab to the left side of the Victim's chest caused fatal injury. After the killing the co-conspirators fled in various directions; some left the jurisdiction for Pakistan and others were later arrested. The judge concluded that the stabbing was a deliberate single blow delivered with severe force and that, at the time of the stabbing, the Appellant intended to kill.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the minimum term of 30 years (subject to deduction for time on remand) under paragraph 3(2)(c) of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 was correctly applied to this murder committed "during the course of a robbery".
2. Whether the sentencing judge correctly balanced aggravating and mitigating features (notably planning, disposal of evidence and flight, versus youth, vulnerability and previous good character) in determining whether to move from the 30-year starting point.
3. Whether the Appellant's youth and vulnerability justified a materially lower minimum term than the 30-year starting point set by Parliament for this category of offending.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Attorney Zahir accepted the correctness of the applicable starting point (30 years under Schedule 21) but argued that the sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to mitigating factors—particularly the Appellant's youth, vulnerability, lack of premeditation and previous good character—and that those factors, cumulatively, should have produced a minimum term materially lower than 30 years.
• Counsel submitted the Appellant was a vulnerable drug addict exploited by an older and more experienced dealer, and that the mitigating features should have heavily outweighed the identified aggravating factors.

Prosecution's Arguments

• Attorney Barraclough filed a Respondent's Notice and argued that the sentencing judge did take vulnerability and immaturity into account and that the judge, having heard all the evidence at two trials, was best placed to weigh the competing factors.
• The prosecution emphasised the Appellant's central role in the plan and execution (acting as the purchaser, being armed, using the weapon, and taking actions to avoid detection and escape the jurisdiction) as factors supporting the sentence imposed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Kamarra-Jarra [2024] EWCA Crim 198	When there is evidence of particular immaturity in a child or young adult, a court may be justified in moving down from the Schedule 21 starting point because chronological age may not reflect actual maturity.	The court acknowledged the principle but held there was no evidence of particular immaturity in this Appellant's case, so the principle did not justify moving below the paragraph 3 starting point.
ZA (case referred to in argument)	Referenced in submissions on youth and immaturity; noted context differs from murder sentencing.	The court observed that ZA did not involve a murder sentence and therefore was not directly applicable to the sentencing question governed by Schedule 21 starting points for murder.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded on the basis that the correct statutory starting point for the minimum term was 30 years under paragraph 3(2)(c) of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, because the murder occurred "during the course of a robbery". The sentencing judge had been presented with and had relied upon detailed factual findings, which the court accepted were appropriately summarised in the judge's written Sentencing Note. The appellate court emphasised that the sentencing judge had heard all the evidence at two trials and was therefore best placed to assess credibility, identify relevant aggravating and mitigating features, and balance them.

In weighing aggravating factors, the judge treated the detailed planning of the robbery as relevant but gave it limited weight (observing that some planning is inherent in murder for gain). The judge did not treat the mere production/use of a knife as an additional aggravating factor because the production/use of a weapon was already reflected in the statutory 30-year starting point; however, the judge did assign greater weight to the disposal of the knife and the phone/SIM card and to the fact of fleeing to Pakistan after the offence.

On mitigation, the judge accepted that the Appellant was vulnerable and had been exploited by the Senior Co-Conspirator, and noted the Appellant's age at the time of the offence and previous good character. The judge concluded that the killing had not been premeditated (in the sense of a prior plan to kill) but found that, when the Appellant stabbed the Victim, he intended to kill. The sentencing judge therefore treated that intention as negating mitigation rather than adding an aggravating feature beyond the starting point.

The appellate court considered the submissions that youth and vulnerability should have produced a materially lower minimum term. It analysed the statutory scheme, observing that paragraph 5A of Schedule 21 provides graduated starting points for defendants aged 14–17 and that Parliament, in setting those figures, has already taken developing maturity into account. The court held that where particular immaturity is shown a departure from the starting point may be justified (citing R v Kamarra-Jarra), but found no evidence of such particular immaturity in this case. For those reasons the court concluded that the sentencing judge had not failed to take relevant factors into account or misapplied the law in balancing aggravation and mitigation.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The court dismissed the Appellant's appeal against the minimum term. The sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum term equal to 30 years less time spent on remand (resulting in a specified minimum term of 29 years and 142 days) stands.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the sentencing determination remains in force and the Appellant's minimum term is not reduced. The court declined to set a new precedent; it applied the statutory starting points in Schedule 21 and existing principles (including the limited circumstances in which maturity may justify departing from those starting points). The opinion emphasises that where particular immaturity is demonstrated a downward adjustment may be appropriate, but found no such evidence here.

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