Ojiri, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application for leave to appeal against sentence referred to the full court by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals because, as far as can be discovered, it is the first occasion on which a person has been sentenced for an offence under section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000 and there are no offence‑specific sentencing guidelines for that offence.

The Appellant (aged 53) pleaded guilty on 9 May 2025 in the magistrates' court to eight offences contrary to section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000. He was committed for sentence to the Crown Court under a power in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (section 70) because confiscation proceedings were contemplated; the magistrates indicated that, if not committed under that power, they would have committed under section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020, giving the Crown Court the full range of sentencing powers up to the statutory maximum (five years).

The guilty pleas were entered at a time when the Appellant was entitled to full credit for them, which he received. The sentencing hearing occurred on 6 June 2025 at The Court before Judge Cheema‑Grubb.

The sentencing judge imposed Special Custodial Sentences pursuant to section 278 of the Sentencing Act 2020 because the Appellant's convictions for scheduled offences meant he fell to be treated as an offender of particular concern. As recorded in the sentencing remarks, the imposed terms were a total term of three years and six months with a custodial term of two years and six months and an extended licence period of 12 months, all ordered to run concurrently.

The offending related to eight separate failures to disclose information while operating in a Regulated Sector (the art market) between 24 October 2020 and 18 December 2021. The judge found that the Appellant believed that a person with whom he dealt (referred to here as Individual A) had committed or attempted to commit offences under sections 15–18 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (terrorist financing offences) and that the Appellant failed to disclose those transactions as required.

The suspected offending by Individual A was assessed as fundraising for terrorism on behalf of a proscribed organisation (referred to here as Organization A). Individual A had earlier been designated by a foreign authority (Agency A) in December 2019 as a financier of that organisation; that designation was known to the Appellant before the eight transactions took place. The Appellant made a series of eight sales amounting to about £140,000. He took steps to conceal the purchaser's identity within his business records and accepted identification he knew to be false on two occasions. When arrested and interviewed, the Appellant initially provided a prepared, dishonest statement denying knowledge and later, at a subsequent interview, made admissions and tendered early guilty pleas.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether leave to appeal against sentence should be granted in a first‑of‑its‑kind sentencing for an offence under section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in principle or made a manifestly excessive sentencing decision given the Appellant's claimed naivety and lack of experience in the Regulated Sector.
3. What the appropriate starting point and adjustments (aggravation and mitigation) are for a single offence under section 21A and how to reflect multiple offences, concealment and totality in the final sentence.
4. Whether precedent decisions cited by the defence (notably R v Swan) are analogous and persuasive in the context of offences under section 21A.
5. Whether a Special Custodial Sentence imposed on an offender of particular concern can be suspended and, if so, the conditions under which suspension is lawful (as affected by Attorney General's Reference (R v John)).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Irwin)

• The Appellant was markedly naïve and inexperienced in the Regulated Sector at the relevant time; this should reduce culpability substantially.
• Other mitigating features (character, lack of previous convictions, genuine remorse, limited experience in the sector, psychiatric material) justified a materially lower sentence and might have supported a suspended sentence.
• Reliance on the decision in R v Swan ([2011] EWCA Crim 2275) as a comparable authority in which serious failing to disclose in a money‑laundering context produced a sentence that the defence submits is relevant by analogy.

Prosecution's Arguments (Attorney Harris)

• The sentencing judge did not commit any error of principle; her findings of fact (high culpability, deliberate concealment, sophistication, belief as to Individual A's activities) were open to her.
• The aggravating features (knowledge of foreign designation, active concealment, multiple transactions over an extended period) justified a substantial uplift from any starting point.
• R v Swan is of limited assistance and should not be carried across to offences under section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Swan [2011] EWCA Crim 2275	Decision in a serious case of failing to disclose money laundering under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; relied on by the defence as a comparator.	The court held that Swan is of very limited assistance. It is an older decision in the money‑laundering context and the court considered it would be an error to carry across its result into offences under section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000.
Attorney General's Reference (R v John) [2022] EWCA Crim 54	Principle on suspension of sentences for offenders of particular concern: such a sentence may be suspended only if the custodial term is two years or less; the licence period must be included in calculating the term.	The court relied on this authority to explain why the defence's attempt to obtain a sentence which might lawfully be suspended faced a high hurdle: the custodial part would have to be two years or less (and effectively 12 months or less in some formulations when licence is included) to render suspension possible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court (delivering judgment through Judge Edis) granted leave to appeal because this was the first known sentencing for section 21A and there were no offence‑specific guidelines. The court emphasised that the sentencing judge had followed the correct procedural framework: she applied the general guideline overarching principles, the totality guideline, the guideline on reduction for guilty plea, and the guideline on imposing community and custodial sentences when no offence‑specific guideline exists.

The sentencing judge's factual findings — that the Appellant believed Individual A was engaged in terrorist fundraising for Organization A, actively concealed the purchaser's identity, used false identification he knew to be false, and took deliberate steps to defeat regulatory controls — led her to conclude the offences involved a high degree of culpability and a moderate to high degree of harm. The judge characterised the Appellant's state of mind as belief (close to knowledge) rather than mere suspicion.

For a single offence of the type described, the sentencing judge adopted a starting point of at least two years' custody (the custodial part applicable to offenders of particular concern). The judge then considered aggravating features (knowledge of the foreign designation, active concealment, and the multiplicity and duration of separate transactions) and mitigating features (good character, no previous convictions, genuine remorse, limited experience in the Regulated Sector, and a psychiatric report describing severe clinical depression). The judge uplifted the sentence substantially to reflect the multiplicity, duration and deceit, and applied an unspecified reduction for mitigation (including early guilty pleas).

The court assessed the arguments on appeal methodically. It rejected the defence submission that the Appellant was a naïve offender whose naivety should substantially reduce culpability. The court accepted the sentencing judge's view that the Appellant was inexperienced in the art market but, by the time the transactions began, he was fully aware of both Individual A's prior designation and the regulatory obligations. The court emphasised that deliberate deceit and concealment increase seriousness compared with straightforward failures to disclose.

The court explicitly treated R v Swan as of limited persuasive value in the present, terrorism‑linked context and noted that sentencing practice in money laundering had evolved since 2011; it would be an error to automatically apply Swan to section 21A offences. The court also relied on Attorney General's Reference (R v John) to explain that a suspended special custodial sentence for an offender of particular concern is possible only in limited circumstances (custodial part two years or less, with the licence period included in calculating the term).

Applying the above principles the court concluded the sentencing judge's method — a two‑year custodial starting point for a single offence, a substantial uplift for the multiplicity, duration and concealment, and a reduction for mitigation and totality — was sound. The court found no error of principle and no manifest excess in the sentence imposed.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The appeal against sentence was dismissed. The court upheld the sentencing judge's approach and outcome. The sentencing judge's findings of fact and application of the general guidelines were held to be within the permissible range of judgment and not vitiated by error of principle or manifest excess.

Implications:

• The direct practical effect is that the sentence imposed by the Crown Court stands as upheld by this court. (The sentencing remarks, as recorded in the opinion, indicate Special Custodial Sentences producing a total term of three years and six months with a custodial term of two years and six months and an extended licence period of 12 months; the sentencing remarks also contain a passage referring to a different numeric formulation in the course of explaining adjustments for plea — both formulations appear in the record of sentencing remarks.)
• No new offence‑specific guideline was created by this decision; the court applied and emphasised the existing general sentencing framework where no offence‑specific guideline exists.
• The court signalled that decisions in the money‑laundering context (for example R v Swan) are of limited assistance and should not be uncritically extended to offences under section 21A where terrorism‑related considerations and the specific facts (deceit, concealment, multiplicity) materially affect seriousness.
• The decision reaffirms that a Special Custodial Sentence for an offender of particular concern can only be suspended in the narrow circumstances identified by Attorney General's Reference (R v John) — effectively imposing a high threshold for suspension in such cases.
• No broad new precedent altering sentencing ranges for section 21A offences was articulated; the court endorsed applying the established general sentencing guidelines and careful factual assessment in future cases of this novel offence.