Anonymized Summary of Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment concerns the prosecution and sentencing of members of an Organised Crime Group (OCG) based in The City for large-scale supply of prohibited drugs (notably import-quality cocaine) and trafficking in firearms, including fully automatic weapons. The investigation recovered firearms, ammunition, drugs and over £600,000 in cash; ledger evidence indicated the cocaine's value was in the region of £70 million.

Six defendants were tried over six weeks in September–October 2023 at the Crown Court in The City before Judge Baxter and a jury on a nine-count indictment. Principal counts included conspiracy to possess firearms or ammunition with intent to endanger life (Count 1), conspiracy to supply Class A drugs (Count 2 — cocaine; Count 3 — MDMA) and conspiracy to supply Class B drugs (Count 4 — amphetamine). The prosecution relied heavily on encrypted EncroChat data, surveillance, cell-site analysis, CCTV, non-encrypted messages and items recovered at arrests. Some defendants disputed attribution of particular EncroChat handles to them and challenged the reliability of the EncroChat data.

The court considered renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction or sentence by four trial defendants, a granted appeal against sentence by one defendant, and a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence by a co‑accused who pleaded guilty before a different judge due to medical reasons. Various applications for extensions of time and for amendments to grounds were also considered.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction should be granted or refused, including whether extensions of time should be allowed for late applications.
2. Whether particular trial rulings and directions (admission of prior bad character, jury directions on bad character and no‑comment interviews, summing‑up, response to jury requests for written summaries of expert evidence, and alleged procedural ambushes) rendered convictions unsafe.
3. Whether various sentence appeals should succeed, including challenges to: the assessment of culpability and harm, application of sentencing guidelines, the imposition of extended determinate sentences (dangerousness determinations), totality and concurrency/consecutive structuring, and alleged misapplication of the correct sentencing table for a firearms offence.
4. Whether amendments to grounds of appeal and extensions of time for sentence appeals should be permitted.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant A (renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction and extension of time)

• Contended the EncroChat handle attribution ("payyabills") to him was not sufficiently proven and that the EncroChat data was unreliable due to incompleteness and lack of verifiable audit trail.
• Grounds advanced included that the judge erred by admitting his 2007 firearms conviction as bad character evidence (or failed to direct the jury properly about it), that the judge failed to fairly sum up the defendant's case, that the judge failed adequately to respond to a jury request for a written summary of expert evidence, and that the judge failed to direct the jury not to draw an adverse inference from his no‑comment interview.
• Sought an extension of time (approximately 253 days) explaining delay by need for new legal team to read into the case and pursue Strasbourg remedies first.

Defendant B (renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction; appeal against sentence)

• Challenged procedural unfairness at trial arising from cross‑examination about a contact list on a Nokia phone download that was disclosed earlier but not adduced in the prosecution case; argued the late use prejudiced him and that the judge should have discharged the jury.
• Raised supplementary grounds alleging inadequate representation and sought to add grounds in person after waiving privilege; complained about tactical choices and claimed unfamiliarity with certain evidence at the moment he gave evidence.
• On sentence, submitted challenge to culpability assessment, starting points, and to the imposition of an extended determinate sentence (arguing excessive extension period and potential double‑counting of EncroChat use across offences). Advanced personal mitigation and rehabilitation efforts in custody.

Defendant D (application to amend grounds and challenge sentence for possession of prohibited weapons — Count 8)

• Contended that the trial judge had used the wrong sentencing table for an offence under section 5(1)(b) of the Firearms Act 1968; argued the sentence was manifestly excessive and sought amendment of grounds and an extension of time to appeal sentence.

Defendant E (renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence)

• Argued that his role was over‑assessed (characterised as a leading or top‑end significant role) and that the finding of dangerousness and the resulting sentence were excessive given his operational role as a courier/collector.

Defendant C (renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence following guilty pleas)

• Argued disparity with co‑defendant sentences and claimed errors of principle by the sentencing judge, notably in the handling of personal mitigation (serious medical condition) and in failing to adjust starting points to reflect lesser hierarchical status.

Prosecution / Respondent

• Opposed leave and extensions where appropriate, contending the grounds lacked merit or were not timely. Emphasised the strength and multiplicity of evidence against defendants (EncroChat data, recovered devices, co‑operative evidence, ledger evidence, cell‑site and CCTV, recovered cash and weapons) and that trial judges were best placed to assess culpability and dangerousness.
• Submitted that admissions of prior convictions and directions given were lawful and that there was no arguable basis as to safety of convictions or manifest excess in sentencing except in the specified, limited respects addressed by the court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v A, B, C and D [2021] EWCA Crim 128	Context: seminal decisions on EncroChat considered in pre‑trial litigation.	Explained as background to trial delay and judge allocation; no direct legal application beyond chronology provided in the opinion.
R v Atkinson and others [2021] EWCA Crim 1447	Context: seminal decisions on EncroChat considered in pre‑trial litigation.	Explained as background to trial delay and judge allocation; not further applied in the court's reasoning in the passages summarised.
R v Hanson [2005] EWCA Crim 824	Principles for admitting a single previous conviction as evidence of propensity (bad character) and assessing relevance.	The trial judge correctly referred to Hanson when assessing whether the 2007 firearms conviction demonstrated propensity; the court upheld admission and the judge’s exercise of discretion under PACE s.78.
R v Singh‑Mann [2014] EWCA Crim 717	Guidance on approaches to summing up, including reminding the jury of defence points at convenient junctures rather than a single dedicated section.	The court relied on Singh‑Mann to conclude the trial judge's approach to summarising defence points was acceptable and did not render the summing up unfair.
R v McGarry [1999] 1 Cr App R 377	Principles concerning directions about drawing adverse inferences from an interview (McGarry direction).	The court explained that a positive direction not to draw an adverse inference from a no‑comment interview (McGarry direction) is a discretionary matter and that no such direction was required where the defendant did not give evidence; no unfairness found.
R v Thacker [2021] EWCA Crim 97	Guidance that a direction warning juries not to draw an adverse inference from silence can sometimes prejudice a defendant and is discretionary.	The court cited Thacker in support of the view that absence of a McGarry direction for a defendant who did not give evidence did not render the trial unfair.
R v Fawcett [1983] 5 Cr App R (S) 158	Disparity test: whether sentences for similar offenders would be regarded by reasonable members of the public as indicating an error in administration of justice.	The court applied Fawcett in assessing disparity arguments between co‑defendants and concluded no reasonable observer would find sentencing administration flawed in the cases examined.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out its reasoning by addressing the renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction first, and then the appeals against sentence. The court reviewed the evidence, trial rulings, and each defendant's submissions in detail and explained why each application or appeal succeeded or failed.

Defendant A (conviction and extension of time)

The court was unpersuaded that the renewed grounds had merit or that the long extension of time should be granted. On bad character, the 2007 firearms conviction was admitted as relevant and properly directed upon: the trial judge applied the principles in R v Hanson, considered age of conviction and defendant's age at the time, and rejected the suggestion it was being used merely to bolster a weak case. The conviction was relevant both to propensity to possess firearms and, crucially, to attribution of the EncroChat handle "payyabills," linking the defendant to the firearms and drugs conspiracies. The court endorsed the trial judge's discretion under PACE s.78.

On summing up, the court accepted that the judge's approach—reminding the jury of salient defence points at convenient junctures—was permissible (citing Singh‑Mann) and that the summing up fairly explained defence submissions. The court rejected the contention that the jury's early note seeking a written summary of expert evidence indicated failure of the summing up: the judge appropriately invited the jury to particularise their request and the jury did not pursue it; the court found it likely the jury decided they did not need further assistance and were diligent.

On the alleged failure to give a McGarry direction about the no‑comment interview, the court explained that a s.34 direction (adverse inference) could not be given where the defendant did not give evidence, and that no positive direction to the contrary was required. The court noted the judge explicitly confined the s.34 direction to a co‑accused who did testify, removing any risk the jury would apply it to Defendant A. Overall, the court concluded the evidence against Defendant A was compelling (including the hidden EncroChat device and correlations with his personal phone) and refused leave and the extension of time.

Defendant B (conviction and sentence)

The court rejected the principal procedural unfairness ground: the Nokia phone download had been disclosed well in advance, and the trial judge was best placed to assess relevance when issues emerged in cross‑examination. The judge's decision not to discharge the jury was upheld; the court agreed the matter did not render the conviction unsafe. On complaints about trial representation and tactical choices, the court reviewed the waiver of privilege and trial counsel's responses, concluding that the trial team had taken appropriate steps and that tactical decisions did not amount to ineffective representation rendering the conviction unsafe.

On sentence, the court examined culpability and harm assessments and the judge's decision to impose an extended determinate sentence for dangerousness. The sentencing judge's assessment of role and aggravating features (use of EncroChat, automatic weapons, large scale of firearms and cocaine trading) was held to be in range, and the court rejected the submission that the extension period was excessive in light of the offending and the judge's detailed reasoning. The sentence appeal was dismissed.

Defendant D (sentence for possession of prohibited devices — Count 8)

The court found the trial judge had applied the wrong sentencing table for an offence under section 5(1)(b) of the Firearms Act 1968; the judge had treated the offence as if it attracted the statutory minimum when it did not. Having considered the correct guideline (Table 2) and the factual circumstances (two devices, one functioning and concealed), the court concluded the original notional sentence was manifestly excessive. The court allowed the amendment and extension, granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal on the amended ground, quashed the original sentence on Count 8 and substituted 12 months' custody (with 25% credit for guilty plea) to run concurrently with other determinate sentences.

Defendant E (sentence)

The court rejected the claim that the judge erred in assessing the defendant's role or in finding dangerousness. The sentencing judge's findings that the defendant held an operational/management function within the OCG (instrumental in cover businesses, couriering, directing others and being aware of the scale of criminality) supported placement at a high level of culpability and a finding of dangerousness. The court found no real prospect of successfully arguing the sentences were manifestly excessive and dismissed the renewed application.

Defendant C (sentence after guilty pleas)

The court identified an error of principle in the sentencing judge's apparent approach to mitigation: the judge said he would not take the medical condition into account when fixing the custodial element because it had been considered in the dangerousness decision, which the appellate court regarded as incorrect — mitigation and dangerousness are distinct inquiries. For that reason leave to appeal against sentence was granted. However, after reviewing the record and sentencing exercise, the court concluded the sentencing judge had already afforded a substantial (four‑year) reduction for mitigation, which was generous and more than adequate to reflect the medical condition and other mitigation and to address the defendant's slightly lower hierarchical role. The court therefore dismissed the appeal on the merits, concluding the total sentence of 25 years after credit was not manifestly excessive and disparity with a co‑defendant's sentence did not indicate an error.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings

• The renewed applications by Defendant A for leave to appeal against conviction and for an extension of time are refused.
• Defendant B's renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction is dismissed on all grounds; Defendant B's appeal against sentence is dismissed.
• Defendant D is granted permission to amend grounds and an extension of time for his sentence appeal; the appeal is allowed, the original sentence on Count 8 is quashed and substituted with 12 months' custody (concurrent), and a representation order was granted for his counsel.
• The renewed application by another defendant (referred to in the opinion as Mr Ward) for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.
• Leave to appeal against sentence was granted to Defendant C and a representation order issued, but the appeal was dismissed on the merits.

Implications: The decisions primarily resolve discrete questions about the safety of convictions, admissibility and use of prior bad character evidence for propensity and attribution, appropriate jury directions and summing up, procedural fairness concerning late reliance on disclosed documents, and correct sentencing application (including dangerousness findings and correct guideline tables). The court upheld most trial rulings and sentences as within judicial discretion and supported by the evidence, except for one sentencing error (possession of prohibited devices) where the court substituted a reduced sentence. The opinion does not purport to establish new general legal principles beyond applying established authorities to the facts; it confirms that trial judges' discretionary assessments on admission of bad character, summing up, and sentencing (including dangerousness assessments) will generally be upheld where reasoned and supported by the evidence. The direct consequences are the refusal or dismissal of most renewed appeals and, in one instance, a substituted sentence.

Representation and procedural notes recorded in the opinion: representation orders were granted where fresh representation was permitted on appeal; several defendants were represented pro bono at various stages; some defendants waived privilege to permit review of counsel's responses to complaints about trial representation.