Summary of Judgment by Judge Bolger

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment arises from appeals to the High Court under section 46 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 against two determinations of the Labour Court (identified in the judgment as TID 241 and TID 242). The Appellant, identified in the originating proceedings as Chair of a European Works Council (EWC) for a multinational group (hereafter "Company B"), was employed by an affiliate of that group. The Respondent in the original proceedings is the employer's EU representative agency (hereafter "Company A").

The underlying disputes concerned (i) whether an invoice for expert advice and assistance obtained by the EWC select committee should be funded by Company A (TID 241) and (ii) whether Company A was obliged to fund the Appellant's attendance at an external training event (the "Hamburg Conference") because Company A had provided online training earlier (TID 242). In each matter the Appellant sought the payment of sums and also sought an award of costs arising from the proceedings before the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) and the Labour Court. The Labour Court dismissed the Appellant's appeals on the substantive points and held that the costs issue was moot because the appeals were not upheld.

The Appellant appealed to the High Court on points of law. The Appellant also sought declarations that aspects of the national implementing legislation (the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996, as amended — "TICEA") were incompatible with Directive 2009/38/EC (the Recast Directive), and sought an Article 267 reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union; Judge Bolger declined to make a reference, finding the law sufficiently clear for national resolution. The High Court heard argument and identified that errors of law had been made by the Labour Court; the impugned parts of both determinations were to be set aside and further submissions were directed on the appropriate final orders and costs.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Labour Court's finding upholding Company A's refusal to fund the Appellant's attendance at the external training (the Hamburg Conference) in TID 242 was an appealable point of law or a non-appealable finding of fact, and if an appealable error of law, whether the refusal was lawful.
2. Whether, in TID 241, the Labour Court erred in interpreting s. 17 of TICEA as applying only to individual complaints and not to collective complaints brought on behalf of an EWC (i.e. whether s. 17 and related provisions can be read and applied to collective claims or to expenses incurred by an EWC under the Second Schedule).
3. Whether the Labour Court erred by treating the Appellant's applications for costs as moot because his appeals were not upheld, and whether the Labour Court was required to consider costs or reimbursement of expenses in light of the Directive and TICEA (including principles of EU law such as effectiveness and the requirements of Article 11 of the Directive).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant acted in a representative capacity as Chair of the EWC and sought funding of expert and training expenses properly incurred by the EWC under the Second Schedule to TICEA and under Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/38/EC (as transposed by s.17/17(1A) of TICEA).
• The Appellant argued that "means required to apply the rights arising from the Directive" includes reasonable expert and legal costs and that, because the EWC lacks separate legal personality and independent resources, central management (Company A) should bear such costs unless the claim was totally without merit, frivolous or vexatious. Counsel relied on the EU principle of effectiveness to support this position.
• On the training point, the Appellant argued the May online training was inadequate (for example, it did not permit questions, did not share materials, and omitted confidentiality training) and that these deficiencies meant that Company A's refusal to fund the Hamburg Conference was unreasonable.
• In relation to costs, the Appellant contended that the Labour Court should consider whether reimbursement of legal expenses was necessary to secure effective enforcement of Directive rights, even where the appeal on the merits was not upheld.

Respondent's Arguments (Company A)

• Company A accepted that EWCs may be assisted by experts and that central management may fund necessary and reasonable expert assistance, but disputed that s. 17 of TICEA extended to collective claims brought on behalf of an EWC. Company A argued s. 17 was intended to protect individual representatives, not to provide a route for collective enforcement of the Second Schedule entitlements.
• Company A submitted that the finding that the May training was adequate was a factual determination by the Labour Court which could not be re-opened on a point of law appeal and that the Labour Court's conclusion on adequacy did not give rise to an appealable error of law.
• On costs, Company A argued that the national implementing legislation and the Directive make no express provision for awards of costs in these proceedings and that criminal sanctions and existing statutory remedies under TICEA provide an appropriate enforcement framework.
• Company A relied on interpretive material (including Commission reports) to argue that "means" in Article 10(1) of the Directive should be read narrowly (as legal capacity) and not as an entitlement to broader financial resources for experts or lawyers.

Attorney General's Submissions (Notice Party)

• The Attorney General accepted that Article 10 of the Directive concerning employee representatives was given effect in s. 17 of TICEA and that Article 17 of the Directive requires provision for compliance measures; the Attorney General challenged Company A's reliance on criminal sanctions as an adequate substitute for judicial or administrative enforcement.
• The Attorney General submitted that the Labour Court should have considered whether expert costs properly incurred collectively by an EWC could fall within the "means required to apply the rights arising from the Directive" and that, depending on circumstances, s. 17(1A) could encompass claims for reimbursement which could then be the subject of a complaint to the WRC.
• In relation to costs awards, the Attorney General acknowledged the Labour Court's general lack of national jurisdiction to award costs but identified the separate question of whether s. 17(1A) could, in appropriate circumstances, be interpreted to require central management to reimburse legal expenses necessary to apply Directive rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Plaintiff v Company A [2025] IEHC 224	Illustrative reference concerning formatting and citation practice of Labour Court determinations.	Referred to as precedent supporting the Court's criticism of the Labour Court's formatting lacking page/paragraph numbers; used to emphasise appellate difficulties in citing extracts.
Entity v The Labour Court and Plaintiff [2024] IESC 38	Supreme Court authority on the limited scope of appellate review from the Labour Court and that the appellate court's view of the merits is not the legally relevant factor.	Cited to explain the High Court's constrained appellate role and to frame the standard of review of factual findings and points of law.
Plaintiff v Nano Nagle School [2019] IESC 63	Duty to give reasons: requires an outline of relevant facts and evidence upon which reasoning is based.	Used to support the proposition that the Labour Court must give adequate reasons; the High Court compared the Labour Court's reasoning to the standard set out in this case.
Plaintiff v Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 697	Criticism of a decision reached by a "bald conclusion" without explaining why certain evidence was accepted or reconciled.	Applied as an example of prior criticism where the Labour Court failed to articulate reasons; used to assess whether the impugned determinations met required standards of explanation.
Plaintiff v The Teaching Council [2025] IEHC 155	Requirement that a decision-maker give sufficient reasons so parties know what was decided and why, and that submissions were considered.	Relied on to reinforce the High Court's conclusion that the Labour Court's determinations lacked sufficient reasoning on key EU law points.
Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (Case C-106/89) [1990] ECR I-4135	Principle of indirect effect / interpretation of national law in the light of a Directive (Marleasing principle).	Adopted and applied by the High Court to require that TICEA be construed, as far as possible, to give effect to the Directive; used centrally in the Court's analysis of s. 17.
Plaintiff v The Governor of the Midlands Prison [2019] 3 I.R. 595	Limits on conforming interpretation: national courts must interpret national law in light of EU obligations but cannot strain plain words contra legem.	Used to explain the interpretive approach: national law should be interpreted to conform with Directive obligations where possible, without distorting the statute's meaning.
Heather Hill v An Bord Pleanála [2022] 2 ILRM 313	Statutory interpretation principles: consider the Act as a whole and its legislative context.	Invoked to support the instruction to interpret TICEA in its legislative context, namely the Directive it implements.
Francovich (CJEU principle)	State liability principles and the broader context of remedies for breaches of EU law.	Mentioned as part of the interpretive landscape and to note that potential State liability considerations do not displace indirect effect; referenced by the Court in framing possible remedial approaches.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Bolger set out a structured analysis addressing each of the identified issues. The Court's reasoning follows the text of the implementing statute (TICEA), the text and preamble of Directive 2009/38/EC (the Recast Directive), and established principles of EU law and domestic administrative law. The principal strands of reasoning are as follows:

1. Appellate standard and the Labour Court's duty to give reasons:

   The Court emphasised the limited nature of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction on points of law from the Labour Court and reiterated that factual findings ordinarily attract curial deference. However, where a decision breaches statutory duties (including the duty to give adequate reasons), such breaches can found appealable points of law. The Court relied on domestic authorities requiring that reasons outline relevant facts and evidence and show that submissions were considered.

2. Issue (i) — Adequacy of the May training and whether the Labour Court's determination was a non-appealable finding of fact:

   The Court examined the evidence before the Labour Court, including engagement between Company A and EWC members about training content, an internal email indicating consultation, and the Labour Court's own consideration of the May training materials (PowerPoint) and the Court's professional experience with training. Judge Bolger concluded that the Labour Court made reasoned factual findings that the May online training constituted appropriate training under TICEA and that the Labour Court's decision that Company A's refusal to fund the Hamburg Conference was reasonable was a rational finding of fact. The Appellant, therefore, did not discharge the heavy burden of establishing an appealable error of law in relation to those factual determinations.

3. Issue (ii) — Interpretation of s. 17 TICEA and the Directive (collective vs. individual claims):

   The Court undertook a detailed statutory interpretation exercise, beginning from the premise that TICEA must be read in light of the Directive it implements (invoking the Marleasing indirect effect principle and related domestic authorities). The Court rejected the Respondent's narrow interpretation that "means" in Article 10(1) of the Directive and in s. 17 of TICEA should be confined to "legal capacity" alone (i.e. a narrow "competence" / process guarantee). The Court observed that the Directive's text and TICEA's repeated use of plural forms and collective language (e.g. references to employees and employee representatives) support a broader reading of "means" as potentially encompassing financial and material resources necessary to apply Directive rights.

   The Court also rejected the submission that criminal sanctions and the statutory offence/regime under TICEA could be treated as an adequate and exclusive enforcement mechanism displacing complaints and appeals to the WRC and Labour Court. The Court concluded that the Labour Court erred in law by interpreting s. 17 as protecting only individual EWC members "qua individuals" and by disallowing the Appellant's representative capacity claim on behalf of the EWC. The Labour Court also failed to examine whether the expert advice and associated costs were necessary and appropriate as expenses properly incurred by the EWC for the purpose of applying Directive rights and recoverable from central management under the Second Schedule.

4. Issue (iii) — The costs applications:

   The Court noted that the Labour Court's handling of the costs applications in both determinations was cursory (a single sentence dismissing the application as moot because the appeals failed). The High Court held that the Labour Court should have considered the Appellant's costs arguments in the light of TICEA and the Directive, including Article 11 and the principle of effectiveness. Given that an EWC lacks separate legal personality and independent funds, the Court found that there were circumstances in which reimbursement of expenses (including legal expenses) might be necessary to secure effective enforcement of Directive rights. The Labour Court therefore erred in treating the costs issue as automatically moot and in failing to analyse whether the mechanisms available under national law were sufficient by reference to EU law requirements and the potential need to avoid deterrence in enforcing rights.

On the procedural question of a potential Article 267 reference, the Court determined the relevant law to be sufficiently clear and declined to refer questions to the CJEU.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court found multiple errors of law in the Labour Court's determinations and set aside the impugned parts of both determinations.

Implications:

• The High Court concluded that s. 17 of TICEA must be interpreted in the light of Directive 2009/38/EC and that the Labour Court erred by construing s. 17 as applying only to individual complaints and by disallowing the Appellant's representative capacity claim. The Labour Court also erred by failing to assess whether expert costs properly incurred by the EWC were recoverable under the Directive and TICEA.
• The High Court held that the Labour Court should have examined the Appellant's applications for costs (or reimbursement of expenses) in light of the Directive and the principle of effectiveness; a bare conclusion that the costs issue was moot because the appeal failed was inadequate. This means the Labour Court must reconsider (or be directed to reconsider) the costs questions consistent with EU law principles and the correct interpretation of TICEA.
• The High Court declined to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, finding national resolution appropriate because the law was sufficiently clear in the Court's view.
• Practical outcomes ordered by the Court at the date of this judgment: the impugned parts of both determinations were set aside. The Court directed further submissions on the precise final orders (including costs) and listed a further hearing date to make final orders. The Court also observed (and criticised) the Labour Court's formatting of determinations and encouraged improvements to facilitate precise appellate review.
• No novel binding precedent from the CJEU was established by this judgment; rather, the High Court applied existing principles of EU and domestic law to find that the Labour Court erred in its interpretation and reasoning. The immediate effect is remedial: the matters are to be revisited (remitted or otherwise reconsidered) in accordance with the High Court's legal findings.

Administrative and Procedural Notes

The Court directed parties to make further written submissions, if any, ahead of the final orders hearing and scheduled a hearing to determine final orders and costs. The Court explicitly invited further written submissions to be lodged at least 48 hours in advance of the return date and requested notice if the hearing was expected to exceed one hour.

Anonymization Note

Consistent with the summary requirements, personal names and specific company identifiers from the original opinion have been replaced by generic placeholders (for example "Appellant", "Company A", "Company B", and "Judge Bolger") throughout this summary. Institutional names used in the original judgment (for example the Labour Court and the Workplace Relations Commission) are referred to descriptively to preserve the meaning of the legal analysis.

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Prepared from the provided High Court opinion dated 14 November 2025, as authored by Judge Bolger. Counsel appearing in the original judgment are identified here as Attorney Keany, Attorney Kerr, Attorney Mallon, Attorney Barrington, Attorney Ryan and Attorney Geoghegan.