Anonymised and Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns whether the Respondent was entitled to conclude that the Appellant had become intentionally homeless and therefore that the Respondent had no duty to rehouse him.

Key factual sequence (all parties anonymised):

• The Appellant lived with his family in privately rented accommodation until September 2018. After being required by his landlord to leave, he applied to Local Authority A for assistance and was provided with temporary accommodation at [Address 1].
• On 8 November 2021, the management company for [Address 1] informed the Appellant that the landlord intended to take back the property and served notice to vacate by 15 January 2022. Local Authority A replied that an alternative offer would be made before the notice expired.
• On 14 January 2022 Local Authority A offered temporary accommodation at [Address 2], warned that refusal would discharge its rehousing duty under section 193(5) of the Housing Act 1996, and set short deadlines for acceptance.
• The Appellant expressed dissatisfaction with [Address 2] and was informed by Local Authority A that he could request a suitability review but that he should accept the offer to ensure accommodation if the review failed.
• The Appellant did not accept the 14–17 January 2022 deadlines for [Address 2]. Local Authority A then withdrew the offer and notified him it regarded its duty under section 193(2) as discharged pursuant to section 193(5).
• The Appellant said he could not vacate [Address 1] immediately because he had nowhere to go. Local Authority A then offered alternative temporary accommodation at [Address 3], which the Appellant accepted and to which he moved.
• After the placement at [Address 3] ended, the Appellant applied to the Respondent for assistance on 13 April 2022. The Respondent accepted that he was homeless, eligible and in priority need, but concluded that he had become homeless intentionally and therefore had no duty to rehouse him. The Appellant requested a review; the review officer upheld the decision on 18 April 2024.
• The Appellant appealed to the County Court under section 204 of the 1996 Act; that appeal was dismissed by Judge Holmes. The Appellant then appealed to this court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Respondent was entitled to conclude that the Appellant intentionally became homeless because he deliberately refused the offer of accommodation at [Address 2], such that he "deliberately did or failed to do anything in consequence of which he ceased to occupy accommodation which was available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy" (section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996).
2. Whether the review officer erred in determining that [Address 1] was accommodation available for the Appellant's occupation and that it was reasonable for him to continue to occupy it for the purposes of section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented)

• The Appellant's representative (Attorney Burton, assisted by Attorney Kelleher) argued that the Appellant ceased to occupy [Address 1] because he was required to do so by the landlord's notice and not as a consequence of his refusal of [Address 2].
• It was submitted that [Address 1] had ceased to be available regardless of whether the Appellant accepted [Address 2], because Local Authority A told him it could not give the usual 28 days to vacate owing to the "lease end deadline" having passed, and instructed immediate vacation; thus the landlord's notice—an event independent of the Appellant's refusal—was the operative cause of his cessation of occupation.
• The review officer, so it was argued, answered the wrong question by focusing on why the Appellant was homeless rather than on whether the refusal of [Address 2] caused him to cease occupying [Address 1].
• The Appellant also challenged the conclusion that [Address 1] was both available and reasonable to continue to occupy, though this ground was dependent on success on the first ground.

Respondent's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

• The Respondent accepted that the Appellant was homeless, eligible and in priority need but maintained that the Appellant had become intentionally homeless because his deliberate refusal of [Address 2], followed by his refusal or failure to vacate [Address 1] without an alternative, caused him to cease to occupy accommodation which was available and reasonable to continue to occupy.
• The Respondent relied on the sequence of offers and withdrawals made by Local Authority A and the fact that the Appellant only vacated [Address 1] when alternative accommodation at [Address 3] was provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court in This Case
Haile v Waltham Forest LBC [2015] UKSC 34	Explains the two-stage inquiry under sections 191(1) and 193(1): (i) whether the applicant deliberately did/failed to do something causing him to cease to occupy accommodation meeting s.191(1); and (ii) whether current homelessness was caused by that intentional conduct.	The court applied Haile's two-stage framework to focus on whether the Appellant's refusal of [Address 2] caused him to cease to occupy [Address 1]; the judgment follows Haile's guidance on causation and novus actus interveniens.
R v Brent LBC, ex p Awua [1996] 1 AC 55	Holds that deliberate cessation of occupation of one property can lead to intentional homelessness later when one is obliged to leave subsequent temporary accommodation; underlines that temporary accommodation does not necessarily interrupt homelessness caused by earlier conduct.	The court treated Awua as authority for the proposition that refusal of a suitable offer can be the operative cause of later homelessness; Godson and the present facts were compared to Awua.
Din v Wandsworth LBC [1983] 1 AC 657	Establishes that the relevant time to assess the elements of intentional homelessness can be the time the applicant ceased to occupy the earlier accommodation; hypothetical subsequent events do not extinguish the actual cause if s.191(1) is satisfied at that time.	The court relied on Din (as reassessed in Haile) to reject arguments based on hypothetical later causative events and to confirm that the definition is to be considered at the time of cessation of occupation.
Chishimba v Kensington and Chelsea RB [2013] EWCA Civ 786	States the "ultimate question" is the real or effective cause of the homelessness; causation should be answered practically and is more than a simple 'but for' test; if multiple operative causes exist, only one needs be deliberate.	The court invoked Chishimba to hold that even if the landlord's notice could be a cause, it sufficed that the Appellant's deliberate act was one effective cause of cessation of occupation.
Godson v Enfield LBC [2019] EWCA Civ 486	Held that refusal of a council tenancy was the effective cause of the applicant's homelessness and that the reviewing officer could conclude the applicant was intentionally homeless where refusal led to eviction from previous accommodation.	Godson was treated as closely analogous: earlier cases where temporary accommodation was lost after refusal of an offer supported the view that the Appellant's refusal could be the operative cause of homelessness.
William v Wandsworth LBC [2006] EWCA Civ 535	Referenced for causation principles and previous authorities supporting approaches to causation in intentional homelessness context.	Cited in support of the analysis of causation and as part of the authorities the court considered in framing its approach.
R (Ajayi) v Hackney LBC (1998) 30 HLR 473	Authority approving approaches to causation relevant to homelessness decisions.	Referenced (through William) to support the general causation analysis; cited as part of the authorities indicating that immediate cause may not be the only operative cause.
Muse v Brent LBC	Cited in argument illustrating parliamentary intention that an authority's discharge of duty by offering suitable accommodation should not be rendered ineffective by refusals.	Used by analogy in reasoning that the statutory scheme should not be frustrated by refusals of suitable offers.
Kyle v Coventry CC [2023] EWCA Civ 1360	Clarifies when it is "reasonable" to continue to occupy accommodation: it need not be indefinite; used to assess reasonableness under s.191(1).	The court relied on Kyle to conclude it was reasonable for the Appellant to have remained in [Address 1] until the acceptance deadline for [Address 2], if the deliberate conduct is to be ignored.
Denton v Southwark LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 623	States that when assessing reasonableness to continue to occupy, the court must ignore the acts or omissions for which the applicant is responsible.	The court applied Denton when considering Ground 2, observing that the Appellant's deliberate refusal must be disregarded when assessing whether it was reasonable to remain at [Address 1].
Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond upon Thames LBC [2009] UKHL 7	Directs a benevolent, realistic and practical approach to interpreting review decisions; courts should not adopt nit-picking approaches.	Invoked to justify a generous interpretation of the review officer's reasoning where the decision, read realistically, supported the outcome reached.
Poshteh v Kensington and Chelsea RB [2017] UKSC 36	Endorses Holmes-Moorhouse's approach to review decision interpretation.	Used to reinforce that interpretation of the review decision should be practical and not overly technical.
Nzolameso v Westminster CC [2015] UKSC 22	Requires that review decisions must show proper consideration of matters required by statute and the Homelessness Code of Guidance.	Cited to remind that benevolence in interpretation does not excuse lack of reasoning; the review decision must show those considerations were addressed.
Rikha Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC [2005] EWCA Civ 340	Illustrates the limited circumstances in which a local authority may decline to entertain a fresh homelessness application.	Referenced by the Appellant to show that Local Authority A (or any authority) could only reject a fresh application if it concluded intentional homelessness.
R (Ivory) v Welwyn Hatfield BC [2025] EWCA Civ 21	Referenced as a recent authority on circumstances for declining further applications (as cited in argument).	Cited in submissions context to highlight restrictions on rejecting fresh applications; not central to the court's causal analysis but referenced by the Appellant.
Dyson [1980] 1 WLR 1205	Quoted (via Brightman LJ) on causation language ("if she had not done that deliberate act she would not have become homeless").	Used in Haile and repeated here to illustrate the standard for causal connection and novus actus interveniens analysis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court (Judge Newey, with Judges Falk and Cobb concurring) conducted its analysis in two linked stages following the statutory framework set out in sections 191(1) and 193(1) of the Housing Act 1996 and the guidance in Haile.

1. Identification of the operative legal test. The court reiterated that the first, threshold question under s.191(1) is whether the applicant deliberately did or failed to do something in consequence of which he ceased to occupy accommodation meeting s.191(1). If that question is answered affirmatively, the second stage under s.193(1) asks whether the applicant's current homelessness has been caused by that deliberate conduct.
2. Facts distilled to causal question. The court accepted that the Appellant did not dispute that (a) he would not now be homeless but for his refusal of [Address 2] and (b) the refusal was deliberate. The court therefore concentrated on whether the Appellant's ceasing to occupy [Address 1] was in consequence of that refusal.
3. Examination of the sequence of events and alternative explanations. The Appellant argued that the landlord's notice was the operative cause of his leaving [Address 1]. The court examined the actual chronology: the landlord had served notice, Local Authority A offered [Address 2] with tight deadlines and warned that refusal could discharge the duty, the Appellant did not accept by the deadline, Local Authority A withdrew the offer and notified discharge of duty, the Appellant said on 18 January he had nowhere to go, and only after Local Authority A offered [Address 3] did the Appellant move from [Address 1]. Thus, the Appellant did not immediately vacate on receipt of the landlord's notice; he moved only once [Address 3] was made available.
4. Application of causation principles. Drawing on Chishimba and other authorities, the court emphasised that if there is more than one operative cause of the loss of accommodation, it suffices that one of them is the deliberate act of the applicant. The court concluded it was open to the review officer to find that the Appellant's deliberate refusal of [Address 2], coupled with his subsequent situation (declining to vacate without alternative), was an operative cause of his ceasing to occupy [Address 1]. Even if the landlord's notice could also be regarded as a cause, the presence of a deliberate act by the Appellant as an operative cause was sufficient.
5. Interpretation of the review decision. The court applied the guidance in Holmes-Moorhouse (endorsed in Poshteh) that review decisions should be interpreted benevolently and realistically. Although the review officer did not explain the reasoning in precisely the terms the court articulated, his findings that the Appellant's refusal was "the operative cause" of his homelessness and that he "left in consequence of the duty being discharged" were, read practically, sufficient to support the conclusion that the Appellant ceased to occupy [Address 1] in consequence of his deliberate conduct.
6. Assessment of the "reasonable to continue to occupy" element (Ground 2). The court noted that when assessing whether it was reasonable to continue to occupy the previous accommodation, the deliberate conduct that led to leaving must be ignored (Denton). Thus, if the Appellant failed on Ground 1, the refusal of [Address 2] must be disregarded and it was clear that it would have been reasonable for him to continue in [Address 1] until the acceptance deadline (or until he could move to [Address 2] if accepted). Because Ground 1 failed, Ground 2 could not succeed.
7. Conclusion of analysis. Taking the statutory tests, authorities and the factual chronology together, the court concluded that the review officer was entitled to find the Appellant had ceased to occupy [Address 1] in consequence of deliberate conduct (the refusal of [Address 2] and the consequences that followed).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the appeal. The decision of the County Court (Judge Holmes) and the Respondent's review decision were upheld.

Implications and consequences:

• The practical effect is that the Respondent is not under the main rehousing duty to the Appellant because it was entitled to conclude that the Appellant had become homeless intentionally within the meaning of section 191(1) and therefore s.193(1) did not apply to impose a rehousing duty.
• The court applied existing authorities and statutory interpretation principles; it did not purport to create new legal principles. The decision is an application of established causation and review-decision interpretation principles to the facts of this case.
• Ground 2 (reasonableness of continued occupation) was rejected as dependent on Ground 1; since Ground 1 failed, Ground 2 necessarily failed on the legal approach required by Denton.

Decision Makers and Representatives (Anonymised)

• Judges: Judge Newey, Judge Falk, Judge Cobb (Court of Appeal panel).
• County Court judge on earlier appeal: Judge Holmes.
• Appellant's counsel: Attorney Burton (KC) and Attorney Kelleher.
• Authorities involved in original housing events: Local Authority A (original provider of temporary accommodation), Management Company A (manager of the initial temporary accommodation), the Landlord (unnamed).

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the material and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond that text has been introduced. Personal names, addresses and organisational identifiers from the source have been replaced by anonymised placeholders used consistently throughout this document.