Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant is an Egyptian national born in 1990 who arrived in The State on 3 September 2015 and commenced working shortly thereafter. In February 2019 an application made by the Applicant's then employers for a work permit was refused. On 19 August 2020 the Applicant was granted a Stamp 1 permission for a period of one year; that permission was automatically renewed because of the COVID pandemic and continued until 31 May 2022.

In February 2022 the Applicant applied under the Regularisation of Long-Term Undocumented Migrant Scheme (the "Scheme"). The first-instance decision dated 28 July 2022 refused that application on the basis that the Applicant did not satisfy the required period of being undocumented. The Applicant appealed on 21 August 2022. An appeal decision was recorded as refused on 2 August 2023 but was not served; a fresh refusal dated 23 September 2024 was issued and included a proposal to deport the Applicant pursuant to section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999 (the "1999 Act").

On 13 April 2023 the Applicant (through solicitors at the time) sought the exercise of ministerial discretion to remain in The State (either on a Stamp 4 or a Stamp 1 without need for a work permit). By decision dated 14 July 2023 (the first impugned decision) the Respondent refused to exercise ministerial discretion. The Applicant initiated judicial review proceedings (an amended statement of grounds was filed on 18 December 2024). The Applicant's solicitors were taken off the record on 30 May 2025, after which the Applicant has been a lay litigant.

The judgment in these proceedings was delivered by Judge O'Regan on 23 October 2025.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Respondent's decision of 14 July 2023 refusing to exercise ministerial discretion was unlawful because the Respondent allegedly refused to accept or consider the Applicant's application to regularise his status, or failed to recognise the Applicant as a "settled migrant", and/or failed to consider rights under Article 40.3 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. Whether the Respondent's decision of 23 September 2024 (which proposed deportation under s.3 of the 1999 Act) was unlawful because it was issued in circumstances where the Respondent had allegedly failed to adequately address the Applicant's asserted settled migrant status and associated private life rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Respondent refused to accept and consider the Applicant's applications to regularise his status and to exercise ministerial discretion.
• The Respondent failed to recognise the Applicant as a "settled migrant" (said to flow from the Stamp 1 permission from 19 August 2020 to 31 May 2022) and therefore failed to consider the Applicant's rights under Article 40.3 of the Constitution and Article 8 ECHR.
• The decision proposing to deport the Applicant (23 September 2024) is unlawful because it was made without adequate consideration of the Applicant's asserted settled migrant status and private life rights.

Respondent's Arguments (as recorded by the Court)

• The Respondent acknowledged receipt of further correspondence and documentation and indicated that the Applicant's request had not been examined in full pending further examination.
• In the decision of 14 July 2023 the Respondent recorded that the Applicant did not hold a valid permission under section 4 of the Immigration Act 2004 at the time of the application and therefore s.4 did not apply.
• The Respondent stated that the Applicant had not submitted any exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of freestanding ministerial discretion.
• The Respondent maintained that any potential interference with constitutional or Article 8 rights would be considered at the deportation stage under section 3 of the 1999 Act, where appropriate, rather than when declining to exercise ministerial discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Luximon v Minister for Justice [2018] IESC 24; [2018] 2 IR 542	Holds that where applicants are lawful, long-duration residents with periodic renewable permission, the Minister's failure to consider constitutional or Article 8 rights in a decision that would effect a material change of status is an error; such rights may need to be considered at the stage of change of status.	The Court distinguished Luximon on the facts: the present Applicant was not a lawful long-duration resident in the same sense, having entered without permission and engaged in unlawful work; therefore Luximon did not require Article 8 consideration at the ministerial discretion stage in this case.
Bode (A Minor) v The Minister for Justice [2007] IESC 62	States that the making of a deportation order under s.3 of the 1999 Act is a sufficiently wide-ranging process for the Minister to discharge the duty to consider constitutional and ECHR rights.	The Court relied on Bode to support the proposition that Article 8 and constitutional rights can be considered at the deportation stage under s.3(11) of the 1999 Act rather than at the earlier ministerial discretion decision.
Chen v The Minister for Justice & Equality & Ors. [2021] IECA 99	The Court of Appeal held that requiring the Minister to conduct an Article 8 assessment at the applicant's chosen time (e.g., at s.4 application stage) would unduly burden the immigration system; an assessment in deportation proceedings can be sufficient to discharge the State's obligations under Article 8.	The Court applied Chen to conclude that it was not unlawful for the Minister to defer detailed Article 8 assessment until the deportation/proposal stage in respect of the present Applicant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the written decision of 14 July 2023 in detail and the correspondence preceding it. The Judge concluded that, contrary to the Applicant's primary contention, the Respondent did in fact accept and consider the Applicant's requests. The decision explicitly addressed the applicability of s.4 of the Immigration Act 2004 and recorded that the Applicant's permission had expired on 31 May 2022 and that at the time of the application the Applicant did not hold a valid permission under s.4.

On the specific issue of exercise of ministerial discretion, the decision stated that the Minister had "carefully examined" the Applicant's immigration history and all submitted facts but decided not to exercise discretion because no exceptional circumstances were shown. The decision further stated that any potential interference with constitutional or Article 8 rights would be considered under section 3 of the 1999 Act where such interference might arise.

The Court then considered relevant authority. Luximon was analysed and distinguished: Luximon concerned applicants who entered lawfully and were continuously lawfully present for a long duration, and the Supreme Court held that an Article 8/constitutional assessment was required where a material alteration of status would result. The Court observed that the present Applicant did not fall within Luximon: the Applicant entered The State without permission, worked without permission, had an unsuccessful employment permit application, held Stamp 1 subject to conditions that required departure on expiry and a work permit to work, and by the time of the 13 April 2023 application was unlawfully present and unlawfully working. The Court therefore held Luximon to be inapposite.

The Court relied on Bode for the proposition that the s.3 deportation process is an appropriate stage to consider constitutional and ECHR rights. The Court also relied on Chen (Court of Appeal) which held that imposing an obligation on the Minister to undertake Article 8 assessments at the applicant's chosen time would burden the immigration system and that an assessment at the deportation stage can suffice to discharge the State's obligations under Article 8.

Applying these authorities and the facts, the Court concluded that the Respondent was not obliged to undertake a detailed Article 8 or constitutional assessment when deciding the April 2023 ministerial discretion request, and it was therefore not unlawful to decline to exercise discretion without such an assessment. Similarly, when the Respondent proposed deportation on 23 September 2024 after rejecting the Scheme appeal, the Respondent acted lawfully in issuing a s.3 proposal based on the factual finding that the Applicant was in The State without permission and that deportation would be conducive to the common good within the meaning of s.3(2)(i) of the 1999 Act.

Having considered the totality of the material, the Court concluded that the Applicant had not demonstrated a basis to quash either impugned decision.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION DISMISSED / RELIEFS CLAIMED REFUSED

Holding: The Court refused the reliefs sought. The decisions of the Respondent dated 14 July 2023 (refusing to exercise ministerial discretion) and 23 September 2024 (proposing deportation under s.3 of the 1999 Act) were not quashed.

Implications:

• The direct effect is that the Respondent's determinations stand and the proposal to deport remains lawful on the basis recorded (that the Applicant was in The State without permission and deportation was considered conducive to the common good under s.3(2)(i)).
• The Court treated existing authorities (Luximon, Bode and Chen) as guiding when Article 8 and constitutional rights must be assessed; the judgment distinguishes Luximon on the facts and confirms that, in cases involving persons unlawfully present, detailed Article 8 consideration can properly be deferred to the deportation/proposal stage under the 1999 Act.
• The judgment does not announce a novel legal principle; it applies established authorities to the facts and records that no error was made in the Respondent's approach on the facts presented.
• Costs: The Court proposed making no order as to costs. The parties were invited to file submissions, not exceeding 1,000 words, within 10 days if they had difficulty with that proposed costs order.