Supreme Court of Ireland Judgment Summary – [2025] IESC 44

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment is a concurring opinion delivered by Judge Collins of the Supreme Court on 7 November 2025. Judge Collins agrees with the Chief Justice that the appeal brought by the Plaintiffs/Appellants should be dismissed.

The Appellants consist of one adult parent and several minor children, the minors suing by their mother and next friend. They challenge the refusal of the State authorities (the State Respondents) to issue:

• Birth certificates in assumed names that differ from the names accurately recorded in the official register of births maintained under the Civil Registration Act 2004, and
• A marriage certificate in the assumed name of the parents (referred to in the discussion of evidence on the right to life argument).

It is common case on the material before Judge Collins that the existing entries in the register of births accurately record the Appellants’ particulars of birth. The Appellants do not seek to correct any inaccuracy in the register. Rather, for reasons the Court describes as “perfectly understandable,” they wish to conceal rather than reveal their true identity through the use of assumed names on official documents.

The proceedings have reached the Supreme Court by way of appeal. In this judgment, Judge Collins explains why, in agreement with the Chief Justice, he considers that the appeal must be dismissed and why neither the constitutional right to identity nor the right to life requires the State to issue the inaccurate identity documents sought by the Appellants.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Appellants have a constitutional or other legally protected right to be issued with new birth certificates (and related official identity documents) in assumed names that differ from their accurately recorded particulars of birth in the civil register.
2. Whether the refusal of the State to issue such inaccurate birth certificates and other official documents engages or breaches a constitutionally protected right to identity, including any right recognised in earlier case law such as Caldaras and Habte or under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as interpreted in Goodwin.
3. Whether, on the evidence, the State’s refusal to issue fictitious identity documents amounts to a violation of the Appellants’ right to life protected by Article 40.3 of the Constitution, on the basis that the absence of such documents is said to place them in danger.
4. More generally, what the constitutional source and scope of the right to identity is, and how it relates to express constitutional rights such as equality before the law, protection of the person and the right to one’s good name.
5. A broader doctrinal question, discussed though not determinative of the appeal: whether human dignity is to be understood in Irish constitutional law as:
   • a constitutional value only,
   • a justiciable constitutional right, or
   • both value and right;
   and what consequences would follow from any such characterisation.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Caldaras v An tArd Chláraitheoir [2013] IEHC 275; [2013] 3 IR 310	Recognition of a right to identity in the context of correcting an inaccurate entry in the register of births, where the applicant’s name had been incorrectly recorded in her daughter’s particulars and on the birth certificate.	Cited to show that earlier authority concerned the rectification of inaccurate civil registration records so that authentic particulars are correctly recorded and recognised. Judge Collins states that this principle cannot be inverted to justify issuing documents that deliberately do not reflect the authentic details, as the Appellants seek here.
Habte v Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IEHC 47; [2020] IECA 22; [2021] 3 IR 627	Recognition of a right to identity in the context of rectifying an inaccurate official record: a certificate of naturalisation that wrongly recorded the applicant’s date of birth.	Used alongside Caldaras as an example of cases where the right to identity required correction of inaccurate records. Judge Collins contrasts that situation with the present case, in which the entries are accurate and the Appellants seek fictitious documents instead.
Foy v An tArd-Chláraitheoir [2007] IEHC 470; [2012] 2 IR 1	Describes the purpose of the civil registration system: the particulars of birth recorded are intended to capture “the fact and event of birth” as a record of historical fact, and the birth certificate is “intended to be a document of current identity.”	Relied on to emphasise that the birth register is designed to record factual, historical truth about birth, which underpins its role as a document of current identity. This supports the conclusion that there is a compelling public interest in maintaining an accurate, historically grounded register and that this system is not designed to facilitate assumed or fictitious identities.
Chesnokov v An tArd Chláraitheoir [2017] IECA 19	Affirms the importance of maintaining a register of births “of the utmost integrity,” underscoring the public interest in accuracy in civil status registers.	Cited to reinforce the strong public interest in the integrity and accuracy of the birth register. This integrity would be undermined if the State were required to issue or maintain records that do not reflect historical and factual truth.
Goodwin v The United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18	European Court of Human Rights case recognising both: that “great importance” may be placed on the historical nature of birth record systems, and that arguments against creating exceptions to that system “weighed heavily,” and that, nonetheless, “respect for human dignity and human freedom” may require recognition of fundamental aspects of identity and personality, including changes to registration systems, to enable individuals (in that case, transgender persons) to live in dignity and worth according to their chosen sexual identity.	Judge Collins uses Goodwin to acknowledge: the general importance of maintaining the historical integrity of birth records, and that limited derogations may be required in exceptional circumstances implicating fundamental aspects of identity (such as gender recognition for transgender persons). He then distinguishes the present case, holding that nothing comparable arises here: the Appellants’ wish for documents in assumed names does not implicate fundamental aspects of their identity or their “sense of themselves,” even if Article 8 ECHR protections were assumed to align with the Constitution’s protections.
Simpson v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2019] IESC 81; [2020] 3 IR 113	A leading authority on: the concept of constitutional personhood and its close connection with human dignity, the proposition that each individual has an intrinsic worth that must be respected and protected by others and by the State, and the understanding of Article 40.3.2º’s protection of the “person” as encompassing a broad range of rights, including privacy and autonomy, which are essential to personal liberty and development. It also characterises dignity as a constitutional value underlying fundamental rights, especially equality before the law.	Judge Collins: Invokes Simpson to ground the right to identity in the broader framework of constitutional personhood, human dignity, equality, privacy and autonomy. Relies on Simpson as “the clearest and most authoritative statement” of the central place of human dignity as a constitutional value that informs the interpretation and application of personal rights. Uses its treatment of dignity as a value (rather than a free-standing right) as support for his conclusion that there is no separately justiciable “right to dignity” in the constitutional text.
NHV v Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESC 35; [2018] 1 IR 246	Reaffirms that the “essential equality of the human person” is the foundation of the Constitution and corrects an earlier restrictive interpretation of Article 40.1 (“human persons”) which had greatly narrowed its protection.	Cited to show that Irish constitutional law is anchored in the principle that every individual has the same intrinsic value and worth as a member of society. Judge Collins uses this to support his account of the right to identity as part of a constellation of rights grounded in equality and human dignity.
Quinn's Supermarket v Attorney General [1972] IR 1	An earlier Supreme Court authority that: recognises the “radical equality that underlies our inherent value as human beings,” and characterises Article 40.1 as a guarantee of equality as human persons, tied to human dignity and prohibiting inequalities based on assumptions that certain individuals or classes are inferior or superior to others.	Used to support the understanding of Article 40.1 as a robust guarantee of equality rooted in human dignity. Judge Collins notes that NHV restores this approach, after a period when reliance on the phrase “human persons” was used to narrow equality protection almost to vanishing point.
Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) [2000] 2 SCR 307	A Canadian Supreme Court case stating that: respect for the inherent dignity of persons is an essential value in a free and democratic society that must guide courts in interpreting the Charter, but dignity is not thereby elevated to a free-standing constitutional right.	Cited as a comparative authority consistent with the approach that dignity functions as a fundamental interpretive value rather than a separate, justiciable right. Judge Collins uses it to reinforce his position that dignity in the Irish constitutional order should be treated in a similar way.
Friends of the Irish Environment v Government of Ireland [2020] IESC 49; [2021] 3 IR 1	Explains the concept of a “derived right” in constitutional law, i.e. rights that may be derived from express constitutional provisions in particular circumstances.	Judge Collins invokes this case to explain why he does not regard a free-standing “right to dignity” as a plausible derived right. Instead, he considers dignity to be a springboard from which specific rights may be derived, rather than itself being derived from other provisions.
Fox v Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] IESC 61; [2022] 3 IR 221	Contains observations by the Chief Justice on dignity, consistent with the idea that dignity is a foundational concept from which rights can be derived.	Referred to in support of Judge Collins’s view that dignity is best understood as a springboard or foundational value which informs and generates concrete rights, rather than as a free-standing right in itself.
In re a Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2) [1996] 2 IR 79	A case in which references to dignity in the treatment of a ward of court are underpinned by recognised rights such as bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy.	Used by Judge Collins as an example where what might be described as “dignity rights” are, in substance, specific rights (bodily integrity, privacy, autonomy) that can entail an entitlement to be treated with dignity, without requiring recognition of a separate right to dignity.
People (DPP) v AM [2025] IESC 16	A recent judgment (authored by Judge Collins himself) where references to dignity in the treatment of a complainant in a criminal trial are grounded in rights to privacy and bodily integrity.	Cited as another instance where an entitlement to be treated with dignity arises from existing rights—privacy and bodily integrity—rather than from an autonomous constitutional right to dignity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Fundamental Characterisation of the Appellants’ Claim

Judge Collins begins by stating that he agrees with the judgment of the Chief Justice and that, for the reasons set out by the Chief Justice, the appeal should be dismissed. He then identifies what he considers the “fundamental difficulty” with the Appellants’ case:

• The Appellants’ claim is premised on an assertion that they have a right to receive, and that the State is under a corresponding duty to issue, birth certificates (and, by implication, other identity documents) in names different from those accurately recorded in the existing register of births under the Civil Registration Act 2004.
• There is no suggestion that the current entries are inaccurate. This sharply contrasts with cases such as Caldaras and Habte, where the applicants sought to correct demonstrable inaccuracies in official records.

On this basis, Judge Collins concludes that the Appellants are not asking the Court to vindicate a right to have their authentic particulars of birth accurately recorded. Instead, they seek the creation of fictitious civil status documents in assumed names so as to conceal their true identities.

2. The Nature of the Right to Identity and Its Limits

Judge Collins affirms that earlier cases, such as Caldaras and Habte, recognise a right to identity but emphasises the proper content of that right:

• The right identified in those authorities is a right to have one’s authentic name and civil registration details recorded and recognised by the State.
• It is therefore a right to accuracy and authenticity in public records, not a right to have those records altered to reflect assumed or adopted identities where the original records are already correct.

He states that it would “turn that right on its head” to allow it to be invoked in circumstances where the Appellants’ complaint is that their birth certificates “all too accurately” record their true identities—an identity which they wish to conceal. Accordingly, he holds that the right to identity recognised in Caldaras and Habte “simply will not do duty” for the Appellants.

3. Public Interest in the Integrity and Historical Nature of Birth Registration

Building on Foy and Chesnokov, Judge Collins underlines the constitutional and public importance of the civil registration system:

• The birth register is intended to record “the fact and event of birth” and to serve as a record of historical fact as well as a document of current identity.
• There is a “manifest and compelling” public interest in maintaining an accurate register of births (and other key civil events such as marriage and death) and in preserving that register’s “utmost integrity.”

He notes that this emphasis on historical accuracy is not peculiar to the Irish system. Relying on Goodwin, he notes that the European Court of Human Rights has recognised both:

• the “great importance” that may be attached to the historical nature of the birth record system, and
• the weight of arguments that creating exceptions could undermine its essential function.

Although Goodwin ultimately accepted that certain changes to birth and related records may be necessary in exceptional circumstances (primarily to allow transgender persons to live in dignity in accordance with their sexual identity), Judge Collins finds that “nothing like that arises here.” The Appellants’ situation does not involve a challenge by a person whose gender identity is not reflected in their historical birth record; rather, it concerns a wish to use assumed names for reasons not said to go to the core of personal identity in that sense.

4. Non-engagement of the Right to Identity in This Case

Having distinguished the authorities and emphasised the function of the registration system, Judge Collins concludes:

• Even accepting that the Constitution’s protections are co-extensive with Article 8 ECHR in this context, the analysis in Goodwin does not assist the Appellants.
• It is “not (and could not plausibly be) suggested” that the refusal to issue birth certificates in the Appellants’ assumed names strikes at fundamental aspects of their identity “as individual human beings” or their “sense of themselves.”
• Therefore, the right to identity is simply not engaged on the facts of this case.

5. The Right to Life Argument and Its Evidential Failure

Judge Collins acknowledges that, “in truth,” the only potentially plausible argument open to the Appellants is that:

• the State’s refusal to issue new, inaccurate birth certificates (and/or other official identity documents) amounts to a violation of their right to life, protected by Article 40.3 of the Constitution.

However, he finds that the evidence presented “falls a long way short” of establishing that:

• the unavailability of birth certificates in the Appellants’ assumed names, and/or
• the absence of a marriage certificate in the assumed name of the parents
• has put them in danger or increased any danger to which they might otherwise be exposed.

He adds that, if there had been “cogent evidence” of such danger, the Court would have had to confront the “difficult question” of whether the State’s duties under Article 40.3 could extend so far as to impose an obligation to issue fictitious identity documents. On the facts, however, no such question arises. The right to life claim therefore fails at the evidential threshold.

6. Constitutional Source and Content of the Right to Identity

Judge Collins then turns to a more general discussion of the constitutional foundations of a right to identity. He considers that there is no need to resort to “the murky waters of unenumerated rights” to find such a right:

• The right to identity is “an essential aspect” of various interlocking express rights, including:
  • the right to equality before the law in Article 40.1,
  • the protection of the person in Article 40.3.2º, and
  • the right to one’s good name in Article 40.3.2º.
• The right to a good name is said to be broader than a mere protection against defamation and is “arguably concerned with the protection of a person's place and reputation in civil society,” which necessarily implies a right to a social identity that the State must seek to protect.
• Recognition as a person—recognition of one’s personal and civil/social identity—is essential to participation as an equal in the free and democratic social and political community envisaged by the Constitution.

He endorses the view, articulated by another member of the Court, that it is impossible to function in modern society without a name and identity. Identity underpins parental and family relationships and civil status more broadly. Thus, “the right to know who you are, and the right to establish that identity to third parties and to have it recognised by the State,” are basic rights enjoyed by all.

7. Human Dignity as Constitutional Value (and Not a Standalone Right)

Judge Collins situates the right to identity within the broader constitutional commitment to human dignity and freedom, as articulated in the Preamble. He notes:

• The Preamble’s reference to “the dignity and freedom of the individual” predates and anticipates the centrality of dignity in many post-war human rights instruments.
• Constitutional personhood, closely connected with human dignity (as emphasised in Simpson), entails that each individual has an intrinsic worth that must be respected and protected by the State.
• The “essential equality of the human person” underpins the Constitution, as restated in NHV and earlier recognised in Quinn’s Supermarket.

Drawing on Simpson and comparative authorities such as Blencoe, he concludes that dignity should be understood primarily as a constitutional value:

• Simpson clearly characterises dignity as a value which “underlies all fundamental rights, especially that of equality before the law.”
• Dignity, in this sense, informs and “enlivens” the interpretation and application of express personal rights, including privacy, autonomy and equality.
• While there is substantial academic debate (including Irish commentary) about whether dignity can or should be conceptualised as a constitutional right, Judge Collins is not persuaded that the constitutional text supports recognition of a free-standing “right to dignity.”

In particular, he reasons that:

• Dignity is referred to in the Preamble but not expressed in terms of a justiciable constitutional right, unlike express rights elsewhere in the text.
• The drafters of the Constitution used rights language when that was their intention; the absence of such language in relation to dignity suggests a deliberate choice.
• Dignity cannot plausibly be regarded as a “derived right” as explained in Friends of the Irish Environment. Rather, dignity is the springboard from which, in certain circumstances, other rights may be derived.
• Case law references to “dignity rights” (such as In re a Ward of Court and People (DPP) v AM) are best understood as references to underlying, established rights (bodily integrity, privacy, autonomy) that entail an entitlement to be treated with dignity in specific contexts.

He thus sees Simpson as providing the most authoritative account of dignity’s role: as a central, foundational constitutional value that guides the interpretation and application of personal rights, rather than as a separate justiciable right.

8. The Limited Relevance of the Dignity Debate to the Outcome

Finally, Judge Collins emphasises that, as the Chief Justice has observed, the resolution of the present appeal does not depend on whether human dignity is to be regarded as a constitutional value, a right, or both. While he has outlined the issues that would arise were that question to be squarely addressed in a future case, it is not necessary to decide it here.

The decisive points are instead:

• The Appellants seek inaccurate identity documents for the purpose of concealing their true identities.
• The right to identity, properly understood, is a right to have authentic particulars accurately recorded and recognised, not a right to fictitious records.
• The public interest in maintaining the historical integrity of the birth register is strong and recognised in both domestic and European case law.
• The evidence does not establish any violation of the right to life arising from the State’s refusal to issue such documents.

For these reasons, Judge Collins concludes, in agreement with the Chief Justice, that the appeal must be dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court, with Judge Collins concurring, held that the Appellants are not entitled to be issued with new birth certificates or other official identity documents in assumed names that differ from the accurate particulars recorded in the civil register. The Court further held that:

• The right to identity recognised in prior Irish case law is a right to have one’s authentic particulars of birth accurately recorded and recognised, and that right is not engaged where the existing records are already accurate.
• On the evidence presented, the refusal of the State to issue the requested fictitious documents does not amount to a violation of the Appellants’ right to life under Article 40.3, because there is no cogent evidence that the absence of such documents has placed them in danger.
• There is no basis in the constitutional text or existing authority for recognising a free-standing constitutional right to dignity; rather, dignity functions as a foundational value that informs and underlies the interpretation of express personal rights.

Accordingly, the appeal was DISMISSED.

Implications:

• For the parties, the immediate consequence is that the existing birth register entries and associated civil status documents remain unchanged. The State is not required to create or issue replacement birth certificates or other official documents in the Appellants’ assumed names.
• The judgment clarifies and limits the scope of the constitutional right to identity in the context of civil registration: it is a right to accuracy and authenticity in public records, not a right to concealment through fictitious documentation.
• The decision underscores the “manifest and compelling” public interest in maintaining the historical integrity of civil status registers and aligns domestic law with the European Court of Human Rights’ recognition of the importance of the historical nature of birth records.
• On the broader doctrinal plane, while not strictly necessary to the outcome, the judgment provides a strong indication that the Supreme Court regards human dignity principally as a constitutional value that informs the interpretation of express rights, and not as a free-standing, justiciable constitutional right in itself. However, Judge Collins explicitly notes that the precise status of dignity may require further consideration in future cases.
• The judgment does not purport to create new constitutional rights or to set out a comprehensive test for when changes to civil registration records may be required (for example, in circumstances akin to those in Goodwin). Its principal precedential value lies in reinforcing the distinction between correcting inaccuracies in official records and creating fictitious records, and in clarifying the constitutional analysis that applies when such claims are made.