Anonymised Summary of Judgment (Costs) — Judge Fontaine

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment concerns an outstanding costs dispute arising from a remote hearing held on 14 July 2025 in a defamation claim. The Plaintiffs were represented by legal professionals; the Defendants, who are a married couple, acted in person (the Second Defendant briefly confirmed she wished to be represented by the First Defendant, with the court's agreement). At that hearing the Defendants' application to strike out the claim ("the strike out application") and the Plaintiffs' application for permission to amend their Particulars of Claim ("the amendment application") were both listed. Neither application succeeded: the Defendants' strike out application was dismissed and the Plaintiffs' amendment application was refused on the ground that a complete, written amended draft had not been provided to the court or to the Defendants. The court granted leave to restore the amendment application with directions for service of a draft amended pleading and related steps.

The claim was subsequently stayed by order of 28 July 2025 so the parties could attempt mediation. The parties engaged in mediation ordered by the court (26 July 2025) which took place before Judge Skinner on 19 September 2025 and was successful. One issue remained unresolved after mediation: who should bear the costs of the hearing on 14 July 2025. This judgment determines that reserved costs issue on the papers after written submissions from both sides.

Legal Issues Presented

1. How should the costs of the 14 July 2025 hearing be allocated between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, applying the general rule in CPR r.44.2(2) and any exercise of the court’s discretion under r.44.2(2)(b)?
2. What quantum of costs is appropriate to award to the Plaintiffs for defending the Defendants' strike out application, having regard to the work done, counsel's fees, solicitor time, VAT and the particular circumstances of the hearing?
3. What approach should the court adopt in assessing the Defendants' costs claimed as litigants in person, and what figure should be allowed for the Defendants' costs of the amendment application given the absence of a properly itemised statement?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

• The Plaintiffs submitted that the Defendants' strike out application had no prospect of success and that the Plaintiffs should recover their costs of that application.
• The Plaintiffs proposed a reduction to their claimed costs equal to the Defendants' costs of dealing with the amendment application (proposing a deduction of £493.32 from the Plaintiffs' claimed sum).
• The Plaintiffs made written submissions concerning the correct approach to assessing litigant-in-person costs and relied on guidance (including the summary assessment guide and commentary in the White Book) to contest the Defendants' unitemised costs claim.

Defendants' Arguments

• The Defendants, appearing in person, sought costs relating to the hearing. Their written position included claims of time costs and disbursements, but the narrative supplied covered the entire claim to settlement and was not itemised or separately apportioned to the amendment application.
• The Defendants did not initially consent to the amendment application made by the Plaintiffs at the hearing, although they later consented when a fully amended draft was served following the directions given in court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Morris v Wiltshire & Woodspring DC (unreported, 16 January 1998) (Jacob J)	Authority cited for the approach to assessing a litigant in person’s claimed costs: the bill must be gone through in some detail and the exercise involves comparing a litigant in person rate with two-thirds of the notional solicitor rate and giving the lower figure.	The court relied on this approach when determining the appropriate sum to allow for the Defendants' costs of the amendment application in the absence of a properly itemised statement of costs.
Mealing McLeod v Common Professional Examination Board [2000] 2 Costs LR 223 (Buckley J)	Authority for the proposition that it is appropriate to allow a litigant in person more time for a particular task than would be allowed to a solicitor.	The court noted this principle when assessing the Defendants' litigant-in-person claim and in deciding to adopt a conservative, guided approach (using standard rates and the two-thirds notional-solicitor comparison) given the lack of detailed time records.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court started from the general rule in CPR r.44.2(2): the unsuccessful party normally pays the successful party’s costs. The court recognised that r.44.2(2)(b) permits a different order and therefore considered relevant factors that could justify departing from the general rule.

The judge identified several factual and procedural factors relevant to the exercise of discretion:

• The Defendants' strike out application had already been listed when the Plaintiffs' amendment application was made; the judge directed both to be heard at the same hearing, meaning no additional burden was caused by separate attendance.
• Although the Defendants did not consent to the amendment application at the hearing, they later consented once a fully drafted Amended Particulars of Claim was provided in accordance with the directions. The court emphasised that litigants in person (and the court) are entitled to receive a properly formulated amended statement of case in order to decide whether to agree to amendments.
• The Defendants had not pleaded a CPR-compliant Defence and therefore would, in any event, have needed to amend their Defence irrespective of the Plaintiffs' proposed amendments.
• The hearing itself was not wasted because it prompted the parties, at the court’s urging, to consider mediation; the court subsequently ordered mediation which led to settlement — a factor tending to moderate the costs award.

On the quantum of the Plaintiffs' costs for defending the strike out application, the judge accepted that the strike out application had no realistic prospect of success and that the Plaintiffs should recover costs. However, recognizing that:

• Counsel had been instructed and prepared a full skeleton argument; and
• the hearing facilitated a process that led to settlement (thus saving wider costs),

the judge allowed the Plaintiffs' costs but applied a percentage reduction to reflect these and related factors. The court analysed the costs claimed and the Plaintiffs' Statement of Costs:

• The Plaintiffs' skeleton argued total costs of £7,716 for defending the strike out application, but the formal Statement of Costs for the hearing showed £6,066.20 (including VAT) and did not separate the two applications' costs.
• The court reviewed items: solicitor attendances deemed reasonable (£1,189); preparation of the hearing bundle (3 hours at a claimed £1,110) assessed as excessive and reduced to a more reasonable £600 based on use of a trainee plus a Grade B solicitor; counsel's combined fees (conference and hearing) were recognised as high and the court allowed a combined figure of £2,000 for those items.
• On that basis the permitted total before further allowances was calculated as £3,789 (fees) + £1,000 (additional solicitor and counsel time on costs) = £4,789. VAT of £957.80 was added to give £5,746.80.
• The court then applied a 15% reduction to reflect the matters identified (including the hearing facilitating settlement) and a further 5% reduction because the statement of costs covered both applications; these reductions produced an assessed figure of £4,597.44 in favour of the Plaintiffs.

On the Defendants' claimed costs, the court noted the Defendants had supplied a narrative and an overall figure (time costs and disbursements totalling £8,719.36) that related to the whole claim and was not separately itemised for the amendment application; the court therefore treated it as not a realistic, compliant statement for this narrowly focused costs dispute.

Applying the guidance cited (including the exercise described in the Guide to the Summary Assessment of Costs and the White Book commentary) the court accepted the Plaintiffs' estimate for the Defendants' costs attributable to the amendment application at a figure of £493.32 (calculated on the basis of two-thirds of two hours of a Grade B solicitor's time). That figure was used to set off the Defendants' costs against the Plaintiffs' costs.

The net result of the set-off was a sum due from the Defendants to the Plaintiffs of £4,104.12. The court ordered that this sum be paid within 28 days of the assessment of costs, specifying the deadline as 4.00 pm on 1 December 2025.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court ordered that, after set-off, the Defendants must pay the Plaintiffs the net sum of £4,104.12, to be paid within 28 days of the assessment (by 4.00 pm on 1 December 2025).

Implications:

• Direct effect: The Defendants are liable to pay the assessed net costs figure to the Plaintiffs by the date specified. The Plaintiffs recover a reduced sum for defending the strike out application; the Defendants recover a modest sum for their work on the amendment application, resulting in the stated net liability.
• Procedure and precedent: The judgment applies established principles (CPR r.44.2(2) and the exercise of discretion under r.44.2(2)(b)) and follows existing guidance on assessing litigant-in-person costs (as reflected in the cited authorities and texts). The judgment does not purport to establish a new principle of law beyond the application of those authorities to the facts of this case.

This summary is strictly confined to the matters and figures set out in the provided opinion. No information not contained in the judgment has been added.