Anonymised Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by the Solicitor General for leave to refer a sentence imposed on the Respondent for controlling and coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship contrary to sections 76(1) and (11) of the Serious Crime Act 2015. The Respondent, a 35‑year‑old man of previously good character, pleaded guilty on the first day of trial on 14 July 2025 at the Crown Court at The City after a Goodyear indication on the full facts of the prosecution case.

The Judge sentenced the Respondent to a suspended sentence order: a custodial term of 18 months suspended for 24 months, a requirement to complete 100 hours' unpaid work, a rehabilitation activity requirement of up to ten days, a ten‑year restraining order, and a victim surcharge.

The offending arose out of a long‑running on‑and‑off relationship of about seven years between the Respondent and the Victim. The conduct included physical assaults (including two incidents of choking/strangulation in 2018 and 2022), threats, property damage (including use of an axe to damage outbuildings and ornaments), belittling and controlling behaviour (insulting, monitoring, checking phones, restricting friendships), sexual pressure after surgery, isolating the Victim from family and friends, and behaviour after separation that aggravated the earlier conduct (entering the Victim's property to look through drawers, driving past and watching the house).

Procedurally, the Respondent was arrested and interviewed in April 2023. Initial decisions not to charge were revisited and a charge was made by postal requisition on 25 July 2024. The Respondent appeared in the magistrates' court, the matter was sent to the Crown Court, plea and trial preparations occurred, and on 14 July 2025 the Goodyear indication and guilty plea were entered and sentencing followed in accordance with the indication.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence of 18 months' custody (reduced from a starting point of 30 months and discounted for a guilty plea) was unduly lenient such that leave should be granted to refer the sentence for increase.
2. Whether, if the overall quantum of custody was appropriate, the sentence should nevertheless have been immediate custody rather than suspended.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Pattison (on behalf of the Solicitor General)

• The sentence of 18 months' custody was too low given the agreed categorisation of the offending as category A1.
• The sentence should not have been suspended; immediate custody would have been appropriate given aspects of the offending (including strangulation).

Attorney Finnegan (on behalf of the Respondent)

• The sentence imposed was appropriate; it might be lenient but was not unduly lenient.
• The Judge started from the correct starting point (category A1) and properly balanced aggravating and mitigating factors, including the Respondent's previous good character, work, effects on others, and delay in prosecution.
• Even if the sentence were considered lenient, it should not be increased due to a combination of mitigation and subsequent progress (compliance with conditions and engagement with probation).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Alfie Cook [2023] EWCA Crim 452	Referenced in relation to sentencing for strangulation: used as part of guidance on an appropriate starting point for a single offence of strangulation.	The court noted this decision as part of the materials suggesting an 18‑month starting point for a single strangulation offence, which normally results in immediate custody; the opinion treated it as a relevant sentencing benchmark but applied the principles to the facts of the present case.
R v Borsodi [2023] EWCA Crim 899 (para. 17)	Reinforces that a starting point for strangulation can be 18 months and that such offending will normally attract immediate custody; emphasises that each case turns on its own facts.	The court used Borsodi to highlight that, while strangulation often warrants immediate custody with a similar starting point, Borsodi also supports that sentencing must be fact‑sensitive; the court therefore assessed whether the first instance judge's balancing fell outside a reasonable range.
Attorney General's Reference No 4 of 1989	Authority for the principle that even where an appellate court considers a sentence unduly lenient, it retains a discretion whether to exercise its powers.	The court relied on this precedent to emphasize the limited scope for reference and the appellate court's discretion; it formed part of the framework for assessing whether to grant leave to refer.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reciting and applying the established principles governing references of sentences. It emphasised that:

• The trial judge is particularly well placed to assess competing aggravating and mitigating factors because of proximity to the evidence and sentencing context;
• A sentence is only unduly lenient if it falls outside the range of sentences which the judge at first instance might reasonably consider appropriate;
• Leave to refer should not be granted in borderline cases; Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is aimed at cases of gross error; and even where an appellate court considers a sentence unduly lenient it retains a discretion whether to act (Attorney General's Reference No 4 of 1989).

Applying those principles, the court accepted that the Judge at first instance was correct to categorise the offending as category A1, with a starting point of two years six months (30 months). The court identified important aggravating factors (persistent abuse over a prolonged period; multiple methods of control; physical assaults including strangulation; presence of children during some offending; threats and property damage) and important mitigating factors (the Respondent's lack of previous convictions, compliance with bail conditions, absence of further offending since the acts, prospects of rehabilitation, and personal mitigation such as employment and family responsibilities).

The court acknowledged that, as an appellate panel, some members would have reduced the sentence by a smaller amount (i.e., would have imposed a longer custodial sentence or imposed immediate custody) but concluded that the reduction to 18 months (after an indicated sentence of 20 months and a 10% guilty‑plea discount) and the decision to suspend that sentence fell within the ambit of decisions the first instance judge could reasonably make. The court noted there was no indication that any relevant factor had been omitted from the Judge's consideration.

On the specific question of suspension, the court recognised that immediate custody would be a defensible option given the serious elements (notably strangulation), but nevertheless found that the Judge had exercised a lawful discretion in suspending the sentence. The court took into account post‑sentence developments shown in probation material (substantial completion of unpaid work hours, engagement with probation, emerging insight, and ongoing mental health issues affecting employment) as supportive of the view that the suspension was not inappropriate in all the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court REFUSED the application for leave and REFUSED the reference. In short, the court held that although the sentence was lenient, it was not unduly lenient.

Implications:

• The sentence imposed by the trial court stands: an 18‑month custodial term suspended for 24 months with requirements to complete 100 hours' unpaid work, a rehabilitation activity requirement of up to ten days, a ten‑year restraining order, and a victim surcharge.
• The court affirmed the principle that appellate intervention is limited to cases where the first instance judge has fallen into gross error or the sentence lies outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge; borderline or debatable decisions should not attract a referral.
• No new sentencing precedent was established by this decision; the court applied existing guidelines and authorities to conclude that the first instance judge's exercise of discretion was within a reasonable range.

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Note: All names and identifying particulars in this summary have been anonymised and replaced with generic placeholders; the summary is strictly based on the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.