Anonymized Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application for permission to appeal against a judgment of Judge Tindal, sitting in the Administrative Court. The application was heard by a panel including Judge Newey, who gives the principal reasons recorded here. Permission to appeal was refused at the conclusion of the hearing on 23 October 2025; this document explains the reasons for that decision.

The Appellant is a 16‑year‑old (referred to in the originating judgment by initials). She was born in a foreign State and came to the State with her parents and a younger brother in 2012. The parents entered initially on visitor visas which expired and were not renewed; the parents therefore became overstayers.

In 2023 the Appellant's mother left the Appellant's father following domestic abuse. The Defendant (the local authority) provided the Appellant, her mother and her brothers with emergency accommodation (initially a hotel and then a shared house) and provided financial support. The Defendant proceeded on the basis that, lacking leave to remain, the family was ineligible for support under the mainstream welfare benefits system, relying on paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 ("NIAA 2002"). The opinion records that paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to NIAA 2002 provides an exception where exercise of a power or performance of a duty is necessary to avoid breach of a person's Convention rights.

In November 2023 the Appellant's mother applied for leave to remain under the Immigration Rules and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; at the time of the hearing before Judge Tindal that application remained undetermined.

By mid‑2024 the Defendant was paying the family £196.72 per week pursuant to an assessment dated 24 April 2024. On 16 July 2024 the Appellant issued a claim for judicial review challenging that assessment. The claim form sought (i) a declaration that the financial assistance was unlawful as contrary to section 17 of the Children Act 1989 and Article 8 ECHR, (ii) a declaration that the Defendant's policy/practice for financial assistance under section 17 was unlawful to the extent it was fixed on asylum support levels, (iii) damages for breach of ECHR rights, and (iv) costs.

The claim was heard on 21 November 2024 and Judge Tindal gave judgment on 7 January 2025. The Judge rejected contentions that the family should be paid more under section 17 CA 1989 or Article 8 ECHR but quashed the challenged assessment on other grounds. An order dated 4 February 2025 quashed the assessment for the reasons given in the judgment. The Defendant completed a reassessment on 3 April 2025 and concluded that the level of support should not be changed.

The Appellant issued an appellant's notice seeking, among other things, a variation of the Judge's order so as to grant additional grounds (referred to as Grounds 1A and 1B in the notice). Three grounds of appeal were advanced: Ground 1 challenged the Judge's interpretation of paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to NIAA 2002 (alleging error in concluding the provision permitted restriction of support to an overstayer family); Grounds 2 and 3 concerned whether Article 8 ECHR was engaged and/or breached.

On 29 July 2025 Judge Snowden directed that the permission application be listed on a "rolled‑up" basis so the appeal would follow if permission were granted. Subsequently, on 12 August 2025 the Home Secretary determined that the family should be granted leave to remain. On 15 August 2025 the Defendant informed the court that, having been granted leave to remain, the family were applying for appropriate benefits and secure housing and that the Defendant would continue to provide support until arrangements were in place.

Because the family were granted leave to remain, the parties' dispute about the effect of paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to NIAA 2002 became academic: no one in the family remained an overstayer and they were no longer subject to the restriction in paragraph 1. The Appellant did not pursue damages in the appellant's notice and did not challenge the reassessment carried out in compliance with the Judge's order. After considering precedent and principles governing academic appeals, the court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal. Judge Newey states the conclusion and is joined by Judge Singh and Judge Bean.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 was misinterpreted by Judge Tindal in a way that permitted the Defendant to restrict provision of support to the Appellant's mother and family because she was an overstayer (Ground 1).
2. Whether Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights was engaged on the facts of the case (Ground 2).
3. Whether there was a breach of Article 8 ECHR (Ground 3).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant argued that Judge Tindal had erred in his interpretation of paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to NIAA 2002, contending that the Judge wrongly concluded that paragraph 3 permitted the Defendant to restrict support because the mother was an overstayer. The Appellant submitted that this interpretation had wider significance for future cases involving migrant families with an overstayer parent.
• On Article 8 grounds, the Appellant contended that Judge Tindal erred in concluding that Article 8 was not engaged (Ground 2) and that he misdirected himself in failing to find that Article 8 had been breached (Ground 3). The skeleton argument for the appeal emphasised that errors on Article 8 would have material impact on future similar cases.

Defendant's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Defendant's legal arguments in the appeal application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Salem [1999] 1 AC 450	Establishes that appellate courts have a discretion to hear public law appeals that have become academic between the parties, but that discretion should be exercised with caution; appeals that are academic should not be heard unless there is a public interest reason (for example, a discrete point of statutory construction likely to arise in many cases soon).	The court relied on Salem to frame its discretionary approach to the now‑academic appeal and concluded there was no sufficient public interest reason to hear the appeal between the parties (no need to resolve the point now for the wider public interest in this context).
R (Dolan) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2020] EWCA Civ 1605; [2021] 1 WLR 2326	Illustrates exercising discretion to decide a discrete point of statutory construction despite other aspects being academic where deciding the discrete issue serves the public interest.	The court considered Dolan as an example where it was appropriate to decide a discrete legal question; it contrasted Dolan with the present case and concluded Ground 1 did not meet the same standard of public interest necessity here.
References in Salem to the "Sun Life" case and Ainsbury v Millington	Used in Salem to signal that the discretion to hear academic appeals in public law differs from the approach in private law disputes between parties.	The court noted Salem's discussion of those authorities as part of the reasoning why academic public law appeals should be approached cautiously; those authorities were not applied to resolve the substantive issue in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds from the factual development that the family's immigration status changed between the first instance judgment and the appeal hearing. Because the Home Secretary granted leave to remain to the family, the factual basis for the Appellant's challenge under paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to NIAA 2002 ceased to exist: the family were no longer overstayers, and thus the restriction in paragraph 1 did not apply.

On that basis the court treated the appeal as academic between the parties. The court then applied the principles articulated in Salem concerning the discretionary power to hear academic public law appeals: although a court may hear such appeals, it should do so only where there is a good public interest reason — for example, when a discrete statutory construction point arises that does not require detailed factual inquiry and where many similar cases are anticipated.

The court analysed the three grounds of appeal against that framework. Grounds 2 and 3 (Article 8 engagement and breach) were held to be fact‑specific; the panel (as accepted by Attorney Khubber for the Appellant) concluded these grounds were unsuitable for resolution in an academic appeal because they require detailed factual consideration and therefore would not be appropriately decided when the appeal between the parties no longer raised live issues.

Ground 1 (interpretation of paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to NIAA 2002) was acknowledged to raise a principally legal question that did not depend on the detailed facts of the case. Nonetheless, applying Salem's cautionary approach, the court considered whether there was a sufficient public interest reason to decide the statutory construction issue now. The court concluded that it was not evident the issue would need to be resolved in the near future nor that this case presented the most suitable context in which to do so; the court considered it would be better resolved in a case in which the issue was live and of significance to the parties.

The court also noted procedural and tactical points: the Appellant's originating claim had sought damages for breach of ECHR rights, but the appellant's notice did not pursue damages; the Appellant had not challenged the Defendant's reassessment undertaken under the first instance order. These factors diminished the practical consequences of denying permission and supported the exercise of discretion to refuse to hear the academic appeal.

Accordingly, in the exercise of the court's discretion, and applying the precedents cited, the court declined to grant permission to appeal.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: PERMISSION TO APPEAL REFUSED. The panel refused permission to appeal at the hearing (the decision to refuse permission was communicated at the hearing on 23 October 2025 and the reasons are set out in the opinion).

Implications:

• The appeal is academic between the parties because the family were granted leave to remain; the restriction in paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to NIAA 2002 no longer applies to them.
• The court did not decide the substantive interpretation of paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to NIAA 2002 nor did it determine the Article 8 issues on the merits. Ground 1 was not decided and was left for resolution in a case where the issue is live and of direct significance to the parties.
• No broader precedent or new legal principle was established by this refusal; the direct effect is that the Appellant's application for permission to appeal is refused and the reassessment by the Defendant stands (the reassessment having concluded no change to the level of support).

The opinion is signed by Judge Newey (delivering the reasons), with agreement recorded from Judge Singh and Judge Bean.