Structured and Anonymized Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This case concerns a request for environmental information made on 12 November 2018 by the Applicant concerning a proposed windfarm project. The request sought, among other things, cost-benefit or economic analyses, business cases, board documentation and minutes related to the project.

Timeline of key events (based exclusively on the opinion):

• 12 November 2018: Applicant submitted an access-to-environmental-information request to the notice party (the public body).
• 16 November 2018: The notice party requested clarification of parts of the request; the Applicant supplied a narrowed version the same day.
• 11 December 2018: The notice party refused the request.
• 10 January 2019: Applicant sought internal review.
• 9 February 2019: Internal review timeframe expired without decision, producing an implied refusal.
• 25 February 2019: Applicant appealed to the Respondent (the independent reviewer). On 22 November 2019 the Respondent varied the notice party's decision in part and directed that a fresh decision be made by the notice party.
• 20 February 2020: The notice party again refused access; internal review affirmed that refusal on 26 March 2020.
• 27 April 2020: Applicant appealed to the Respondent (accepted out of time).
• 15 September 2021: The Respondent referred certain legal points to the High Court (reg. 12(9)(a) of the AIE Regulations).
• 28 April 2023: The High Court issued a judgment clarifying aspects of exemptions under the relevant AIE Regulations.
• Mid-2024 to November 2024: The Respondent engaged with the notice party about remittal; key exchanges dated 2 July 2024 and 7 November 2024 recorded the Respondent's intention to remit.
• 19 December 2024: The Respondent annulled the notice party's decision and directed a fresh internal review by the notice party (the impugned remittal decision).
• By this stage the underlying planning permission related to the information had lapsed.
• 24 January 2025: Applicant became aware of communications between the Respondent and the notice party on extracts from the Respondent's file.
• 14 March 2025: Judicial review proceedings challenging the Respondent's 19 December 2024 decision were issued by the Applicant.
• 24 March 2025: Leave to bring the judicial review was granted.
• 20 October 2025: Main hearing took place. Judgment was reserved.
• 24 October 2025: A draft of the present judgment was circulated to the parties for limited comment.
• 24 October 2025 (separately): The Respondent issued a later appeal decision (on the third internal review) which varied and annulled parts of the notice party's decision and directed release of certain information; that later decision was not part of the reasoning for the 19 December 2024 decision and did not affect the judicial review of the remittal decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, in the performance of the Respondent's functions on appeal under the AIE Regulations and related instruments, there is a duty of timeliness/expedition that requires the Respondent to act so as to make a final decision without remitting the matter to the notice party where remittal would likely cause further delay.
2. Whether remittal of an appeal by the Respondent to the notice party was lawful in domestic law under reg. 12(5) of the AIE Regulations (i.e., whether the Respondent had jurisdiction to remit and, if so, on what basis).
3. Whether communication between the Respondent and the notice party without copying the Applicant and without giving the Applicant an opportunity to address submissions breached the Applicant's right to fair procedures.
4. Whether the impugned remittal decision gave adequate reasons.
5. Whether remittal in the circumstances breached the Applicant's right to an adequate, effective and timely remedy under the Aarhus Convention, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and the AIE Directive.
6. Whether the judicial review proceedings were moot or futile in light of subsequent administrative steps and decisions.
7. If the Applicant succeeds on the procedural points, what remedies would be appropriate.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Respondent acted unlawfully and ultra vires by annulling the notice party's decision and directing a fresh internal review rather than reviewing the decision on the material before the Respondent (reg. 12(5)(a)).
• The Respondent breached fair procedures by communicating directly with the notice party without informing or copying the Applicant and without providing an opportunity for the Applicant to respond to the notice party's submissions.
• The Respondent failed to provide sufficient reasons for remittal and repeatedly remitted the matter, thereby denying the Applicant an effective and timely remedy under domestic and European law.
• Remittal in the circumstances infringed obligations of timeliness required by Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention and related EU provisions (including interpretation obligations under Article 47 CFR and the AIE Directive).
• The Applicant sought declaratory relief and, alternatively, quashing (certiorari) of the 19 December 2024 decision (with an extension of time if required).

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent accepted there is an obligation of timeliness but submitted that remittal falls within the Respondent's jurisdiction under reg. 12(5) of the AIE Regulations and is compatible with national procedural autonomy and the AIE regime.
• The Respondent maintained that the communications with the notice party were administrative and non-consequential; copying every administrative exchange to applicants would be impractical and risk delay.
• The Respondent argued that remittal was the most efficient way to progress the appeal in light of the High Court decision clarifying the law, backlogs, and the need to allow the notice party to make updated submissions—efficiency and administrative resource considerations justified remittal.
• The Respondent suggested the judicial review might be moot because a fresh internal review had been completed and a further appeal and decision were ongoing.

Notice Party's (Company A) Observations

• The notice party did not actively participate in the hearing and took a largely watching role; affidavit evidence indicated the notice party did not request remittal and described some exchanges as administrative.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedents are listed by citation and court (party names omitted in this summary to comply with anonymization requirements). Entries reflect the rule or principle for which the authority was cited and how the court applied it in this opinion, as stated in the text.

Precedent (citation and forum)	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
[2023] IEHC 227 (High Court)	Clarification of scope of exemptions under the AIE Regulations (reference made during consideration of the appellant's request).	Used as context: the High Court judgment altered the legal landscape and formed part of the reason why the Respondent invited updated submissions and considered remittal appropriate.
[2017] IESC 75; [2017] 3 I.R. 751 (Supreme Court)	Principle that fair procedures need not be uniform; procedural requirements vary with context; caution against treating administrative processes as criminal-trial-like.	Cited to support the proposition that administrative communications with the notice party were not necessarily a breach of fair procedures in these circumstances.
[2023] IESC 11 (Supreme Court)	Warning against entitlement to elaborate procedures at every point; procedural fairness depends on context.	Used to caution against demanding excessively elaborate procedural safeguards at every administrative exchange.
[2018] IESC 31; [2021] 2 I.R. 752 (Supreme Court)	Standards for adequate reasons in administrative decisions.	The court held that the reasons given for remittal met established requirements for reasons (citing this authority as guidance).
(1911) 219 U.S. 498 (US Supreme Court)	Doctrine concerning cases that "evade review" and repetition-capable categories.	Applied to support the view that certain administrative practices (like quick remittal) can evade effective judicial review and so declaratory relief can be appropriate.
[1981] I.R. 62 (Domestic appeal authority cited)	Related authority cited alongside the “evade review” doctrine.	Referenced in the discussion of cases that evade review and the implications for granting declaratory relief.
[2015] IEHC 768 (High Court)	Authority cited in the context of the "evade review" principle and timing of judicial review.	Used to illustrate practical difficulties in obtaining judicial review in time to pre-empt administrative action.
[2017] IEHC 611 (High Court)	Authority on repetition-capable matters and ability to obtain judicial review.	Referred to in support of the argument that declaratory relief can be appropriate where the administrative process would otherwise evade review.
[2024] IEHC 472 (High Court)	Domestic authority cited on mootness and reviewability in environmental context.	Used to show the court's approach to mootness in environmental judicial review claims.
[2025] EWHC 2761 (Admin) (England & Wales)	Illustration that judicial review is a backward-looking speedy audit and that remedies can be valuable even if implemented after administrative steps.	Cited to reinforce that judicial review can be backward-looking without undermining its public interest value; supported the non-mootness of declaratory relief.
[2025] EWHC 1729 (Admin)	Reference to the role of judicial review as a speedy audit of legality.	Contextual support for the importance of judicial review timing and remedies.
[2025] IESCDET 74 (Supreme Court determination)	Limits on admissibility of EU law references when premised on incorrect factual assertions or when not necessary for domestic resolution.	Cited in discussing criteria for referring questions to the CJEU and the necessity condition under art. 267 TFEU.
[2023] IECA 63 (Court of Appeal)	Guidance that a reference under art. 267 TFEU is not admissible if it would not affect the outcome of the case.	Used in formulating the court's analysis of whether a CJEU reference was necessary to resolve the present dispute.
(1982) EU:C:1982:335 (CILFIT, ECJ)	Principle: reference relates to interpretation/validity not application; national court not compelled to refer where no genuine point of interpretation arises.	Used to frame admissibility criteria for art. 267 references and to explain limits on referral obligations.
C-561/19 EU:C:2021:799 (Grand Chamber)	Principles on acte clair/ acte éclairé and the limits of the duty to refer.	Applied when considering whether proposed questions to the CJEU were sufficiently novel and necessary to warrant referral.
Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v. Belgium (ECHR, 20 Sept 2011)	Requirement to give reasons when declining to refer a question (relevant to national courts' duties).	Referred to in explaining the duty to give reasons for a decision not to refer under art. 267 TFEU.
C‑176/96 EU:C:2000:201	Precedent that reference is inadmissible if procedure is concluded.	Used to explain when a court may no longer refer to the CJEU.
C‑3/16 EU:C:2017:209	Acte clair/ acte éclairé principle application.	Part of the background legal framework for assessing whether the questions were acte clair.
Jeroen van Schijndel and van Veen C‑430/93 & C‑431/93 EU:C:1995:441	Rules on admissibility specific to the national procedure and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.	Referred to when addressing whether national procedural rules bar a reference to the CJEU.
C‑165/09 to C‑167/09 EU:C:2011:348	Principles concerning the national court's discretion and responsibility in making a reference.	Cited as part of the general principles guiding references under art. 267 TFEU.
C‑70/20 EU:C:2021:379	National courts' responsibility to determine need and relevance of questions to the CJEU.	Used to support the court's exercise of discretion to send questions to the CJEU.
C-225/22 EU:C:2025:649	Authority on national courts disregarding conflicting national precedent if inconsistent with EU law.	Referred to in the broader discussion of national courts' obligations under EU law.
Various CJEU authorities on the duty and scope of referrals (multiple ECJ/GC citations)	General principles governing when and how national courts may refer questions to the CJEU (art. 267 TFEU).	Collected to underpin the court's decision to frame and refer specific legal questions to the CJEU.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning addressed multiple, interlinked themes: statutory architecture and remit of the Respondent under the AIE Regulations; the content and effect of international and EU obligations of timeliness (Aarhus Convention, AIE Directive, Charter); procedural fairness; jurisdiction to remit; reasons and timeliness; mootness and remedies; and whether a reference to the Court of Justice (CJEU) was necessary.

1. Statutory architecture and scope of the Respondent's powers

The court interpreted reg. 12(5) of the AIE Regulations, which directs the Respondent to review an appeal, to affirm, vary or annul the public authority's decision and, where appropriate, require disclosure. The court held that the power to annul logically imports the consequence that the public authority must, where appropriate, undertake a fresh decision-making process; remittal, therefore, is properly described as the natural consequence of annulment where the Respondent does not itself order disclosure. In other words, an explicit express power to remit was not necessary for such a remittal to be the practical consequence of annulling an internal review decision.

2. Timeliness and its legal sources

The court recognised that an obligation of timeliness and expedition derives from Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention (which requires that procedures provide adequate and effective remedies that are fair and timely), recital 13 of Directive 2003/4/EC, Article 6 of the AIE Directive and more generally from Article 47 of the Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights framework for timely procedures. The court accepted the Respondent's acknowledgement that timeliness is an obligation but analysed its implications for a decision whether to remit or to decide on the merits.

3. Fairness of communications

The court accepted that communications between the Respondent and the public authority were largely administrative and non-consequential and held that, on the facts, there was no demonstrated breach of fair procedures by the Respondent in conducting such communications without copying the Applicant. The court emphasised contextuality of fair procedures and warned against a one-size-fits-all rule requiring replication of elaborate procedural protections at every administrative step. The court did encourage, as best practice, maximising sharing of comments where practicable, but found no legal prejudice to the Applicant from the exchanges described.

4. Jurisdiction to remit

The court concluded that the Respondent has jurisdiction under reg. 12(5) to annul a public authority decision and that an annulment that does not itself order disclosure logically leaves a "void" which must be filled by a fresh decision by the public authority. The court therefore dismissed the Applicant's argument that remittal is ultra vires as pleaded, reasoning that remittal is the necessary practical consequence of annulment unless the Respondent exercises its power under para. (c) to require disclosure itself or varies/affirms in a manner that is final.

5. Adequacy of reasons

The court found that the reasons given for remittal in the Respondent's decision complied with applicable standards for reasons in administrative decisions. The reasons identified efficiency, the changed legal position following the High Court's earlier decision, backlogs, and delay in responses from the public authority. The court observed, however, that the Respondent's conception of "efficiency" emphasised resource conservation as well as administrative convenience, which is not identical to a judgment about which route would be quickest to finality.

6. Timeliness of the remittal in substance

The court acknowledged that remittal may sometimes be appropriate, but emphasised that remittal should not be used where it is likely to cause further delay that would jeopardise the timely and effective vindication of the applicant's rights. Applying those principles to the facts, the court found it probable that keeping the appeal with the Respondent and requiring the public authority to make its case within the appeal context would have produced a materially earlier final decision than the chosen course of remittal, particularly as this was a second remittal and given the other contextual factors (backlog and prior delays by the public authority). Thus, while the Respondent acted in good faith, the court indicated that remittal was not obviously the option most consistent with the timeliness obligation on the facts.

7. Mootness and remedies

The court found that the judicial review could not be dismissed as wholly moot. If the Applicant's core complaint (that the Respondent had no jurisdiction to remit) were correct, subsequent administrative steps would be void and could not render the judicial review moot. The court declined to grant certiorari (quashing) as that relief was either inappropriate or unavailable on the pleaded case, but indicated that declaratory relief addressing undue delay and procedural issues remained a meaningful remedy given the "capable of repetition yet evading review" dynamic identified in environmental contexts.

8. Reference to the Court of Justice of the EU

The court considered whether questions about the scope and implications of the timeliness obligation under the AIE Directive, the Aarhus Convention (as interpreted in EU law) and Article 47 CFR required a preliminary ruling from the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU. Applying established criteria (necessity for the decision, whether the questions relate to interpretation or validity rather than application, and whether the issue was acte clair), the court concluded that the questions it formulated were issues of EU law of interpretation and were necessary to resolve the declaratory relief sought. The court therefore decided, in principle, to refer specified questions to the CJEU and invited joinder with the related Case C-330/25 (RTÉ).

9. Practical orders

The court made a range of procedural orders to facilitate the referral process (timelines for submissions, arrangements for possible amici curiae, document preparation and transmission protocols, notice to the State, and a listing for review). Costs to date were reserved and liberty to apply was granted.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court declined to grant certiorari to quash the Respondent's 19 December 2024 remittal decision and instead: (a) concluded that remittal is a lawful consequence of annulment under reg. 12(5) of the AIE Regulations in appropriate cases; and (b) ordered that specific questions of EU law concerning the interplay of timeliness obligations and remittal be referred in principle to the Court of Justice of the European Union under Article 267 TFEU (with invitation to join Case C‑330/25 RTÉ), subject to the procedural directions set out in the order.

Implications and consequences:

• The immediate consequence for the parties is that the Respondent's remittal decision was not quashed by certiorari in these proceedings, but the court expressly reserved the availability of declaratory relief and addressed the legal question of whether remittal is compatible with EU and international timeliness obligations by referring discrete questions to the CJEU.
• The court provided detailed procedural directions to govern how the reference to the CJEU should proceed, including timelines and document protocols; it invited joinder with an existing related CJEU case.
• The court found no demonstrated breach of fair procedures on the facts presented and held that the reasons for remittal were not legally deficient in form, though it questioned whether remittal was the quickest way to finality on the facts.
• Costs to date were reserved; further costs directions were left open.
• The court did not purport to create a general rule that remittal is impermissible; rather it framed the legal question for the CJEU about when the duty of timeliness requires a national reviewing authority to decide rather than remit (particularly where remittal would probably cause additional delay or where there has been prior remittal).
• No final new domestic precedent overturning the Respondent's practice was declared in these proceedings; instead the court opted for a reference to the CJEU to obtain authoritative interpretation of EU law on the point.

Additional procedural outcome (order summary)

The court ordered, in summary:

• Referral in principle of the specified EU-law questions to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU.
• Invitation to the CJEU to join the reference with Case C‑330/25 (RTÉ).
• Directions on notice to the State and provision for possible amici curiae (with costs borne by amici if added and participation to be by written submissions unless ordered otherwise).
• Timelines and formats for simultaneous submissions by parties and any amici; document management and PDF submission requirements to the CJEU; procedural steps for the referring court to be notified of developments at the CJEU.
• Reserve of costs to date and liberty to apply; a mention date to review arrangements for the reference.

Standardized Note Where Information Is Not Available

This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the content contained in the opinion provided. No information has been inferred beyond that text. Where the opinion did not contain discrete detail (for example, the opinion did not adopt the Applicant's requested form of certiorari relief), this summary either omits the non-stated detail or records the absence in the text above.

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Prepared on the basis of the provided judgment text. All named persons and entities in the original opinion have been anonymized in this summary as required; legal citations and reasoning are reproduced only to the extent expressly contained in the opinion.

Drafting judge recorded in the opinion: Judge Humphreys (judgment delivered 5 November 2025).