Summary of Judgment — High Court (Record Nos. 2023/898JR & 2023/899JR)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two separate judicial review applications were brought by two married applicants (referred to here as "Applicant A" and "Applicant B"), nationals of Country X, challenging decisions of the first respondent (referred to here as "Agency A") dated 19 July 2023. Those decisions affirmed recommendations made by the examining office (referred to here as "Agency C") to the Minister (referred to here as "Agency B") that neither Applicant A nor Applicant B be granted a refugee declaration or a subsidiary protection declaration.

The applicants had lodged a joint appeal to Agency A against Agency C's recommendations. Agency A heard the two appeals on the same day and issued two similar but separate decisions. The High Court (Leave stage) had earlier granted the applicants leave to apply for judicial review. The judicial review challenges were heard together by Judge Bradley, who delivered judgment on 23 October 2025.

The material factual background accepted by the examining office and Agency A (and largely accepted by the Court as not disputed for the purposes of the judicial review) is that Applicant A and Applicant B are a married couple from Country X whose families strongly disapproved of their relationship because of a religious/godparent connection between Applicant A and Applicant B's mother. After the families discovered the relationship, there were episodes of assault, threats, and other hostile conduct. A named police officer (referred to here as "Officer A") had been betrothed to Applicant A by her family previously and was implicated in violent acts against Applicant B and in threatening behaviour. The applicants left Country X in 2021 and later applied for international protection in Country Y on 22 November 2021.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the decisions of Agency A (Agency A's affirmance of Agency C's recommendation) were legally flawed and should be quashed by certiorari because they failed to find a Convention nexus (nexus between the feared persecution/serious harm and a Convention ground) in respect of Applicant A and Applicant B.
2. Whether Agency A erred in its assessment of State protection (availability and effectiveness of protection in Country X) after findings that the applicants had suffered or faced threats of serious harm and/or persecution.
3. Whether Agency A correctly addressed and, where appropriate, rebutted the statutory presumption attaching to Country X being a designated "safe country of origin."
4. Whether Agency A's sequencing and application of statutory provisions (including the assessment required by section 28(6) of the applicable Act) complied with applicable law and fair procedures.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

• The applicants contended that their factual account (assaults, threats and other hostile conduct arising from their forbidden relationship) established a well-founded fear of persecution and/or a real risk of serious harm if returned to Country X.
• They argued that there was a Convention nexus: the harm was linked to religious and social norms (the godparent/godchild relationship and the reaction of the community) and/or to membership of a particular social group (women, and persons in similar religious/community circumstances), including gender-based aspects.
• They submitted that Country X's designation as a safe country of origin was rebutted by the facts of their cases (including the local authorities' response) and by Country of Origin Information (COI) and human-rights reports demonstrating problems such as violence against women and weaknesses in accountability for abuses by state agents.
• They argued that Agency A erred in treating the applicants' subsequent civil marriage as dispositive of the risk (for example by concluding forced marriage could no longer occur) without properly analysing how the prior and continuing hostile reaction to the relationship produced a risk of persecution or serious harm.

Respondents' Arguments

• The State respondents submitted that Agency A correctly applied the statutory scheme and relevant legal tests, including the need to establish a nexus to a Convention ground before a finding of refugee status could be made.
• They urged that Agency A's factual findings (accepting the core facts and credibility) were properly evaluated and that Agency A lawfully concluded the principal motive for the violence by Officer A was possessive/vengeful rather than driven by a Convention ground.
• The respondents contended that Agency A correctly addressed the safe-country designation and then properly carried out a State-protection analysis. The respondents submitted that Agency A lawfully found State protection to be available in Country X because reasonable steps and mechanisms for addressing police misconduct and addressing violence exist.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
ABO v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IEHC 191	Presumption of state protection absent total breakdown of state apparatus; applicants must rebut presumption of adequate protection.	The Court cited ABO for the proposition that an applicant must rebut the presumption that adequate state protection is available in Country X absent evidence of complete state collapse.
XS & Anor v IPAT & Anor [2022] IEHC 100	Relevant to state protection and assessment of credibility in protection claims.	Referenced as part of the legislative and jurisprudential context about state protection and credibility assessments.
TA v IPAT & Ors [2023] IEHC 390	Clarifies approach to protection claims: separate assessment of whether harm constitutes persecution/serious harm and whether effective State protection exists.	The Court applied and relied upon TA (as approved in later High Court authority) when explaining the sequential nature of assessing threshold risk and then State protection.
NG v IPAT [2023] IEHC 535	Affirms the approach in TA regarding separate elements: well-founded fear and State protection; discusses interplay of these steps.	The Court used NG to support the legal framework that the Tribunal must first assess whether the harm reaches the threshold, and, if so, then assess State protection.
K, L v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Case C-646/21), ECLI:EU:C:2024:487 (CJEU)	Recognition that in some societies women may constitute a particular social group due to systemic discrimination; focus on gender-based violence within asylum law.	The Court cited K, L to situate the jurisprudential development recognising gender-based violence and the treatment of women as potentially forming a particular social group under EU law, noting Agency A did not find such circumstances applied here.
WS (Advocate General observations) (C-621/21)	Observations on 'distinct identity' of a particular social group and that women may be such a group depending on societal norms.	The Court referenced these AG observations to explain the legal context on social-group analysis and that Agency A did not accept those circumstances as met in these cases.
BA v IPAT [2020] IEHC 589	Example of finding a well-founded fear of persecution from a private actor (ex-partner) and then assessing State protection.	The Court cited BA as precedent where a finding of risk from a private actor led to a State-protection assessment; used to demonstrate established practice.
ES v IPAT [2022] IEHC 613	Discusses the standard for effective State protection (reasonable steps, effective legal system, access to protection).	The Court relied on ES (and accompanying exposition) to assess whether Agency A's State-protection analysis met the required standard.
ZM (MZ) v IPAT [2023] IEHC 637	Related authority on protection claims and State protection analysis.	Referenced as part of a group of authorities illustrating how Tribunals treat threshold risk and State protection.
LAA (Bolivia) & Ors. v RAT & Ors [2016] IEHC 12	Test for State protection derived from the Qualification Directive and domestic law.	Cited for the principle that state protection must be reasonable in practical terms and include effective legal processes for detection, prosecution and punishment.
Idiakheua v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2005] IEHC 150	Test that the country should provide reasonable protection in practical terms; laws must be enforced.	Used to support the proposition that existence of laws alone is insufficient; enforcement and practical protection matter.
BC v IPAT [2019] IEHC 763	Guidance on assessing whether the correct test for State protection has been applied; specific questions to consider.	The Court applied the line of reasoning from BC to evaluate whether Agency A addressed the relevant State-protection questions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court set out the statutory framework (the relevant sections of the governing Act) concerning definitions of "refugee", "serious harm", "international protection", the assessment of facts and circumstances (section 28), actors of protection and State protection (sections 30 and 31), and the safe-country-of-origin provisions (section 33). The Court also discussed the application of section 28(6) concerning the evidential advantage where an applicant has already been subjected to persecution or threats.

The Court accepted that Agency C and Agency A accepted the core facts of the applicants' experiences: assaults, threats, hospitalization of Applicant B after an assault by Officer A, seizure of Applicant A's phone, confinement by her family, and the applicants' subsequent movements and eventual departure from Country X. The Court noted that credibility of the applicants was not in issue.

The analytical structure adopted by Agency A in each report was described and examined by the Court: (1) assessment of facts and circumstances; (2) analysis of whether the conduct amounted to persecution or serious harm; (3) examination of nexus to a Convention ground (refugee ground); (4) assessment of State protection; and (5) subsidiary protection analysis if refugee status was not established.

On the nexus issue, Agency A found the hostile acts by Officer A flowed from his desire to marry Applicant A and resentment at being thwarted, rather than from a reason covered by the refugee definition (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group). Agency A thus concluded there was no Convention nexus. The Court described Agency A's reasoning that the hostility did not exist independently of the threat and therefore could not be characterised as persecution for a Convention reason.

Agency A accepted that Applicant A and Applicant B faced a real risk of assault from Officer A; the question therefore became whether such risk was connected to a Convention ground (for refugee status) or alternatively whether State protection was ineffective (for subsidiary protection). Agency A also dealt with the applicants' contention that the safe-country presumption for Country X was rebutted by the facts. Agency A found that the police dropped an investigation when Officer A's involvement was known and that this constituted a serious ground to displace the safe-country presumption.

Having accepted that the safe-country presumption was displaced, Agency A conducted a State-protection analysis. Agency A concluded that, although there were problems in Country X (including concerns about police misconduct and accountability), there nevertheless existed mechanisms (police, judiciary, Public Defender/Ombudsman) and procedures that constituted reasonable steps to provide protection in practical terms. Agency A observed that statutes and systems were in place to investigate and address police misconduct and that such systems were, on balance, effective and available to the applicants. Agency A noted some specific procedural failings in the particular local interaction with Applicant B but concluded these did not establish a general lack of State protection in the applicants' particular circumstances.

The Court considered authorities on State protection (including the test that protection must be reasonable in practical terms and need not be perfect) and found that Agency A had applied the correct legal test and had addressed the relevant factors. The Court accepted that Agency A had given due consideration to section 28(6) (the evidential advantage where prior persecution had occurred) and ultimately concluded that Agency A's assessment that State protection would be available in Country X was open to the Tribunal on the evidence and law.

On the applicants' contention that Agency A treated the legal civil marriage as determinative of the risk (by concluding that forced/arranged marriage could not now occur), the Court accepted that Agency A did rely on the civil marriage when assessing the likelihood of forced marriage. But the Court held that Agency A nevertheless assessed the risk of assault and serious harm (particularly from Officer A) and proceeded correctly to the State-protection analysis; the Court did not accept that Agency A's approach amounted to a legal error or a breach of fair procedures.

Relying on the legislative scheme, COI and precedents summarised above, the Court concluded that Agency A's determinations as to (i) lack of Convention nexus for refugee status and (ii) availability of State protection such that subsidiary protection was not appropriate, were legally sound and factually open to the Tribunal. Consequently, the Court found no basis to quash Agency A's decisions.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The High Court refused the applications for relief by way of judicial review in both proceedings (Record No. 2023/898JR and Record No. 2023/899JR).

Implications:

• Direct effect: The judicial review challenges brought by Applicant A and Applicant B against Agency A's decisions dated 19 July 2023 were dismissed; Agency A's affirmance of Agency C's recommendation (that neither applicant be granted refugee status nor subsidiary protection) stands.
• Costs: The Court's initial view was that the respondents (the State) having been entirely successful were entitled to their costs, including reserved costs; however the Court ordered that the parties be heard on costs and any ancillary matters and on whether any different costs order should be made in light of relevant statutory provisions and rules.
• Precedential effect: The judgment applies established principles (as discussed) about the assessment of nexus, the sequential approach to threshold risk and State protection, and the standard for effective State protection. The judgment refused relief on the facts and legal analysis set out; it does not purport to create novel legal principle beyond the application of existing jurisprudence.

Concluding Practical Orders

The Court refused the applicants' applications for judicial review and proposed to list the matter for a mention hearing to address costs and any consequential matters on a specified date. The Court indicated an initial view on costs in favour of the respondents but permitted submissions before making a final costs order.

Administrative Details and Representation

The judgment was delivered by Judge Bradley on 23 October 2025. Applicants were represented by Attorney O'Dwyer and Attorney Burgess (instructed by Law Firm A). The State respondents were represented by Attorney O'Hanlon (instructed by the Chief State Solicitor's Office). The applicants had previously been granted leave to apply for judicial review by the High Court (permitted at earlier stage).