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Chamdal, R. v

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Nov 3, 2025
Smart Summary (Beta)

Anonymized Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 29 July 2024, in the Crown Court before Judge Clegg, the Appellant pleaded guilty on re-arraignment to a single count of contravening a tree preservation order (TPO) contrary to s.210(1)(c) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The count alleged that the Appellant caused or permitted the cutting down of at least 132 trees protected by a TPO made by Company A. On 30 August 2024 the Appellant was sentenced to a fine of £200,000, or in default 3 years' imprisonment.

The Appellant appealed against sentence with leave. Company A (the local planning authority and respondent on the appeal) had brought the prosecution. Two contractors (Contractor A and Contractor B) who carried out some of the felling pleaded guilty earlier and were fined £20,000 each.

The felled trees were located on land described in the opinion as the site of a former permission for a four-bedroom house. The TPO was confirmed in 2008 and included an area order covering the whole site. The unauthorised felling occurred between 1 and 18 March 2021. At the relevant time the Appellant was the beneficial owner who had exchanged contracts to purchase the land and became legal owner on completion in April 2021. Company B (a project-management company engaged by the Appellant) and Company C (a landscape design company) were involved in the site works. Tree and planning officers from Company A inspected the site and recorded at least 132 recently felled mature trees across an area of approximately 1.29 hectares.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the fine of £200,000 was manifestly excessive in circumstances where the Appellant's culpability was said to be strict liability rather than deliberate defiance of the TPO.
  2. Whether the offence was committed for financial advantage and, relatedly, whether any absence of financial benefit made the sentence excessive.
  3. Whether there was an unjustified disparity between the fine imposed on the Appellant and the £20,000 fines imposed on the two contractors who carried out some of the felling.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The established authorities and sentencing examples relied upon by the Crown concerned deliberate defiance of TPOs; this case involved strict liability rather than deliberate defiance.
  • The Appellant did not deliberately flout the TPO: he relied on the experience and expertise of the contractors he instructed and the project manager; culpability should therefore be assessed as low or no culpability.
  • There was no financial gain to the Appellant; he was not acting as a commercial developer but seeking to create a family home.
  • The judge failed to give sufficient weight to the Appellant's positive good character and personal mitigation.
  • Given the Appellant's low culpability and lack of financial benefit, the harm caused by the felling should have been given less weight when fixing the fine.
  • The level of harm attributable to the Appellant was not materially different from that attributable to the contractors, but the contractors had higher culpability; a fine for the Appellant ten times higher than each contractor's fine was disproportionate.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's written submissions in the same way as the appellant's submissions are summarised.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Case A [1990] 1 WLR 1255 Elements required to prove an offence under s.210(1)(c) of the 1990 Act (strict liability). The court cited it to confirm that prosecution must prove the trees were subject to a TPO, prohibited works were carried out, the defendant caused or permitted them, and no consent was given; knowledge of the TPO is not required.
Case B [1980] 3 All ER 552 Confirms that s.210 offences are strict liability and that landowners are expected to make enquiries about TPOs. Used to support the proposition that Parliament intended strong protection for trees under TPOs and that lack of knowledge is not a defence.
Case C [2017] EWCA Crim 908; [2017] 4 WLR 160 Guidance on use of other guidelines by analogy and cautions about reading sentencing levels across different offence types. Applied to indicate that the Environmental Offences Guideline cannot be read across directly to s.210 offences; only the culpability gradations were useful by analogy.
Case D (1989) 11 Cr. App. R. (S) 407 Approach to starting point for fines where a defendant saved costs (financial benefit) and deliberate defiance. Cited for the proposition that saved costs may inform a starting point and that punishment must mark deliberate defiance; also to note statutory replanting obligation is separate from the punitive fine.
Case E (1990) 12 Cr. App. R (S) 142 Reference decision with no substantive assistance. The court recorded that this decision did not assist; it had simply refused leave to appeal and was not worth citation for sentencing principle.
Case F [2013] EWCA Crim 1662; [2014] 1 Cr. App. R (S) 34 Fine and confiscation interplay; amenity benefit may be reflected in fine even where confiscation addresses pecuniary gain. Used to illustrate that confiscation can remove financial benefit but a fine can still properly reflect amenity gains and deterrence; the approach in that case supported the sentencing court's consideration of amenity benefits here.
Case G [2014] EWCA Crim 2683; [2015] 1 Cr App R (S) 53 Approach to very large fines for environmental harm (SSSI) including assessment of culpability, harm, and offender's means. Referred to as an example of the court imposing a substantial fine in a sensitive environmental context; the court held Day is not a direct benchmark but informative on relevant considerations (culpability, harm, wealth, deterrence).
Case H [2014] EWCA Crim 49; [2014] Env LR 19 Guidance on imposing fines on companies and very wealthy individuals for environmental offences. Cited for the proposition that for very wealthy individuals or large companies a significantly greater fine may be justified; used to contextualise proportionality where offender's means are large.
Case I [2025] EWCA Civ 1041 Reference to national policy context (tree coverage and Net Zero) as part of assessing environmental harm. Used in the opinion to support the court's observation that trees contribute to national policy objectives such as Net Zero; relied on for contextual weight given to harm to trees and carbon storage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out the statutory framework for TPOs and the offence in s.210 of the 1990 Act, emphasising that the offence is one of strict liability. The statutory scheme gives landowners notice and means to discover TPOs; landowners who are uncertain may contact the local planning authority or obtain professional advice.

The facts were accepted: at least 132 trees, each more than 20 years old and protected by a TPO confirmed in 2008, were felled between 1 and 18 March 2021 across approximately 1.29 hectares of the Property. The Appellant accepted liability on a strict liability basis and pleaded guilty on re‑arraignment. Contractors (Contractor A and Contractor B) who carried out the felling pleaded guilty earlier and were fined £20,000 each.

The court analysed culpability and harm under the general sentencing framework (including the Overarching Principles and the Sentencing Act 2020). Although the Appellant relied on a strict liability plea and asserted reliance on contractors, the court concluded that the Appellant's culpability was not properly described as "low or no culpability" (a term used in the Environmental Offences Guideline to denote little or no fault). Given the scale of the felling, the Appellant ought to have made checks about which trees were covered by the TPO; in the court's view the degree of fault amounted to at least negligence.

On harm, the court emphasised the centrality of harm in sentencing. The large number of mature trees felled over a substantial area, their amenity value, contribution to biodiversity and carbon storage all pointed to significant harm. The court rejected the submission that such harm was of little significance even if the Appellant's culpability were low.

The court treated the Appellant's undertaking to replant as not mitigating the sentence because replanting is a statutory obligation under s.206 and may not provide like‑for‑like replacement of mature trees. The absence of an identified pecuniary benefit (and the resulting absence of a confiscation order) did not prevent the court from taking account of a non‑pecuniary amenity benefit that accrued to the Appellant from improved prospects for developing a larger family home.

The Appellant's lack of early guilty plea credit was addressed: the sentencing judge found that earlier advice had been incompetent and allowed full credit for the plea. The Appellant's good character and remorse were mitigation, but did not outweigh the seriousness of the offence.

The Appellant's means (the judge described him as very wealthy) were relevant under s.125 of the Sentencing Act 2020 when fixing the fine amount. The court considered and rejected the submission that the £200,000 fine was manifestly excessive, concluding the fine was proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and to the Appellant's means.

On disparity with the contractors' fines, the court noted differences in circumstances: the contractors felled fewer trees (60–70 between them), the contractors had modest means, and the removal of all 132 trees was for the Appellant's personal amenity benefit in seeking to build a larger family home. Those distinctions justified the different levels of penalty.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The appeal against sentence was dismissed. The fine of £200,000 (reduced from an indicated £300,000 starting point to reflect the guilty plea) stands.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the Appellant's sentence is upheld. The court confirmed and explained an approach to sentencing for s.210 offences: (a) s.210 is a strict liability offence but culpability must be assessed in context (the court regarded negligence, not "low or no culpability", as appropriate in this case); (b) harm (number, age, amenity value, area affected, biodiversity and carbon storage implications) is central to seriousness; (c) statutory replanting obligations do not substitute for punitive fines; and (d) the offender's means are relevant to fixing the fine. The opinion provides guidance about factors relevant to sentencing under s.210 but does not purport to establish a new binding precedent beyond applying established principles to the facts of this case.