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Clarke & Anor v Pepper Finance Corporation [Ireland] Designated Activity Company & Anor (Approved)

High Court of Ireland
Oct 21, 2025
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Anonymised Summary of High Court Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application by the Plaintiffs for an interlocutory injunction restraining the First Defendant and the Second Defendant from selling a property referred to in the judgment as "The Property" (registered on the land register under the folio referred to in the judgment).

In summary, on 17 July 2007 the Plaintiffs purchased the Property. The purchase was financed by a loan of €400,000 provided by Company A and secured by a mortgage over the Property. Company B subsequently acquired the loan and mortgage and was registered as the chargee on the relevant folio.

The Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan. As of 3 December 2024 the outstanding balance of the loan was €538,231 (including arrears of €134,436). On 3 December 2024 the First Defendant called in the loan and appointed the Second Defendant as receiver over the Property.

The Plaintiffs applied for an interlocutory injunction on 17 February 2025 (returnable 3 March 2025). At the 3 March 2025 hearing the Defendants gave undertakings not to market or sell the Property and directions were given for further affidavit evidence. The Plaintiffs failed to comply with court directions on two occasions; as a result, the court released the Defendants from their undertakings and the Defendants offered the Property for sale. The Plaintiffs issued a second application for interlocutory relief; the court granted liberty to issue a second motion and fixed a return date in July 2025.

The injunction hearing occurred over several days in late July 2025. The court was not satisfied about the evidence on whether the Property was landlocked, adjourned to 7 October 2025, and directed expert reports and clear maps showing access. An interim injunction was granted restraining sale until the return date. The judgment considered a series of discrete issues raised by the Plaintiffs and the parties' evidence (including affidavits of Attorney O'Dwyer for the Defendants and expert maps produced by both sides).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the First Defendant had the power under the mortgage to appoint a receiver;
  2. Whether any receiver appointed had the power of sale;
  3. Whether the appointment of the receiver was invalid;
  4. Whether Company B (the First Defendant) held any interest in the mortgage (i.e. challenge to the transfer from Company A to Company B);
  5. Whether the receiver was appointed over the correct folio/property (alleged discrepancy between folio references);
  6. Whether the receiver was a rent receiver only (i.e. lacked power of sale);
  7. Whether the First Defendant failed to comply with s.28(6) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act, 1877 (notice of assignment/demand);
  8. Allegation that a Plaintiffs' signature on an application form (from Company C) was forged;
  9. Whether the lands were landlocked (i.e. whether the property lacked access such that sale to a bona fide purchaser would be problematic); and
  10. Alleged trespass by the Defendants onto adjacent lands owned by a partnership of which the first-named Plaintiff is a partner.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The First Defendant did not have power under the mortgage to appoint a receiver;
  • The receiver did not have power of sale;
  • The appointment of the receiver was invalid;
  • Company B (the First Defendant) did not hold any interest in the mortgage dated 2 October 2007;
  • The receiver was appointed over an incorrect folio (the appointment referred to Folio 10478 rather than Folio 10478F) and that omission was fatal;
  • The receiver was a rent receiver only and therefore lacked a power of sale;
  • The First Defendant failed to comply with s.28(6) of the 1877 Act (i.e. did not give express written notice of assignment as required);
  • The Plaintiffs' signature on a mortgage broker application (from Company C) was forged;
  • The Property was landlocked and a sale would expose an innocent purchaser to lack of access; and
  • The Defendants had trespassed on adjacent lands owned by a partnership and had interfered with a gate and removed material to create access.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The mortgage conditions (specifically condition 14.5) expressly authorised the lender to appoint a receiver and condition 15.2 conferred on a receiver the rights referred to in condition 14.5 (including power of sale);
  • The Plaintiffs defaulted in making monthly repayments and the mortgage deed and its conditions permitted acceleration of the whole debt on default; the First Defendant therefore validly appointed a receiver after issuing demands;
  • The loan and mortgage were transferred by deed of transfer from Company A to Company B on 16 November 2018 and Company B is registered on the folio as owner of the charge; the register is conclusive under Section 31(1) of the Registration of Titles Act 1964;
  • The minor discrepancy in folio description (the missing letter "F") is not fatal to the appointment; authority indicates that a description issue does not invalidate an appointment;
  • The Defendants provided documentary evidence (including a demand letter and affidavit evidence) and expert maps showing that the Property abuts the public road (i.e. is not landlocked), although there is no proper vehicular entrance and planning permission would be required to create one;
  • The alleged forged signature is immaterial to the present application because the money was advanced, the Property was purchased with those funds, and the Plaintiffs entered into the loan and mortgage;
  • Any trespass on adjacent partnership land would give rise to a separate cause of action by the partnership (which is not a party to these proceedings) and would not establish a fair issue in this application for an injunction restraining the receiver sale;
  • The Defendants challenged the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' undertaking as to damages and argued that damages would be an adequate remedy at trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Company D v. Company E [2019] IESC (referred to by Judge O'Donnell) Restatement of the legal test for an interlocutory injunction (structured steps including whether a permanent injunction might be granted; fair issue to be tried; balance of convenience/justice; adequacy of damages). The court applied the structured approach from paragraph 64 to assess whether the Plaintiffs raised a fair question to be tried and then to assess the balance of convenience and adequacy of damages.
Company F v. Attorney Kane [2019] 1 IR 385 Support for the proposition that the register is conclusive evidence of the title as appearing on the register (s.31(1) Registration of Titles Act, 1964). The court relied on the conclusive nature of the register to support the position that Company B's registration as owner of the charge was determinative of its interest.
Company G v. Attorney Cody [2021] 2 IR 381 Authority on the conclusive effect of the register (cited alongside the previous authority). Used to support the conclusion that the registered owner of the charge (Company B) held the relevant interest.
Attorney McCarthy v. Attorney Langan [2019] IEHC 67651 Authority that absence of a description in a deed of appointment is not necessarily fatal where the secured properties are described in the deeds of charge and the appointment is expressed to be over those assets. The court relied on McCarthy to hold that a minor discrepancy in schedule description (the missing "F") did not invalidate the deed of appointment of the receiver.
Attorney Casey v. Company H [2021] IEHC 167 Authority that an appointment may still be valid even if the property is imperfectly or not described in the deed of appointment. The court cited Casey to support the conclusion that the description issue did not raise a serious issue to be tried.
Company I v. Attorney Lynn [2020] IEHC 1999 Permits the giving of notice of assignment as part of a demand letter; a single document may serve both as notice of assignment and as a demand for payment. The court relied on this authority to find that the written demand in the Defendants' affidavit met the requirements of express notice of assignment under s.28(6) of the 1877 Act.
Attorney Ryan v. Company I [2025] IEHC 362 Recent authority where the balance of convenience and adequacy of damages were important in refusing an interlocutory injunction in the context of an investment property. The court relied on Ryan to support the view that where the property is an investment property (not a family home) and the undertaking as to damages is unsatisfactory, the balance of justice may favour refusal of an injunction.
American Cyanamid and Campus Oil approach (principles) General established approach for interlocutory injunctions (fair issue to be tried; balance of convenience; adequacy of damages) used in many Irish decisions. The court applied the structured American Cyanamid/Campus Oil considerations as elaborated in the IESC restatement when assessing the interlocutory application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court commenced by applying the interlocutory injunction test as recently restated in the authority cited from 2019 (the structured, multi-step approach). The key analytical steps and findings were:

  1. Power to appoint a receiver: The court examined the mortgage conditions and found that condition 14.5 conferred on the lender the power to appoint a receiver. The Plaintiffs' contention that the First Defendant lacked power was rejected as without substance.
  2. Power of sale vested in the receiver: The court noted condition 15.2 which provides that any receiver "shall have the power to exercise the rights referred to at condition 14.5", and that condition 14.5 includes a power of sale. The Plaintiffs' submission that the receiver lacked power of sale was rejected.
  3. Validity of appointment: The court accepted the affidavit evidence of Attorney O'Dwyer that the Plaintiffs had defaulted in making monthly repayments and that the mortgage deed and conditions authorised acceleration of the whole debt on default. The First Defendant had issued demands on 3 December 2024 and, following default, was entitled to appoint a receiver under the mortgage conditions. The Plaintiffs' challenge to validity was dismissed.
  4. Company B's interest in the mortgage: The court accepted that Company A transferred the loan and mortgage to Company B by deed dated 16 November 2018 and that Company B was registered on the folio as owner of the charge. The court relied on Section 31(1) of the Registration of Titles Act, 1964 (and the cited authorities) that the register is conclusive evidence of title. The Plaintiffs' contention that Company B held no interest was rejected.
  5. Folio description discrepancy: The Plaintiffs argued the appointment was over Folio 10478 while the mortgage referenced Folio 10478F. The court held that this discrepancy (the missing letter "F") was not fatal. The court relied on prior authorities (McCarthy and Casey) for the proposition that defects or absence of description in an appointment deed do not necessarily invalidate the appointment where the secured properties are described in the deeds of charge and the appointment is expressed to be over those charged assets. The court found no significant or serious issue on this point.
  6. Receiver as rent receiver only: The court rejected the submission that the receiver was a rent receiver only, finding the receiver had power of sale under the mortgage conditions.
  7. Notice of assignment / s.28(6) 1877 Act: The court considered the written demand in the affidavit of Attorney O'Dwyer, which expressly stated the deed of transfer by Company A to Company B. The court, following the Promontoria authority, accepted that notice of assignment could be given as part of a comprehensive demand letter and concluded the requirements were satisfied; no fair issue was raised on this ground.
  8. Alleged forgery: The Plaintiffs alleged their signature on an application form prepared by Company C was forged. The court noted the Defendants were strangers to Company C, that the funds were advanced, the Property was purchased with those funds, and the Plaintiffs entered into the loan and mortgage. The court regarded the forgery allegation as irrelevant to the present interlocutory application and not amounting to a serious issue to be tried.
  9. Landlocked / access issue: Both parties' expert maps showed the Property abutted the public road and was not landlocked in the sense of being entirely severed from access. However, the evidence showed there was no proper vehicular entrance from the public road and that current vehicular access appeared to be across adjacent partnership land. The court concluded the receiver must advertise the Property as requiring planning permission for vehicular access and sell "warts and all" (i.e. with the lack of proper vehicular access clearly disclosed). The absence of a proper gate did not amount to a fair question to be tried that would justify injunctive relief in these proceedings.
  10. Trespass to adjacent partnership land: The Plaintiffs alleged trespass on adjacent lands owned by a partnership of which the first-named Plaintiff is a partner. The court observed that the partnership is a separate legal entity, not a party to these proceedings, and had not brought separate proceedings. Even if trespass had occurred, the appropriate remedy would lie to the partnership (injunction and/or damages) rather than to frustrate the receiver sale in this lawsuit. The court held this did not raise a serious issue to be tried in the current application.

After addressing the set of discrete issues advanced by the Plaintiffs, the court turned to the balance of convenience/justice. The court accepted the Defendants' submission (and the cited 2025 authority) that where the property is an investment (in this case a derelict bungalow held as an investment rather than a family home), different considerations apply and the adequacy of damages and the substance of any undertaking as to damages are critical.

The court found the Plaintiffs' undertaking as to damages to be without substance: there was no affidavit evidence establishing that the Plaintiffs had means to satisfy an undertaking, the Plaintiffs had not made bona fide efforts to repay or service the debt, and the arrears/total indebtedness were substantial. The court also concluded that damages would be an adequate remedy if the Plaintiffs later succeeded at trial, and that the Plaintiffs had not raised a fair question to be tried on the merits of the key challenges.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Plaintiffs' application for an interlocutory injunction restraining the Defendants from selling the Property was refused.

Core rulings emphasised by the court:

  1. The Plaintiffs did not raise any fair question to be tried in respect of the principal challenges to the appointment, the receiver's powers or the title/transfer issues;
  2. The balance of justice and convenience favoured refusing the interlocutory injunction;
  3. If the Plaintiffs proceeded to trial and prevailed, damages would be an adequate remedy;
  4. The Plaintiffs' undertaking as to damages was without substance.

Practical consequences and directions recorded by the court:

  • The receiver is entitled to proceed with marketing and sale of the Property but must ensure the Property is marketed and sold with clear disclosure that there is no proper vehicular access from the public road and that planning permission would be required to create such access. The Property must be sold "warts and all".
  • The allegation of trespass to adjoining lands owned by a separate partnership is not material to these proceedings and, if it gives rise to a cause of action, must be pursued by the partnership in separate proceedings.

Broader implications: The judgment applied existing interlocutory injunction principles and authority about registration and the validity of appointments. The decision turned on established principles and factual evaluation; the court did not purport to establish novel legal principle. No new binding precedent beyond the application of existing authorities was created by this judgment.


Judge: Judge Cregan

Decision date as recorded in the opinion: 21 October 2025