Blackmore, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns proceedings under which the Appellant was convicted and sentenced for historical sexual offences. The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 anonymity provisions were held to apply to the victim. On 4 July 2024, at the Crown Court at The City, the Appellant was convicted of three counts of indecent assault contrary to section 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956; the jury were unable to reach verdicts on three further counts of buggery under section 12(1) of the 1956 Act and the prosecution elected not to pursue a retrial on those counts.

On 25 October 2024 the Appellant, then aged 83, was sentenced to 5½ years' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. With leave of the single judge, the Appellant appealed on the ground that, in light of a prior sentence for similar offending, the current sentence was manifestly excessive.

Facts as found or alleged at trial: Between 7 January 1983 and 7 January 1990 the complainant was a pupil at a school in The City, aged between 11 and 17 during that period. The Appellant was head of the Physical Education Department at that school and aged between 41 and 48 during the relevant period. The three convicted incidents comprised (i) groping after the complainant fell from gym equipment when aged 11, (ii) groping in the Appellant's car while conveying the complainant to The Stadium when aged 11, and (iii) a multi-incident count alleging at least ten occasions of touching on naked genitalia and the bottom throughout the secondary school years, with the complainant describing a weekly pattern when alone with the Appellant.

The Appellant had been previously convicted in 2017 at Court A for indecent assault of two pupils at the same school (offending dated 1982–1985) and sentenced to a total of five years' imprisonment. Leave to appeal that earlier sentence was refused by the Court of Appeal in [2017] EWCA Crim 2626, which summarised the earlier offending. The 2017 period of offending overlapped with the present offences.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence imposed on 25 October 2024 (5½ years' imprisonment concurrent on each count) was manifestly excessive having regard to the principle of totality and a previous sentence imposed in 2017.
2. Whether the sentencing judge gave appropriate weight to the Appellant's mitigation, including age, health and psychological reports.
3. Whether a court-imposed surcharge order should stand given the dates of the offending and the relevant surcharge provisions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (presented by Attorney Gomersall)

• The Appellant submitted that, taking account of the previous five-year sentence imposed in 2017 for closely similar offending, the additional sentence of 5½ years resulted in an overall total of 10½ years which was manifestly excessive and disproportionate in all the circumstances.
• The defence relied on the principle of totality (including authorities such as R v Green) and submitted that the judge should have given a greater reduction to reflect the previous sentence, the overlap in offending, the fact the earlier sentence had been served relatively recently, and that a substantial part of the reason the offences were not sentenced together lay with the defendant not having admitted further offending earlier.
• Specific mitigation relied upon included the Appellant's advanced age (83), serious health conditions including incurable pulmonary fibrosis, a psychological report indicating mixed depressive and anxiety disorder and deteriorating memory possibly consistent with early Alzheimer's disease, exemplary prison conduct since the previous conviction, and references from family. The defence argued these factors warranted a more substantial reduction for totality and mitigation.

Prosecution's Position

• The Prosecution and the defence agreed on the appropriate approach to sentencing for the immediate offences: the court should apply the modern sentencing guideline for the equivalent modern offence while recognising the statutory maximum for indecent assault was 10 years' imprisonment.
• The Prosecution treated the leading offence as falling within the guideline for sexual assault on a child under 13 and agreed categorisation in Category 1A given the serious breach of trust and significant impact on the victim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
[2017] EWCA Crim 2626	Records refusal of leave to appeal the Appellant's 2017 sentence and summarises the earlier offending.	The court noted the 2017 decision to identify overlap in offending and to recognise the details of the prior offending when considering totality and the weight to be given to the earlier sentence.
R v Green [2019] 4 WLR 37	Principles concerning totality when sentencing on multiple occasions; guidance on how previous sentences should be taken into account.	Relied on by the defence to argue for greater reduction for totality. The court applied the principles to assess whether the sentencing judge properly balanced totality against the seriousness of the present offending.
R v McLean [2017] EWCA Crim 170	Principle that a defendant should not receive an undeserved bonus when previous sentences are considered; guidance on the role of prior sentences.	Cited by the defence as a supporting authority. The court considered it in the context of whether accounting for the previous sentence would give the Appellant an inappropriate advantage; the court found no such undeserved bonus arose that would render the sentence manifestly excessive.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by confirming that anonymity protections under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 applied to the complainant.

On sentencing issues the court identified the correct framework: the sentencing judge had available a pre-sentence report, prosecuting and defence sentencing notes, a victim impact statement, character references and a psychological report. The court acknowledged that the modern sentencing guideline for sexual assault on a child under 13 should be used as the point of reference, while recognising the statutory maximum for indecent assault remained 10 years' imprisonment.

The court accepted the agreed categorisation that the lead offence fell into Category 1A given the significant breach of trust and serious impact upon the victim. It then addressed the central question of totality: whether and to what extent the current sentence should take into account the prior sentence from 2017. The court emphasised that assessing totality is an exercise of judgment rather than an automatic mathematical adjustment. The court reiterated that, often, the defendant bears some responsibility for offences not being sentenced together (for example by not admitting further offending earlier), but nonetheless the court must consider the aggregate effect of sentences.

Applying the authorities (including R v Green and R v McLean) and the facts before it, the court analysed the comparative seriousness of the present offending and the earlier offences. The appellate court observed that the present offending involved repeated indecent assaults on a single complainant over many years and was “much more serious” than the conduct for which the Appellant was sentenced in 2017. Taking these matters together, the sentencing judge's decision to reduce the sentence by 12 months to reflect totality was examined. The appellate court concluded that the reduction by a year was a defensible exercise of judicial discretion and adequately reflected the need to ensure the sentence for the present offences was not disproportionate when viewed alongside the earlier sentence.

On mitigation, the appellate court reviewed the sentencing judge's remarks and concluded the judge had carefully considered the appellant's health, age, psychological report and character references. The court was not persuaded that the sentencing judge had given insufficient weight to mitigation or that the sentence was otherwise manifestly excessive.

Separately, Judge Warby addressed a point relating to a surcharge order. The court (following identification by the Registrar) concluded that, because of the dates of the offending in this case, the surcharge provisions did not apply and therefore the surcharge order had to be quashed.

Holding and Implications

CORE HOLDING: The appeal against sentence was DISMISSED. The appellate court concluded that the sentence of 5½ years' imprisonment on each count (to run concurrently) was not manifestly excessive in light of the principle of totality and the appellant's prior sentence.

Additional Ruling: The court quashed the surcharge order because, given the dates of the offending, the surcharge provisions did not apply.

Implications:

• The Appellant's custodial sentence was upheld and remains in force.
• The surcharge order was quashed, removing that ancillary obligation in this case.
• The court emphasised that no error of principle was shown in the sentencing judge's approach to totality or mitigation; the decision does not establish a new or different precedent but applies existing authorities (including R v Green and R v McLean) to the facts before it.