Summary of Anonymized Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 17 September 2024 at the Crown Court at The City, the Appellant pleaded guilty to two offences: assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, and having a corrosive substance in a public place contrary to section 6 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019. On 21 January 2025 the Appellant, then aged 37, was sentenced by Judge [Last Name] to three years and nine months' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. The judge also ordered the forfeiture of the ammonia that formed the subject-matter of the second offence and ordered payment of the victim surcharge. The Appellant obtained leave to appeal against sentence.

The underlying events occurred on 14 April 2023. Police Constable [Last Name], while on duty in uniform in the North Shields area, responded to a report of erratic driving. As the officer approached a stationary vehicle he observed two men departing; the Appellant slipped, allowing Police Constable [Last Name] to catch him. The Appellant resisted arrest, bit the officer's left forearm and caused a fracture to the officer's right fifth metacarpal. The Appellant continued to resist, grabbed the officer's baton and at one point threatened to "squirt" ammonia, stating that he had ammonia in his pocket. Three officers were ultimately required to detain him. A quantity of ammonia contained in a detergent bottle was found on the Appellant's person upon arrest.

The Appellant had an extensive criminal record consisting of 19 convictions for 39 offences between July 2002 and January 2018, including multiple violent offending and weapons-related convictions, and had previously been subject to an indeterminate sentence for public protection from which he was released in 2017.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive — specifically, whether the assault should have been treated at a lower harm or culpability level (Category A2 rather than Category A1) and whether the sentencing judge misapplied the sentencing guidelines and/or failed adequately to mitigate the sentence.
2. Whether the sentencing judge should have reduced the sentence to reflect prejudice to the Appellant arising from delay in commencing the prosecution and time spent on recall to custody.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The sentence was manifestly excessive. The Appellant's counsel (Attorney [Last Name]) argued that the judge was wrong to treat the assault as Category A1 (serious physical injury) and that it should have been Category A2 with a lower starting point and lower range.
• Insufficient allowance was made for mitigation, including the Appellant's self-reported autism spectrum disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
• As to the possession count under section 6 of the 2019 Act, while acknowledging the absence of a specific guideline, Attorney [Last Name] did not challenge the use of the Sentencing Council guideline for bladed/offensive articles but submitted that the judge overly relied on previous convictions (noting that, apart from a 2006 robbery, much previous violent offending was juvenile).
• The Appellant argued that there had been unjustified delay in commencing the prosecution (arrest on 14 April 2023; prosecution commenced August 2024; sentence January 2025) and that time spent on recall to prison meant he could not start serving the sentence until 2025; thus a reduction should have been made to reflect prejudice from the delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by reference to the relevant Sentencing Council guidelines, statutory provisions and the facts before the sentencing judge. The court reviewed both counts separately and then considered totality and the submission about delay.

1. Approach to sentencing and pre-sentence report

The court agreed with the sentencing judge that, given the seriousness of the offences and the Appellant's extensive record, a further sentence of immediate imprisonment was inevitable and a pre-sentence report was not necessary. The court held that the judge was entitled not to obtain such a report.

2. Assault (section 47 OAPA 1861)

The judge applied the Sentencing Council guidelines for assault and concluded the assault involved high culpability and Category 1 harm. The court accepted that conclusion. The reasons included: the Appellant's prolonged and persistent resistance; the biting that caused severe bruising and a fracture of the fifth metacarpal; the grabbing of the officer's baton; and the need for multiple officers and force (including threat of a taser) to secure arrest. Those facts supported selection of the Category A1 starting point (two and a half years) and justified an upward adjustment from that starting point for aggravating features.

Aggravating features considered by the court included the Appellant's "appalling" record of previous violent offending and weapons carrying (even if some violent offending occurred when he was a juvenile and a long custodial period followed), and the fact that the victim was an emergency worker acting in the course of duty. The court expressly recorded that the statutory aggravating feature of an offence against an emergency worker is recognised under section 67 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and stated that the offence was so aggravated.

Mitigating features: the court noted that the sentencing judge identified none. The Appellant's counsel relied on the Appellant's self-report of autism spectrum disorder and ADHD, but no evidential material was placed before the judge or this court to substantiate those conditions. The court therefore accepted the sentencing judge's conclusion that there was no established mitigation on that basis and observed that it was not explained how such disorders, even if present, would mitigate this violent conduct.

In light of the aggravating features and lack of mitigation, the court considered that a sentence of around three and a half years would have been available for the assault alone.

3. Possession of a corrosive substance in a public place (section 6 Offensive Weapons Act 2019)

Although there is no guideline specifically tailored to section 6 offences, the judge applied the Sentencing Council guideline for possession of bladed articles and other offensive weapons in a public place. The court endorsed this approach, reasoning that the guideline expressly applies to "like offences" involving offensive weapons in public places and that corrosive substances are specifically mentioned as examples of highly dangerous offensive weapons. The court accepted that the guideline pre-dated the 2019 Act but was sufficiently analogous.

The judge's assessment that the offence was culpability A was supported by evidence that the ammonia was strongly alkaline and capable of causing severe skin burns, eye damage and respiratory irritation. The context of carrying and threatening to use it against officers supported the judge's view that the offence risked serious disorder. The Appellant's criminal record and the targeted threat against a police officer (while resisting lawful arrest) were further aggravating factors. The court agreed the judge could properly take a one-and-a-half year starting point and that, after aggravation, a two-and-a-half year sentence after trial for this count was appropriate.

4. Totality and credit for guilty plea

The judge considered totality and reached a notional total sentence after trial of five years (three years for the assault and two years for the possession), reflecting the appropriate sentences for each count. The judge then allowed 25% credit for the Appellant's guilty pleas, producing the imposed concurrent sentences of three years and nine months on each count. The court accepted that the judge's notional total and the application of guilty-plea credit made adequate adjustments to individual sentences to respect the totality principle. The court observed that a more orthodox approach when passing concurrent sentences might have been to "load" more of the overall criminality onto the principal count, but stressed that it was concerned with the total sentence rather than the precise structuring.

5. Delay and recall to custody

On the ground of delay, the Appellant argued that time spent on recall to custody meant he could not begin serving the sentence until 2025 and that there had been an unjustified delay in commencing the prosecution. The sentencing judge declined to make any adjustment for delay, and the court agreed. The court noted the statutory provision in section 240ZA of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provides that time in custody following recall is not to count as time on remand to be deducted from a later sentence. The court also observed that the delay in commencing the prosecution was not especially lengthy and the case thereafter proceeded with reasonable dispatch. Accordingly, no error of principle arose from refusing to reduce the sentence on account of delay or prejudice from recall.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The appeal against sentence was dismissed. The court upheld the sentencing judge's determinations on categorisation of culpability and harm, the application of the Sentencing Council guideline (as analogous) to the section 6 offence, the assessment of aggravating and mitigating features (including that no mitigation was established by evidence for the Appellant's self-reported neurodevelopmental conditions), the application of the totality principle and the allowance of guilty-plea credit, and the refusal to reduce sentence for delay or prejudice arising from recall to custody.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Appellant's sentence as imposed (three years and nine months' imprisonment on each count, concurrent; forfeiture of the ammonia; payment of the victim surcharge) stands. The decision does not purport to establish a new legal precedent; it applies existing sentencing guidelines and statutory provisions to the specific facts of this case and affirms the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion in those respects.

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Note on anonymization: All personal names and identities appearing in the original opinion have been replaced with standardized placeholders to preserve anonymity consistent with the summary instructions.