Anonymized Summary of Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal, brought with leave of a single judge, by the Appellant against a restraining order imposed as part of a sentence for an offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The sentence was imposed by Judge [Last Name] sitting in the Crown Court on 10 December 2024. In addition to the restraining order, the sentencing judge imposed a suspended sentence of imprisonment of nine months suspended for 18 months, a 30-day rehabilitation activity requirement, 120 hours of unpaid work, and a compensation order.

The facts as described in the sentencing material are that, on the evening of 4 September 2023, the Complainant was parking a bus at The Bus Station with no passengers on board. Three men, including the Appellant and a Co-defendant, were standing at the end of the bus bay. The Complainant asked them to move for safety reasons. An altercation followed in which the Co-defendant pushed the Complainant, then punched him, breaking his nose, and struck him repeatedly. The Appellant subsequently joined in and both the Appellant and the Co-defendant punched and kicked the Complainant until members of the public and another driver intervened. The Complainant sustained a broken nose and multiple facial and head injuries and later reported ongoing physical symptoms and significant mental health effects.

On arrest, the Appellant initially blamed another person for the punch and provided no comment in interview. The Appellant pleaded guilty on a full facts basis when arraigned on 20 September 2024. At the sentencing hearing a prosecution application for a restraining order was uploaded to the court system late (dated the same day as sentencing). The Officer in the Case reported unsuccessful attempts to contact the Complainant, although the court had a victim personal statement from the Complainant describing ongoing mental health problems said to follow the assault.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the restraining order imposed as part of sentence was lawfully made under section 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020 — i.e., whether it was necessary to protect the Complainant from conduct amounting to harassment or causing a fear of violence.
2. Whether the terms of the restraining order (prohibiting direct or indirect contact, and excluding attendance at The Bus Station) were proportionate to the harm sought to be prevented.
3. Whether the sentencing judge afforded sufficient explanation for making the order and whether the prosecution had fulfilled its responsibility to obtain the victim's views.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Arguments

• The prosecution relied on an application (uploaded late) seeking a restraining order that would prohibit the Appellant from contacting the Complainant, prohibit attendance at The Bus Station, and prohibit use of Company A within the relevant borough. The prosecution submitted the order was proportionate and necessary to protect the Complainant, who worked multiple routes for Company A.
• The prosecution noted alternatives were possible to accommodate employment needs, and submitted the court should ensure terms were proportionate and necessary.

Appellant's Arguments (represented by Attorney [Last Name])

• The Appellant opposed the restraining order on the basis that a restraining order should only be imposed if necessary to protect the victim from conduct amounting to harassment or causing fear of violence.
• There was no evidence of any ongoing relationship or contact between the Appellant and the Complainant; they were strangers at the time of the incident, and the Appellant had been on bail without any bail condition prohibiting contact.
• There was no evidence of any contact during the year since the incident, such that it was not shown the order was necessary. The proposed terms would disproportionately infringe the Appellant's ability to live (for example, the Appellant relies on public transport and does not drive).
• The late service of the prosecution application and lack of clear evidence of the victim's views were also relied on in opposing the order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Khellaf [2016] EWCA Crim 1297	The propositions that (1) the court should take into account the views of the person to be protected (as far as practicable); (2) an order should only be made if necessary to protect the victim; (3) terms must be proportionate to the harm sought to be prevented; and (4) particular care is needed where children are involved.	The court relied on Khellaf to set out the legal framework for restraining orders and to evaluate whether the restraining order in the present case was necessary and proportionate. Khellaf was used to emphasise the need to consider the victim's views and to require adequate explanation from the sentencing judge for imposing the order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by setting out the statutory framework in section 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020, which permits a restraining order only when made to protect a victim from conduct amounting to harassment or causing a fear of violence and only when made in addition to dealing with the offender for the offence.

The court then considered Khellaf and the propositions derived from it, emphasising: (1) the relevance of the victim's views (and the prosecution's responsibility to obtain them where possible); (2) the necessity of an order to protect the victim; and (3) the requirement that terms be proportionate to the harm to be prevented.

Applying those principles to the facts, the court noted the incident was an isolated encounter between strangers with no ongoing relationship. The prosecution had uploaded its application for a restraining order late on the day of sentencing and the Officer in the Case had been unable to speak to the victim, so it was unclear how the victim's views had been taken into account (although a victim personal statement was before the court describing significant ongoing distress).

The court agreed with the Appellant's counsel that there was no evidence before the sentencing court of a risk of future conduct amounting to harassment or causing the victim to fear violence. The sentencing judge's remarks did not adequately explain why the order was necessary. The appellate court concluded the restraining order appeared to have been made primarily to give the victim "peace of mind," which the court held does not fall within the statutory purposes (which are confined to preventing harassment or fear of violence). The court gave the example that the mere fact the Appellant might catch a bus that happens to be driven by the Complainant would not, by itself, amount to harassment or cause a fear of violence.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed in respect of the restraining order, which is quashed. The remainder of the sentence imposed in the court below remains unchanged.

Implications:

• Direct effect: The restraining order imposed at sentence is quashed; all other aspects of the sentencing order (suspended sentence, rehabilitation activity requirement, unpaid work requirement, and compensation order) remain in force.
• The court's decision emphasises that restraining orders under section 360 must be made only where necessary to prevent conduct amounting to harassment or causing a fear of violence, that terms must be proportionate, and that sentencing judges should explain adequately why such an order is necessary. The decision does not purport to create new precedent beyond applying established principles from Khellaf to the present facts.

Other Information

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion. Where specific party names, counsel names, company names, and precise location names appeared in the opinion, they have been replaced with consistent anonymized placeholders (e.g., Appellant, Co-defendant, Complainant, Company A, The Bus Station, Judge [Last Name], Attorney [Last Name]). No facts or legal propositions have been invented or inferred beyond what is contained in the opinion.