Anonymized Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns whether and in what circumstances a naturalised British citizen may be deprived of that citizenship on the ground that it was obtained by fraud.

The Appellant entered the UK illegally in November 1999 and applied for asylum using a false identity and nationality. He claimed to be from one territory when in fact he was a national of another. Due to administrative errors and recording mistakes by the Respondent, the Appellant was treated for a period as if he had been granted Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR), although there is no evidence he was formally notified of such a grant. A Special Adjudicator recorded in 2001 that, following an administrative error, the Respondent was estopped from denying ELR for a defined period, but it appears no formal grant was ever made.

The Appellant applied for indefinite leave to remain (ILR) in July 2004 and signed declarations warning that false statements were offences. Internal Home Office/Respondent notes from March 2006 discussed earlier errors and concluded that ILR should be granted; ILR was granted in May 2006. The Appellant applied to naturalise in April 2007, again using the false identity. The naturalisation form included a good character section and warnings about false information; the Appellant answered questions and signed declarations including acknowledgement that a certificate of citizenship could be withdrawn if obtained by fraud or false representation.

Following investigative activity in 2020, the Respondent discovered the Appellant's true nationality and identity. The Appellant admitted the deception when invited to make representations and asked for discretion not to deprive him of citizenship, citing long residence and family ties. On 4 November 2020 the Respondent issued a decision to deprive the Appellant of British citizenship under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 on the basis that registration/naturalisation had been obtained by fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact.

The Appellant appealed. The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) allowed the appeal in July 2022, finding that although the Appellant had made false representations, the ILR (and hence the naturalisation) had been granted mainly because of delays and maladministration rather than the Appellant's nationality or identity, and therefore the deception was not material to the grant of citizenship. The FTT also considered Article 8 ECHR and found in the Appellant's favour on family life grounds.

The Respondent obtained permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (UT). The UT set aside the FTT decision as involving an error of law and remade the decision after a resumed hearing. The UT held that the FTT had erred in relying on the authority cited by the FTT and that the chain of causation had not been broken by maladministration where the decision-maker did not have the true facts. In the resumed UT hearing, the decision-maker found the deception ran throughout the Appellant's residence and that the omission of a material fact in the naturalisation application meant naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud; the UT concluded there was no relevant public law error and that the discretionary balance had been lawfully carried out.

Permission to appeal to this court was granted. The Court of Appeal heard the appeal and dismissed it, concluding that there was no public law error in the Respondent's 2020 decision and that it was realistic to conclude the Appellant would have been refused citizenship in 2007 had the truth been known.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a naturalised British citizen may be deprived of citizenship under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 where the naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact.
2. Whether, on appeal from the Respondent to the First-tier Tribunal under section 40A, the FTT should review the Respondent's decision on the causation issue (whether naturalisation was obtained by impermissible means) on public law grounds and, if so, what standard of review applies.
3. Whether administrative errors or concessions by the Respondent that lead to a grant of ILR can break the chain of causation such that earlier deception is irrelevant to the acquisition of citizenship.
4. Whether the decision to deprive the Appellant of citizenship was lawful in the exercise of discretion and proportionate under Article 8 ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The UT's reasoning was compressed and insufficiently analysed whether the Respondent would have reached the same decisions (ILR and naturalisation) had the true facts been known.
• The Appellant sought an opportunity to re-argue the case in light of subsequent authority (notably Chaudhry), contending that the FTT findings warranted renewed consideration; he also suggested parts of the UT's approach were open to challenge.
• Submissions at the resumed hearing argued assessment should be against the "real world" backdrop in which ILR had been granted because of delays and maladministration, and that it was unnecessary for the UT to consider what the Respondent might have done had the full facts been known.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Appellant had persisted in deliberate and prolonged deception (a "lie on every page" of his applications) and thereby lacked the good character required for naturalisation.
• The deception was maintained up to and including the naturalisation application and had not been disclosed; there was nothing in the decision history that broke the causal link between the deception and the grant of citizenship.
• On the law as it then stood (and as developed in subsequent authorities), the Appellant's case was unsustainable: deception of the kind demonstrated is ordinarily material to the acquisition of citizenship and makes deprivation appropriate and proportionate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Sleiman (deprivation of citizenship; conduct) [2017] UKUT 367 (IAC)	Considered in relation to materiality; referenced by the FTT and Home Office guidance (paragraph 55.7) on whether prior deception had a direct bearing on the grant of citizenship.	The UT and this court treated Sleiman as of limited weight; the UT concluded the FTT's reliance on Sleiman was misplaced in the present facts because the full facts were not known at the time ILR/naturalisation were granted.
Shyti v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 770	Authority relied on by the UT for broader principles relating to review of deprivation decisions and the assessment of good character and causation.	The UT identified Shyti as part of the relevant case law and extracted broad principles from the statutory scheme and case law. The Court of Appeal considered Shyti in its analysis but noted it had not required determination of the appeal point in Shyti.
Begum v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] AC 765	Sets out principles on the scope of appellate review from executive decision-making (public law review principles referred to by Lord Reed); used as guidance for standard of review on appeals under section 40A.	This court and the UT applied the Begum approach (as summarised in Chaudhry) to the public law review of causation and discretion in deprivation decisions under s 40(3).
U3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 19	Reaffirmation by the Supreme Court of principles from Begum concerning appellate review of executive decisions (as noted in the opinion).	The opinion acknowledged U3's reaffirmation of Begum principles but stated that Chaudhry sufficiently set out the law applicable to s 40(3) cases for present purposes.
Chaudhry (referred to, [2025] EWCA Civ 16)	Provides the proper approach to appeals under section 40A from decisions made under s 40(3): (i) FTT finds disputed facts of fraud; (ii) FTT reviews causation on public law grounds; (iii) FTT reviews the exercise of discretion on public law grounds; (iv) FTT considers human rights grounds.	Chaudhry was treated as binding on the Court of Appeal and framed the standard of review applied to causation and discretion in this appeal; the Appellant accepted Chaudhry was binding.
Chimi [2023] UKUT 115 (IAC)	Referenced as providing an approach to structuring the relevant questions for the UT when reconsidering deprivation decisions (e.g., whether the Secretary of State erred on the condition precedent, on discretion, or on human rights grounds).	DUTJ Symes cited Chimi as informing the questions the UT should consider when remaking the decision at the resumed hearing and applied that structured approach.
R(KV) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 2483	Passage (Leggatt LJ) on the effect of withdrawing citizenship obtained by deception and the usual difficulty of successfully resisting deprivation where deception caused grant of naturalisation.	The court cited KV to illustrate that, when deception caused naturalisation, it will be an unusual case in which the person can legitimately complain at withdrawal of rights; noted that it was not suggested the Appellant had lost other rights as a result of naturalisation.
Laci v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 769	Expressed the view that only exceptionally will a person who obtained citizenship by deception be allowed to retain it; consistent with the approach in KV.	The opinion cited Laci for the proposition that retaining citizenship obtained by deception will be exceptional and that this aligns with prior authority.
BA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKUT 85 (IAC)	Discussed in relation to the UT's approach to deprivation where citizenship obtained by deception; broadly part of the background to Laci and subsequent UT reasoning.	Referenced as part of the jurisprudential backdrop; the court noted BA's broad thrust as regards the exceptional nature of retaining citizenship obtained by deception.
SSHD v Daci [2025] EWCA Civ 18	Example of a similar case where an appellant applied for British citizenship using a false identity; cited to support that continued deceit as an adult and prompt action by the Respondent when fraud was discovered do not render deprivation disproportionate.	The Court of Appeal treated Daci as closely analogous and cited it for the proposition that prolonged deceit supports the lawfulness and proportionality of deprivation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from statute and policy to fact-specific application. The relevant statutory power is section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981, which permits deprivation where registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. The operative policy at the time of the decision was Chapter 55 of the Home Office Nationality Instructions, which defines "false representation" (dishonest representation), "concealment of any material fact" (operative concealment with a direct bearing on the decision), and provides guidance on materiality (paragraphs 55.4 and 55.7).

The court treated as binding the approach to appellate review in Chaudhry, which (as summarised) requires the FTT to find disputed facts of fraud, to review the Respondent's causation decision on public law grounds, to review discretionary deprivation on public law grounds, and to consider other legal obligations including Article 8/HRA claims.

Applying the law and guidance to the facts, the court emphasised that the deception in this case was admitted and maintained throughout the Appellant's residence in the UK and through the ILR and naturalisation processes. The critical causation question was whether the grant of citizenship in 2007 was obtained "by means of" the fraud or false representation. The court concluded that the Appellant's long-standing, continuing, and deliberate deception about identity and nationality formed the "real world" backdrop to the grant of ILR and later naturalisation. There was nothing in the decision-making history that broke the causal link between the fraud and the grant of citizenship because there had been no exercise of discretion by the Respondent while fully informed of the true facts.

The court rejected the FTT's reliance on authority that suggested the grant of ILR under a concession might render earlier deception irrelevant. It accepted the UT's conclusion that where decision-makers did not have full knowledge of the true facts at the time of grant, maladministration or concession does not automatically negate causation. The UT's approach—examining whether it was open to the Respondent to find that the exercise of discretion might have been different had the full facts been known—was endorsed.

On proportionality and Article 8/Human Rights Act grounds, the court noted the FTT had failed to undertake a proper balancing assessment of the public interest in deprivation. At the UT resumed hearing the decision-maker conducted the required balancing and concluded that the public interest considerations relied on by the Respondent were relevant and that there was no material factor overlooked.

The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no public law error in the Respondent's decision-maker concluding in 2020 that the Appellant would have been refused citizenship in 2007 because he was not of good character had the truth been known. The court regarded DUTJ Symes' reasoning in the resumed UT hearing as correct and saw no reason to remit the matter for further factual determination.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellant's appeal. The court concluded that the Respondent lawfully deprived the Appellant of British citizenship under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 because the Appellant's naturalisation had been obtained by means of fraud or false representation.

Implications:

• The direct effect is that the deprivation decision issued by the Respondent in 2020 is upheld and the Appellant's appeal is dismissed.
• The court affirmed that where an applicant maintains a prolonged and deliberate deception about identity/nationality and no decision-maker granted leave or naturalisation with full knowledge of the true facts, maladministration or concessions that led to ILR do not necessarily break the chain of causation for the purposes of s 40(3).
• The opinion underscores that the FTT's role includes public law review of causation and discretion (as framed in Chaudhry), and that an absence of a detailed factual finding by the FTT on causation may result in the UT remaking the decision. The court did not state that it was creating a novel precedent; instead it applied existing statutory provisions, Chapter 55 policy (as in force at the time), and established appellate review principles to the facts of this case.
• No broader or new legal principle beyond the reasoning applied to these facts was announced: the decision confirms the established approach that retaining citizenship obtained by deception is likely to be exceptional and that prolonged deception invading good character considerations supports deprivation.

Outcome

DISMISSED — the appeal was dismissed and the decision to deprive the Appellant of citizenship was upheld. The court's panel: Judge Dingemans, Judge King and Judge [Senior President of Tribunals] (as recorded) agreed with the conclusion.

Sources and Observations

This summary is based exclusively on the provided opinion text. It does not add or infer facts beyond those expressly stated in that opinion. Where the opinion quoted or paraphrased policy guidance or case passages, those extracts were used to outline the court's reasoning and its application to the specific facts.