Summary of Anonymized Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a multi-defendant criminal trial in the Crown Court at Minshull Street, Manchester before Judge Pepperall. On 26 April 2024 the Appellant, then aged 17, was convicted of the murder of Victim 1 (count 1) and of an alternative offence of wounding with intent under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (count 3); the Appellant was acquitted of attempted murder of Victim 2 (count 2). On 5 June 2024 the Appellant was sentenced to detention at His Majesty’s pleasure with a minimum term of 13 years and 239 days.

There were multiple co-defendants: Defendant 1 (convicted of murder and wounding; life sentence with a minimum term specified), Defendant 2 (convicted of wounding with intent; sentence imposed; jury failed to reach verdict on murder and prosecution did not seek retrial), Defendant 3 (convicted of wounding with intent), and Defendants 4 and 5 (acquitted of all counts). The Appellant obtained permission to appeal against conviction from a single judge.

The incident occurred shortly after 6pm on 16 August 2023 near the canal at Piccadilly Basin. Victim 1 and Victim 2 were stabbed within minutes of arriving at the towpath; Victim 2 survived, Victim 1 sustained a fatal wound to the heart and later died after life support was withdrawn. The prosecution’s case was that the Appellant and co-defendants jointly attacked and stabbed Victim 1 and Victim 2; the case relied upon eye-witness evidence, CCTV and mobile footage, telephone evidence, medical evidence, agreed facts including items, DNA and blood at the scene, identification parade evidence and police interviews.

At trial, a conflict in the accounts of the Appellant and Defendant 2 emerged concerning who carried and used the knife(s). During the Appellant’s evidence, Defendant 2 applied to adduce bad character evidence against the Appellant under section 101(1)(e) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003). The bad character material comprised two incidents recorded in CRIS reports (October and November 2020) and an Instagram exchange from November 2023. The trial judge admitted parts of that material under s.101(1)(e). The Appellant appealed on the sole ground that admitting that bad character material rendered the convictions unsafe.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge erred in admitting, under s.101(1)(e) CJA 2003, the three items of bad character material (two CRIS-recorded incidents and an Instagram exchange) against the Appellant on the basis that they had substantial probative value as to an important matter in issue between the Appellant and Defendant 2 (namely, which of them carried and used the knife that fatally wounded Victim 1).
2. Whether the timing and manner of Defendant 2’s application (including compliance with Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 r.21.4(4)) and the subsequent cross-examination of the Appellant caused unfairness or ambush such that the Appellant’s trial and convictions became unsafe.
3. Whether it was permissible for Defendant 2 to cross-examine the Appellant on allegations from CRIS reports without establishing that Defendant 2 could and would call evidence to substantiate those allegations if denied (and, relatedly, whether such cross-examination was unfair under the authorities).
4. Whether, in light of the judge’s directions to the jury about the limited use of the admitted bad character material, the Appellant’s convictions on counts 1 and 3 are unsafe.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant challenged the judge’s conclusion that each item of bad character evidence had substantial probative value in relation to the dispute with Defendant 2; the admission of that material had an adverse effect making the convictions unsafe.
• The Appellant argued the notice/application under the Criminal Procedure Rules was late and deprived him of an opportunity to address the matters in his evidence-in-chief, causing prejudice (an argument later not pursued before the appeal court on the procedural point).
• Specific criticisms included that the November 2020 threat allegation should not have been the subject of cross-examination (it was unproven and denied by the Appellant), that the CRIS material (even where partly admitted) was insufficient to establish a propensity to carry knives (citing Braithwaite), and that the Instagram messages, to which the Appellant claimed no recollection, showed willingness to help obtain a knife but not to carry or use one.
• The Appellant further contended that permitting cross-examination on these matters without the adducing party committing to prove them risked unfair prejudice (relying on authorities such as Miller).

Defendant 2's Arguments (as applicant to adduce bad character)

• Defendant 2 submitted that the Appellant had directly attacked his account by suggesting Defendant 2 had stabbed Victim 2 and Victim 1; identity of the knifeman was therefore an important matter in issue between them.
• Defendant 2 argued that the disclosed CRIS reports and the Instagram exchange demonstrated that the Appellant was willing to associate with knife-carrying, to carry knives and to assist others in acquiring knives — material of substantial probative value on the identity/tendency issue under s.101(1)(e).
• Defendant 2's counsel relied on the available documentary material (including mobile phone downloads) and the contents of the CRIS reports which recorded the Appellant’s recorded admissions, arguing those were not mere unproven allegations but material susceptible of proof.
• Defendant 2 contended that although the application was not filed at the earliest possible moment, it did not amount to ambush or deliberate manipulation and any unfairness could be addressed by allowing limited opportunity to take instructions or to reopen evidence.

Prosecution's Position

• The prosecution adduced the factual and forensic case against the defendants and provided the disclosure upon request; it relied upon the judge’s assessment of probative value and did not rely upon the admitted bad character material in the prosecution case against the Appellant.
• The prosecution pointed to the documentary nature of the Instagram exchange (capable of proof from downloaded material) and that the CRIS reports contained recorded events involving identifiable school staff which were not merely vague intelligence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Braithwaite [2010] EWCA Crim 1082; [2010] 2 Cr App R 18	Guidance on when CRIS/intelligence material does not amount to evidence of misconduct; s.109 and the substantial probative value test; caution that CRIS reports that merely record allegations or police suspicions are not evidence and should not be relied upon.	The court distinguished Braithwaite on the facts: unlike Braithwaite, the CRIS entries here recorded identifiable staff actions (knife confiscation; teacher interaction) and the Instagram messages were provable from phone downloads. Braithwaite informed the judge’s analysis of when CRIS material lacks probative value, but the judge found the present material materially different and sufficiently probative.
R v Musone [2007] EWCA Crim 1237; [2007] 1 WLR 2467	Authority on the high threshold for overturning a trial judge’s admissibility decisions and on approaches to bad character material in contentious evidential settings.	Cited for the proposition that appellate interference requires the judge’s exercise to be plainly wrong; the Appellant did not pursue a Musone-based challenge to that high threshold on appeal.
R v Phillips [2011] EWCA Crim 2935; [2012] 1 Cr App R 25	Considerations concerning the substantial probative value test and its importance in admissibility decisions under the CJA 2003.	The court referred to Phillips when emphasising that the substantial probative value assessment is important and that the trial judge’s fact-sensitive assessment should not be displaced absent Wednesbury unreasonableness.
R v Jones [2007] EWCA Crim 2741	Confirmation that s.101(1)(e) may apply where an important issue between co-defendants is put by counsel in cross-examination of one by another.	The court accepted the proposition from Jones and applied it to conclude that the identity of the knifeman was directly in issue between Defendant 2 and the Appellant, and could therefore be the proper subject of a s.101(1)(e) application.
R v Hanson [2005] EWCA Crim 824; [2005] 1 WLR 3169	Observations on the fact-sensitive nature of propensity/bad character assessments and the importance of the trial judge's feel for the case.	The court relied on Hanson to underscore deference to the trial judge’s factual assessment of probative value unless plainly wrong.
R v Renda [2005] EWCA Crim 2826; [2006] 1 Cr App R 24	Similar material on appellate restraint and evaluation of bad character evidence.	Cited as part of the body of authorities supporting deference to the trial judge’s fact-specific evaluation.
R v Lawson [2006] EWCA Crim 2572; [2007] 1 WLR 1191	Further authority on assessing bad character evidence and judicial evaluation.	Used in the court’s discussion of established authorities showing that admissibility assessments are fact-sensitive.
R v Dizaei [2013] EWCA Crim 88; [2013] 1 WLR 2257	Interpretation of s.109(1) CJA 2003: assess relevance/probative value on the assumption that the bad character evidence is true; explains that the assumption frames but does not decide admissibility.	Cited for the principle that s.109(1) requires assuming the bad character evidence true for the admissibility assessment, but the judge must still apply the gateway tests; the court applied that framing to the admitted material.
R v Mitchell [2010] EWCA Crim 783	Upheld admission of material under s.101(1)(e) where the bad character material and explanation were assumed true for s.109(1) purposes and provided context for probative value analysis.	Used to illustrate that the evidential assumption under s.109(1) can encompass both conduct and explanations and that this framing is relevant to the substantial probative value assessment.
R v Miller [2010] EWCA Crim 1153; [2010] 2 Cr App R 19	Authority addressing the unfairness of putting allegations to a witness where the adducing party will not call evidence to prove them; cross-examination on unproven allegations may be impermissible unless limited.	The court considered Miller when assessing whether it was unfair for Defendant 2 to cross-examine the Appellant on CRIS allegations without establishing an intention to prove them. The court concluded the cross-examination here was limited in scope and not unfair, though a jury direction would have been preferable regarding the November 2020 allegation.
R v Robinson [2005] EWCA Crim 3233; [2006] 1 Cr App R 32	Consideration of jury direction complexity when bad character evidence is admitted and the potential for confusing "mental gymnastics".	The court addressed Robinson in considering whether the judge’s directions were apt and whether they risked confusing the jury; the court found the directions here were appropriate and not unduly complex given the issues in the trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a structured analysis rooted in the statutory gateways for bad character evidence (notably s.101(1)(e) and the assumption in s.109(1) CJA 2003) and settled appellate authorities. The principal analytical steps were:

1. Identification of the important issue in dispute: the court agreed with the trial judge that the identity of the person who carried the chrome flick knife and inflicted the fatal injury to Victim 1 was directly in issue between Defendant 2 and the Appellant. The court recognised that such a matter can be put in issue not only by direct evidence but also by how counsel frames and conducts cross-examination.
2. Application of s.109(1): the court applied the statutory requirement to assess probative value on the assumption that the bad character material was true. The court emphasised that this assumption frames but does not resolve admissibility; the remaining gateway tests still had to be applied.
3. Evaluation of substantial probative value: the court reviewed the three items of bad character material together (an eight-inch breadknife brought into school in October 2020 with the Appellant’s recorded explanation; an alleged threat to stab another pupil reported in November 2020 to a teacher; and a provable Instagram exchange in November 2023 in which the Appellant appeared to offer to help obtain a knife). The court agreed with the trial judge that, on the factual matrix, those items could show a propensity to carry knives and thus had substantial probative value as to which of the two men carried the knife at the canal. The court distinguished Braithwaite on the ground that, unlike the material in Braithwaite, the present CRIS entries involved identifiable school staff who recorded the incidents and the Instagram messages were provable from phone downloads.
4. Consideration of timing and procedural fairness: the court considered whether Defendant 2’s application complied with Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 r.21.4(4). The trial judge had found the application was not made as soon as reasonably practicable but that the lateness did not amount to ambush or an attempt to manipulate proceedings. The judge concluded that any unfairness could have been addressed by allowing limited opportunities to take instructions or to reopen evidence; the Appellant’s counsel declined to do so. On appeal the Appellant did not pursue the procedural unfairness point.
5. Fairness of cross-examination absent a commitment to prove allegations: the court analysed Miller. While Miller indicates that putting unproven allegations to a witness can be unfair if the adducing party is not prepared to prove them, Miller is not an absolute bar: limited cross-examination may be permissible. Here, D2's counsel had made clear he would either seek agreed admissions or put the matters in cross-examination. The Appellant’s counsel did not ask the judge to exclude such cross-examination unless D2 intended to call proving evidence. Given the context, the court found the cross-examination was limited, and not unfair: the Appellant admitted the essence of the October 2020 incident and did not accept the November 2020 allegation (saying he did not remember it).
6. Directions to the jury: the court reviewed the judge’s written and oral directions. The judge directed that the prosecution did not rely on the bad character material in its case against the Appellant, and the jury must ignore that material when deciding the prosecution's case against the Appellant; but the jury could consider it when assessing the cases of any defendant who relied on the contention that the Appellant, and not they, had carried or used the knife. The court regarded these directions as clear and sufficient, noting that the judge also indicated the Appellant’s good character remained unaffected for the prosecution’s case.
7. Final appraisal of safety of conviction: weighing the probative value of the admitted material, the scope of cross-examination, the trial judge’s directions, and the overall evidence in the trial, the court concluded that the convictions were not rendered unsafe by the admission and use of the bad character material.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the appeal. The court concluded that the trial judge did not err in admitting the three items of bad character evidence under s.101(1)(e) CJA 2003, that the cross-examination based on those matters was not unfair in the circumstances, and that the judge’s directions to the jury were clear and sufficient. Accordingly, the Appellant's convictions on counts 1 and 3 were not unsafe.

Consequences:

• The Appellant’s convictions and sentence (detention at His Majesty's pleasure with the stated minimum term) remain in force.
• The court emphasised the fact-sensitive nature of s.101(1)(e) admissibility assessments and the deference owed to trial judges' evaluative judgments on probative value and trial fairness; the decision does not purport to establish a new legal test beyond the established authorities cited and applied.
• No broader alteration of legal principle was announced; the decision applies established authorities (including Braithwaite, Miller, Musone, Phillips and others) to the particular facts and evidential configuration of this multi-defendant trial.

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Note: All personal names and identifying details in the original opinion have been replaced with consistent anonymised placeholders (for example, "Appellant", "Defendant 1", "Victim 1", "Witness 1", "Judge Pepperall", "Attorney [Last Name]") in accordance with the anonymisation requirement. The summary otherwise reflects only information explicitly contained in the provided opinion.