Anonymised Summary of High Court Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment was delivered by Judge O'Connor following a trial concerning a claim by the Plaintiff for damages for nervous shock (post‑traumatic stress disorder) arising from the fatal injuring of her adult son on 13 April 2017. The deceased son was struck by a car (a Ford Focus with a "WW" registration) at approximately 19:00 at the scene identified in the record as [Number] Main Street, The City. The Plaintiff arrived at the scene shortly thereafter, observed a large crowd and significant blood on the deceased son, and was removed from the immediate vicinity by emergency personnel. The body remained at the scene until its removal the following day.

A post‑mortem report concluded death was due to a severe head injury with multiple skull fractures. A forensic collision investigator produced a report and photographs indicating that the vehicle made initial contact with the deceased son (who was in front of the vehicle and in line with the driver seat), pushed or toppled him into the roadway and then carried on some distance. The inquest into the death returned a verdict of "unlawful killing" on 24 October 2024.

Procedurally, default judgments had been obtained by the Plaintiff against the First Defendant and the Second Defendant by order dated 17 January 2022. The Third Named Defendant (an entity joined in the proceedings) and the Fourth Named Defendant (an insurer) each participated in the litigation. The trial examined liability for payment of damages and the medical question whether the Plaintiff suffered PTSD as a consequence of the events. The Court received evidence from medical witnesses, forensic witnesses, Garda witnesses and from the Plaintiff; both the First Defendant and the Second Defendant were subpoenaed but declined to answer many questions at trial.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff has established, on admissible evidence, that she suffered post‑traumatic stress disorder (nervous shock) caused by the fatal injuring of her son and is therefore entitled to damages.
2. Whether the First Defendant or the Second Defendant was driving the vehicle at the time of the incident, assessed on the balance of probabilities, for the purpose of resolving the indemnity/liability dispute between the Third Named Defendant (Company A) and the Fourth Named Defendant (Company B).
3. Whether any adverse inferences could properly be drawn from the refusal of the First Defendant and the Second Defendant to answer questions at trial and from their failure to apply to set aside default judgments.
4. Whether aggravated damages should be awarded against the Fourth Named Defendant (Company B) for its conduct in the proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff relied on her own evidence and medical records to establish a diagnosis of PTSD and psychiatric injury arising from the incident and from subsequent traumatic experiences (including attending the morgue and the prolonged investigation).
• The Plaintiff sought an assessment of general damages for PTSD and associated psychiatric conditions, quantified by the Court.
• The Plaintiff argued that the Fourth Named Defendant (Company B) should not avoid responsibility and that its conduct in connection with disclosure and engagement warranted consideration of aggravated damages.

Fourth Named Defendant (Company B)'s Arguments

• Company B disputed the correctness of the PTSD diagnosis and relied on the report of its instructed psychiatric assessor (Attorney Kelly) to argue that the Plaintiff suffered a severe grief reaction rather than PTSD.
• Company B submitted that the Plaintiff bore the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the First Defendant was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the incident and urged the Court to adopt a rigorous standard of proof (described in submissions as requiring clear and convincing proof) because of the serious consequences for the parties.
• Company B explained its position on engagement and disclosure and submitted it had not had authority to instruct a legal team on behalf of the First Defendant; it distinguished prior authority relied upon by the Plaintiff.

Third Named Defendant (Company A)'s Arguments

• Company A required the Plaintiff to establish how Company A must pay any award, pointing to insurance arrangements and the certificate of insurance produced by Company B.
• Company A contested aspects of Company B's liability and participation, but the trial evidence formed the principal basis for the Court's resolution of the insurer dispute.

First Defendant and Second Defendant

• Both the First Defendant and the Second Defendant were present at trial but exercised their right not to answer questions that might incriminate them. They did not file defences and did not seek to set aside the default judgments obtained against them.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Sheehan v Bus Eireann [2020] IEHC 625 (and appeal decision 2022 IECA 28)	Model clarity about the law of nervous shock and an approach to assessment of damages for PTSD; locating seriousness on a scale for awards.	The Court treated Sheehan as a model of clarity and used its approach to assist in assessing seriousness and in fixing general damages for PTSD in this case.
Mongan v Mongan and Company A [2020] IEHC 262	Discussion of limits on drawing adverse inferences from a party's silence in certain contexts (McDonald J.'s view cited).	The Court considered Mongan but distinguished the circumstances here; it declined the broad submission that no adverse inferences could be drawn and explained the limited inferences it would draw from the defendants' refusals to answer.
Whelan v Allied Irish Banks plc [2014] 2 I.R.	Authority cited in Mongan regarding inability to draw adverse inference in certain contexts.	The Court acknowledged Whelan via Mongan but explained why it could draw limited inferences in the present civil proceedings given the context (subpoenaed witnesses, default judgments and the civil fact‑finding task).
Hanrahan v. Merck Sharp and Dohme [1988] IESC 1	Ordinary rule that a person who alleges a tort must prove the necessary ingredients thereof (burden of proof principle).	The Court recorded this principle as relied upon by Company B in submissions concerning the Plaintiff's burden to prove who was driving; the Court nonetheless applied the civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities in its fact‑finding.
Quatja v Badila and Company B [2018] IEHC 202	Authority concerning insurer conduct and cases where insurer involvement may indicate collusion or stage‑managed events.	Company B relied on differentiation from Quatja; the Court noted the distinction and observed that collusion evident in Quatja was not established here.
O'Donnell v O'Donnell [2005] IEHC 216	Statement that maintenance of a denial of liability is not an abuse of process; a defendant can require a plaintiff to prove the case.	The Court recorded the passage relied upon by Company B in support of maintaining a denial of liability and the right to require proof; the Court nevertheless conducted a rigorous balance of probabilities assessment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the case by (a) identifying admissible evidence, (b) excluding evidence it could not accept (including oral statements to the Gardaí by persons who did not give live evidence), and (c) applying the civil standard of proof (balance of probabilities) with a careful and rigorous analysis where the consequences for the parties were serious.

On the medical issue, the Court accepted the Plaintiff's medical records and the evidence of the Plaintiff's treating and expert psychiatric witnesses (notably Attorney Mahon) over the assessment relied on by Company B (Attorney Kelly). The Court recorded Attorney Kelly's view that the traumatic criterion for PTSD was satisfied but that there was not a pervasive sense of threat and that the Plaintiff's presentation could be consistent with a severe grief reaction. The Court found the evidence of Attorney Mahon and the contemporaneous medical records persuasive that the Plaintiff had suffered ongoing and significant PTSD (with elements of abnormal grief), that the condition had been severe immediately after the incident and had attenuated but remained present and likely lifelong in its effects. The Court therefore concluded that the Plaintiff had established psychiatric injury (nervous shock) caused by the events and their aftermath.

On the vehicle/driver and insurer/liability issues, the Court considered:

• Documentary evidence that Company B had issued a temporary certificate of insurance (policy ending 980) and that the First Defendant had effected temporary transfers of that policy to the vehicle on 3 April 2017 and 13 April 2017 (the latter transfer extending to 17 April 2017).
• Call data showing the First Defendant's mobile number had been used to effect the transfer shortly before the incident, with the last call from that number at 18:27:42 on 13 April 2017.
• Forensic evidence that a mobile phone found near the vehicle at the scene carried a DNA profile matching the First Defendant, with the likelihood of a coincidental match described in the expert's evidence as extremely small.
• Forensic collision evidence indicating the position of the deceased at first contact and subsequent drag marks consistent with intentional infliction of injury and that the vehicle carried on for some distance after contact.
• Inconsistent accounts given by the Second Defendant to Gardaí (including a statement that the vehicle had been stolen, followed by other explanations) and the Second Defendant's failure to correct or clarify his accounts subsequently.
• The refusal of the First Defendant and the Second Defendant to answer substantive questions at trial and their failure to seek to set aside default judgments obtained against them.

The Court excluded opinion evidence by Garda witnesses on legal responsibility and held that the DPP's decision not to prosecute (to date) was irrelevant to the civil fact‑finding task. The Court acknowledged the submission from Company B that the Plaintiff bore the burden to prove who was driving, and that a rigorous approach was warranted, but proceeded to apply the balance of probabilities to the admissible evidence before it.

Having considered the totality of admissible evidence and the limited adverse inferences properly available in civil proceedings from the defendants' conduct (including silence, failure to seek to vacate default judgments and inconsistent accounts), the Court concluded that, on the balance of probabilities, it was the First Defendant who was driving the vehicle at the time of the incident for the purpose of resolving the insurer dispute between Company A and Company B. The Court set out the factors relied upon for that conclusion in numbered form (see paragraphs summarised below): lack of any other insured driver for that day; the First Defendant's refusal to answer questions; the temporal link between the First Defendant's calls to Company B and the presence of his mobile phone near the scene; contemporaneous transfers of insurance cover to the vehicle by the First Defendant; prior observation of the First Defendant driving the vehicle; and the Second Defendant's inconsistent explanations and position as registered owner but not insured to drive.

The Court also dealt with a claim for aggravated damages against Company B based on alleged procedural conduct and delayed disclosure. While critical of the lack of earlier directed disclosure about Company B's investigations and communications, the Court found no evidence that Company B's conduct had exacerbated the Plaintiff's psychiatric condition and declined to award aggravated damages.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings

• The Court found that the Plaintiff has suffered severe post‑traumatic stress disorder (nervous shock) arising from the fatal injuring of her son and awarded general damages for that injury in the total sum of €130,000 (comprising €85,000 for the period from 13 April 2017 to date and €45,000 for the future).
• On the balance of probabilities the Court concluded that it was the First Defendant who was driving the vehicle at the time of the incident, for the purposes of resolving the indemnity/liability dispute between the Third Named Defendant (Company A) and the Fourth Named Defendant (Company B).
• The Court declined to award aggravated damages against Company B for its conduct in the proceedings.

Implications and consequences:

• The direct legal consequence is that the Plaintiff is entitled to the assessed general damages totalling €130,000. The precise terms of final orders (including which defendant or insurer will be required to pay and any orders as to indemnity between insurers) were not finalised in the judgment and the Court invited the parties to address it on the final terms of orders and costs at a further hearing listed for 15 October 2025.
• The Court's conclusion on driver identity was limited to the civil fact‑finding required to resolve the insurer dispute and was reached on the balance of probabilities on the admissible evidence before the Court; the judgment expressly disavows any reliance on evidence the Court excluded, and the DPP's decision on criminal prosecution was treated as irrelevant to the civil determination.
• No new principle of law or wider precedent was announced; the Court applied established civil evidential principles (including the balance of probabilities standard and careful treatment of adverse inferences where defendants exercise rights against self‑incrimination) and applied existing authorities to the facts of the case.

Additional Notes

The judgment records that the Court excluded from its consideration accounts given to the Plaintiff by persons who did not give evidence at trial, excluded opinion evidence from Garda witnesses about legal responsibility, and applied a rigorous approach to assessing the balance of probabilities where the outcome carried serious consequences for the parties. The Court also observed procedural deficiencies in disclosure and engagement by an insurer following its joinder, and recommended consideration of early disclosure where insurers are joined in similar cases; however, the Court declined to make a substantive adverse finding against the insurer on those grounds in the absence of evidence of aggravation of the Plaintiff's condition.

Hearing and Further Directions

The Court invited parties to address it on the final terms of the orders to be made, including costs, and requested that the Plaintiff's solicitors serve a hard copy of the judgment on the defendants with a covering letter noting attendance at court at 10:30 a.m. on 15 October 2025 for the hearing on final orders.

Appearances (Anonymised)

• Attorney McGovern (Senior) and Attorney Cosgrove instructed by Company C for the Plaintiff.
• The First Defendant in person.
• The Second Defendant in person.
• Attorney Murray (Senior) and Attorney O'Neill instructed by Company D for the Third Named Defendant (Company A).
• Attorney Walsh (Senior) and Attorney Marray (Senior) instructed by Company E for the Fourth Named Defendant (Company B).