Anonymized Summary of Appellate Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against sentence brought with leave of a single judge. The anonymity provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply: there must be no reporting likely to identify the victims for the lifetime of the victims unless the prohibition is waived or lifted under section 3 of the Act.

On 7 February 2025, in the Crown Court in The City, the Appellant (now aged 42) was sentenced by Judge Swinnerton to a total of 18 months' immediate imprisonment following conviction after trial on 20 December 2024 for two counts of sexual assault contrary to section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The sentences were six months' imprisonment on count 2 and 12 months' imprisonment on count 4, ordered to run consecutively. There were other counts on which the Appellant was acquitted by the jury.

The factual background set out at trial and in the sentencing remarks is as follows (anonymized): the Appellant was a serving officer of Company A who joined the force in 2006. Two complainants, referred to in the trial as Complainant A and Complainant B, were members or employees of the same force. The offences occurred several years apart. In summary:

• Count 2 (early 2015): Complainant A, then a colleague, drove the Appellant to perform a welfare check. During the journey the Appellant made sexualised remarks and, at one point, took Complainant A's hand from the gearstick and placed it on his crotch over his trousers; she felt he was erect and immediately removed her hand and told a colleague, who advised her to report the matter. Complainant A did tell others at the time but was ambivalent about formal proceedings and in 2016 declined to support an investigation; at a 2017 disciplinary meeting the Appellant denied the allegation and received a verbal warning only.
• Count 4 (November 2019): At a leadership and management course run by Company B in The City, the Appellant (who had previously supervised and mentored Complainant B) and Complainant B sat together. During the conference the Appellant made sexualised comments, told Complainant B he was turned on and that his penis was hard, then took her hand by the wrist and pushed it onto his crotch so her hand was on his penis through his trousers for around five to ten seconds; she moved her hand away and felt unable to act or speak further. On the drive home he made further sexually suggestive remarks.

Both complainants provided victim personal statements describing significant psychological and career effects: Complainant A reported difficulty trusting colleagues, therapy and dislike of her career; Complainant B reported anxiety, personality change, disturbed sleep and that she felt unable to progress in her career. The Appellant had no previous convictions and there were character references from his spouse and family friends. The presentence report noted the Appellant still denied the offences, acknowledged some prior inappropriate behaviour, and assessed him as lacking insight into the impact of his conduct.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge misapplied the applicable Sentencing Council guideline for sexual assault by moving the offences from category 3B to category 2B and thereby imposing an excessive sentence.
2. Whether the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient credit for the Appellant's personal mitigation (including good character, loss of employment and family impact), resulting in a manifestly excessive sentence.
3. Whether the sentencing judge failed adequately to apply the principle of totality when imposing consecutive sentences for the two offences.
4. Whether, on the facts found by the sentencing judge, immediate custody was required (this conclusion was not challenged on appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Gray)

• The judge erred in elevating the offences from category 3B to category 2B under the Sentencing Council guideline; the offences fell squarely within category 3B, whose starting point would have been a high level community order and a range up to six months' custody.
• Substantial mitigation existed: the Appellant's good character, loss of his job, the passage of time since the offences, and the impact of the sentence on his family.
• The judge wrongly treated the location of the count 2 offence (in a car) as an aggravating factor sufficient to justify escalation beyond category 3B.
• The judge failed to give sufficient credit for mitigation and to respect the principle of totality when imposing consecutive sentences that produced a total of 18 months.

Respondent's Arguments (Attorney Dudley)

• The judge was entitled, on a proper application of the guidelines, to move outside category 3B because of the findings of serious psychological harm and other aggravating factors; an upward movement to category 2B was justified in respect of the more serious offence (count 4).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Chall [2019] EWCA Crim 865; [2019] 2 Cr App R (S) 44	Authority that a sentencer may move upwards from the guideline starting point where psychological harm, although short of "severe" (category 1), is significantly greater than would generally be seen in the offence in question.	The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the sentencing judge could treat the level of psychological harm as an aggravating factor justifying an upward adjustment from the ordinary category range, particularly in respect of the more serious offence (count 4).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court accepted that the sentencing judge who had presided at trial was best placed to assess harm and culpability. The court reviewed the applicable Sentencing Council guideline and expressly noted the guideline paragraph allowing for consideration of "other relevant factors" at step 2, which permits movement outside the indicated category range when appropriate.

The court identified and analysed the aggravating and mitigating features found by the sentencing judge and considered whether those findings justified departure from category 3B. Key elements of the court's analysis were:

• Other relevant factor: the Appellant was a serving officer of Company A who committed the offences while at work and, at least technically, while on duty. The offences were committed against colleagues. The court accepted the sentencing judge's view that such misconduct by a police officer causes additional harm by undermining public trust in the police, and that this was a highly significant factor not specifically listed in the guideline.
• Count 2 (car incident): the court accepted that the location and circumstances (an assault in a police vehicle while the complainant was driving) aggravated the offence because of the foreseeable risk to road safety and the particular vulnerability of the complainant at that moment. Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that the original sentence for count 2 (six months) was at the top of category 3B and that some further credit for personal mitigation should have been allowed, so that an upward movement to category 2B was not justified for count 2.
• Count 4 (conference incident): the court upheld the sentencing judge's finding of an imbalance of power — the Appellant was older, had been Complainant B's supervisor and mentor, and she was inexperienced. The court agreed that the Appellant took advantage of an environment and a culture where victims might be reluctant to report misconduct, which was an aggravating feature. The court also accepted the judge's finding of serious psychological harm to Complainant B and that, viewed together with other factors, these justified departing from category 3B to category 2B for the more serious offence (count 4).
• Mitigation and totality: the appellate court observed that the sentencing judge mentioned only two mitigating factors explicitly (good character and passage of time), and took the view that additional personal mitigation (dismissal from employment for gross misconduct, likely financial and social consequences for the Appellant and his family, loss of the Appellant's spouse's employment, potential impact on pension and home ownership) should have been given greater weight. The court considered that the combined effect of insufficient credit for mitigation and insufficient adjustment for totality rendered the overall sentence manifestly excessive.

Balancing these conclusions, the court found that the judge was entitled to depart from category 3B for the more serious offence (count 4) but not for count 2, and that further reduction was required to reflect mitigation and the principle of totality.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART

Holding (direct effect on the sentences):

• The appellate court allowed the appeal and reduced the total immediate custodial sentence from 18 months to 13 months.
• The sentence on count 2 was quashed and substituted: six months' imprisonment replaced by four months' imprisonment.
• The sentence on count 4 was quashed and substituted: 12 months' imprisonment replaced by nine months' imprisonment.
• The substituted sentences continue to run consecutively, producing a total of 13 months' immediate custody.
• The victim surcharge recorded at £156 was directed to be amended to £100.

Implications:

The decision confirms that a sentencer may move outside a guideline category where a combination of aggravating or "other relevant" factors (including the offender's role as a serving police officer committing offences while on duty and the consequent damage to public trust) justify an upward adjustment. At the same time, appellate scrutiny will ensure that personal mitigation and the principle of totality are properly reflected in the overall sentence. The court did not purport to set a novel legal precedent beyond applying existing guideline practice and relevant authority; the outcome was an adjustment of sentence on the facts of this case.

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Note on anonymization: This summary has been fully anonymized in accordance with the source opinion and the instructions provided. All personal identifiers have been replaced with generic placeholders; factual content and legal reasoning are taken exclusively from the supplied opinion.