Anonymized Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This case concerns the death of a pedestrian (the "Victim") on 21 July 2021 when she was struck while crossing a road with her dog. The court found that the Defendant drove dangerously for a sustained period (approximately seven minutes and nearly five miles), repeatedly breaching speed limits and committing dangerous manoeuvres, culminating in driving at over 60 mph in a 30 mph zone and colliding with the Victim. The collision was fatal.

CCTV and dash-cam footage captured the Defendant's driving and the fatal collision. Members of the public attempted lifesaving measures; emergency services attended but the Victim was pronounced dead at the scene. A witness collected a dash-cam and memory card which were later provided to police. The Defendant was arrested at the scene, interviewed on multiple occasions, accepted being the driver but otherwise largely elected not to answer questions. The Defendant reported that a distressing family event (a call about his brother) motivated his urgent driving that day.

Procedurally, on 24 January 2025 the Defendant pleaded guilty on re‑arraignment to causing death by dangerous driving contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. On 25 April 2025 the sentencing judge (Judge Mairs) imposed a sentence of four years' imprisonment, a statutory surcharge, and disqualification from driving until an extended retest had been passed; the disqualification period was five years plus a two year extension under section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (total seven years). The Solicitor General applied under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence of four years' imprisonment imposed on the Defendant for causing death by dangerous driving was unduly lenient such that leave should be granted under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
2. How the Sentencing Council's definitive guideline for causing death by dangerous driving (effective 1 July 2023) should be applied to an offence committed prior to the increase in statutory maximum sentence.
3. What custodial sentence would have been appropriate after trial having regard to categorisation under the guideline (in particular whether the case falls within Category A), and the effect of mitigation (including the Defendant's personal circumstances and plea) on any reduction.
4. What adjustment, if any, should be made to the period of disqualification from driving following any uplift of the custodial sentence (having regard to the applicable statutory provisions and authority on combining discretionary disqualification with the half‑sentence addition).

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments on behalf of the Solicitor General (Attorney Oakley)

• The sentencing judge identified multiple factors that, on his own findings, placed the Defendant's culpability within Category A of the definitive guideline; the starting point for Category A is 12 years' custody.
• The judge did not expressly set out his starting point or quantify adjustments for aggravating and mitigating features, but his remarks show Category A culpability (deliberate sustained dangerous driving, dangerous manoeuvres, gross excess speed, disregard for safety).
• Aggravating features (previous dangerous driving conviction, concealment of dash-cam evidence, Victim as a vulnerable road user) would increase the starting point further (to around 13 years or more in submission).
• The sentencing judge's notional post‑trial sentence of five years was not reconcilable with Category A starting points and ranges; even allowing substantial mitigation, a materially higher sentence was appropriate. Therefore the four‑year sentence was unduly lenient.
• No criticism was made of the judge's allowance of 20% credit for the guilty plea, which fell within discretion.

Arguments on behalf of the Defendant (Attorney Chapman)

• The sentencing judge adopted the correct starting point and appropriately balanced aggravating and mitigating factors when arriving at a four‑year sentence (the judge considered that the guideline must be applied but also that the offence pre‑dated the increase in maximum sentence).
• The judge was entitled to treat the case as straddling categories or not fitting neatly into one category; he applied a downward adjustment to reflect the lower statutory maximum in force at the date of the offence (relying on authority about applying the guideline at the date of sentencing).
• There was significant mitigation: an unusual and distressing reason for driving urgently (reported news of the Defendant's brother collapsing), absence of alcohol or drugs, remorse, prior bereavements, physical health difficulties, positive character references, and family responsibilities. These justified a substantially lower sentence.
• Accordingly, while the sentence might be described as lenient, it was not unduly lenient within the meaning of section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Freeth [2023] EWCA Crim 1754	The definitive guideline for causing death by dangerous driving (effective 1 July 2023) applies to offenders sentenced after that date even if the offence pre‑dated the increase in maximum penalty; the guideline must be applied subject to not exceeding the statutory maximum.	The court relied on Freeth to confirm that the guideline categorisation and starting points apply to this sentencing exercise and to reject the idea that the starting point should be affected simply because the offence pre‑dated the statutory increase.
R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 1537	An offender's legitimate expectation is to be sentenced by reference to the guideline applicable at the date of sentencing.	Cited to support the proposition that applying the definitive guideline introduced on 1 July 2023 to sentences imposed after that date is lawful.
Attorney General's Reference (Egan) [2022] EWCA Crim 1751; [2023] 2 Cr.App.R (S) 16	Summarises the principles governing applications for leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and cites seminal authorities on that statutory procedure.	The court used Egan as a recent statement of the established principles to be applied when considering whether a sentence is unduly lenient and whether leave to refer should be granted.
Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 1989) [1990] 90 Cr.App.R 366	Seminal authority on the operation of section 36 and the discretion of the appellate court even where it considers a sentence unduly lenient.	Referenced as foundational authority for the principles that guide whether leave should be granted under section 36 and the appellate court's exercise of discretion.
Attorney General's Reference No 132 of 2001 (Bryn Dorian Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418; [2003] 1 Cr.App.R 41	Authority cited in the context of the principles to be applied on applications under section 36.	Relied on as part of the established body of authority summarised for the section 36 analysis.
Brown [2018] EWCA Crim 1774	Addressed (as cited in Freeth) points about the scope of Category A in causing death by dangerous driving cases and whether Category A should be reserved for particularly egregious examples.	Invoked (via Freeth) to reject the submission that Category A should only be reserved for exceptionally egregious cases; used to support that the present case fell within Category A on the judge's own findings.
R v Needham [2016] EWCA Crim 455; [2016] 2 CrAppR (S) 26	Sets out the approach required by sentencing courts when imposing periods of disqualification in conjunction with custodial sentences (discretionary period plus addition of half the custodial term where appropriate).	The sentencing judge applied the Needham approach in imposing a discretionary disqualification plus an addition equal to half of the custodial sentence; the appellate court adjusted the disqualification upwards to reflect the increased custodial sentence it substituted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first recalling the established principles governing applications under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988: the sentencing judge is well placed to assess weight of competing factors; a sentence is only unduly lenient where it falls outside the range a reasonable judge might have considered appropriate; leave should be granted only in exceptional circumstances and section 36 is designed to address gross error.

Applying the Sentencing Council's definitive guideline for causing death by dangerous driving (which the Court treated as applicable to sentences imposed after 1 July 2023 irrespective of the date of the offence), the Court identified that the facts found by the sentencing judge manifested multiple Category A features: deliberate, prolonged and persistent dangerous driving over several minutes and miles; dangerous manoeuvres; gross excess speeds including driving well above the 30 mph limit in a residential area; and repeated disregard for other road users. The sentencing judge had himself described these features as Category A.

The Court considered the aggravating and mitigating features expressly noted by the sentencing judge. Aggravating features included a relevant previous conviction for dangerous driving and an attempt to conceal the dash‑cam evidence. Mitigating features included the Defendant's reported extreme distress about his brother, other bereavements, physical and mental health issues, expressions of remorse, and the late guilty plea which attracted a 20% reduction. The Court acknowledged the strength of mitigation but concluded it did not remove the case from Category A.

Quantitatively, the Court identified Category A's starting point (12 years' custody) and category range (8–18 years). It concluded that even allowing for mitigation, the notional custodial sentence after trial could not reasonably have been as low as the five years referred to by the sentencing judge; the Court assessed that the minimum sentence that would have been imposed after trial was eight years' imprisonment. Applying the 20% reduction for the late guilty plea produced an effective sentence of six years four months (76 months less 20% = 60.8 months = six years four months).

On disqualification, the Court observed the statutory and authoritative framework requiring disqualification until an extended test is passed and that a period of not less than two years is obligatory in the absence of special reasons. The sentencing judge had imposed a discretionary five‑year period plus an addition equal to half the custodial term then imposed; applying the same approach to the substituted custodial term required increasing the overall disqualification. Half of the substituted custodial term (six years four months = 76 months) is 38 months; adding that to the judge's five years produced a disqualification period of eight years and two months.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The application for leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 was GRANTED. The Court quashed the sentence imposed by the sentencing court and substituted a sentence of six years four months' imprisonment. The Court also increased the period of disqualification from driving to eight years and two months.

Implications:

• Direct effect on the parties: the Defendant's custodial sentence and period of disqualification have been increased as specified above; other ancillary orders imposed by the sentencing judge (statutory surcharge; requirement to pass an extended retest) remain in place as indicated in the opinion.
• The Court applied established precedent and the Sentencing Council guideline; the decision enforces existing principles about applying the guideline at the date of sentencing and the factors that justify Category A. The opinion does not purport to create a novel legal principle but rather applies settled authorities to the facts of this case.

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