Summary of Opinion (Anonymized)

Factual and Procedural Background

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This judgment, delivered by Judge [Last Name], concerns an application made by two joint liquidators ("Applicants" or "Joint Liquidators") of two companies (referred to below as Company A and Company B, together "the Companies") for in personam relief to restrain a foreign party ("Respondent") from pursuing multiple sets of proceedings in a foreign State ("the State"). The Applicants sought anti-suit and related relief to protect the integrity of liquidations of Company A and Company B, which were placed in liquidation by order of the High Court on 31 May 2023.

The Applicants initiated proceedings in this jurisdiction under section 631 of the Companies Act 2014 to have a group of pledge agreements, said to have been executed in March 2022 in favour of the Respondent, declared void (the "pledge proceedings"). The High Court determined that it had jurisdiction under the Recast Insolvency Directive and made orders declaring those pledge agreements void and/or voidable (the "pledge orders").

The Respondent, although not participating in the hearing before the High Court, entered an unconditional appearance to pursue an appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the Respondent had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts by that appearance and dismissed the Respondent's appeal as an abuse of process; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused.

Despite the pledge orders and the unsuccessful appeal, the Respondent pursued multiple proceedings in the State, including:

• an anti-suit injunction obtained from a regional court in the State restraining the Applicants from pursuing matters relating to the pledge agreements;
• three largely identical sets of arbitral proceedings before an arbitral tribunal in the State, resulting in awards concluding that the pledge agreements were valid and that the Respondent had lawfully foreclosed; and
• mandatory injunction proceedings before another regional court in the State seeking an order that the Applicants revoke correspondence sent to lessees and airports concerning asserted ownership of aircraft.

The Applicants applied to this court for orders restraining the Respondent from maintaining or enforcing the State proceedings (including an anti anti-suit injunction), and sought orders to require discontinuance of those proceedings by the Respondent. The court heard the application and indicated that it had jurisdiction to make anti-suit orders to protect the liquidation process; this judgment explains the reasons and the precise relief to be granted.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Irish court has jurisdiction to grant in personam anti-suit and anti-enforcement relief to restrain the Respondent from prosecuting or enforcing proceedings in the State where the Respondent has previously submitted to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts in the liquidation proceedings.
2. Whether the existence of final orders in the State and arbitral awards obtained there (which are inconsistent with the Irish pledge orders) justifies anti-enforcement or mandatory relief in aid of the Irish liquidation.
3. If jurisdiction exists, whether the discretionary considerations (including delay, the nature of the foreign proceedings, protection of the liquidation and international comity) favour granting the relief sought and, if so, the appropriate scope of such injunctions (including whether they may bind third parties "having notice").

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

• The Irish courts possess an in personam jurisdiction to grant anti-suit and anti-enforcement relief, grounded in common law principles and the statutory powers of the courts; because the Companies are in liquidation in Ireland the courts must be able to protect the interests of all creditors and the integrity of the liquidation process.
• Two "gateways" to exercise that jurisdiction apply: (a) the Respondent has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts by entering an unconditional appearance (confirmed by the Court of Appeal), and (b) the Respondent has sought to prove in the liquidation, which, on authority, submits it to the court's jurisdiction in matters concerning the liquidation.
• The State proceedings (anti-suit order, arbitrations and mandatory injunction) constitute a collateral attack on final Irish orders and are being used to undermine the liquidation process and to secure a preferential claim to assets (notably aircraft) that are claimed as assets of the Companies by the Applicants.
• The mandatory injunction proceedings and the arbitral awards have potential extra-State effects (including influencing neutral jurisdictions and third parties who might be asked to recognise or enforce the State orders), hence Irish anti-suit relief is necessary to protect the liquidation worldwide.
• Relief sought is in personam against the Respondent (not an attack on foreign tribunals) and intended to prevent the Respondent from approbating and reprobating — using the Irish liquidation process while simultaneously denying or undermining its orders abroad.

Respondent's Position

The Respondent did not file affidavits or substantive submissions in relation to this application. A solicitor attended by way of courtesy to state that the Respondent did not intend to take part. The court therefore had no direct opposing affidavit evidence or argument from the Respondent on this application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Love v Baker (early seventeenth-century authority) (as discussed in the textbook history)	Historical origins of anti-suit injunctions and the early caution around restraining foreign tribunals.	Used as historical background to the development of anti-suit relief; no direct application to facts, but informs the remedial history.
Ellerman Lines Ltd v Read [1928] 2 KB 144	Anti-enforcement relief where a foreign judgment is sought to be enforced in conscience despite breach of contract or fraud; the court may restrain enforcement by a party subject to its jurisdiction.	Supported the proposition that English (and by parity Irish) courts can grant anti-enforcement relief where a party would be "in conscience debarred" from enforcing a foreign judgment — used to show an accepted basis for in personam relief.
Elektrim Holdings SA v Vivendi Holdings 1 Corp [2008] 2 CLC 564	Anti-suit injunctions can be granted to protect the jurisdiction of the domestic court and to prevent collateral attacks on domestic orders; participation and submission to jurisdiction are relevant.	Adopted as authority for anti-suit jurisdiction to protect domestic proceedings from collateral attacks and for the role of submission to jurisdiction.
Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd [2009] QB 503	Where defendants have submitted to jurisdiction of domestic court, the court can make ancillary anti-suit orders to protect its jurisdiction and processes.	Applied as a close analogue: the court relied on Masri to support that submission to jurisdiction (by appearance) gives power to make protective in personam orders.
Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236	Proving as a creditor in an English liquidation submits a foreign creditor to the jurisdiction of the English court and therefore permits orders to be made against that creditor.	Relied on to support the second gateway: that proof in the liquidation exposes the Respondent to the court's in personam jurisdiction.
Stichting Shell Pensioenfunds v Krys [2015] AC 616	In insolvency, the court may grant anti-suit relief to protect the statutory trust and the equitable interests of all creditors; vexation/oppression is not always required in the insolvency context.	Adopted as key authority for the principle that, in insolvency, the court need not always require vexation/oppression to intervene and protect the global administration of assets.
AHT "Taurus" GmbH & Co KG [2010] Ch 187 (referred to as example of sharp practice)	Illustrates conduct amounting to sharp practice where foreign attachment or foreign remedies are used to obtain prior access to assets.	Used to exemplify the type of conduct that may justify intervention to protect the liquidation; supports reasoning on misconduct in foreign proceedings.
SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2020] 1 CLC 820	Anti-enforcement injunctions are rare, but there is no separate jurisdictional requirement that the case be exceptional; discretion remains applicable.	Relied upon to show that while relief may be exceptional, no separate jurisdictional threshold of exceptionality is required.
JP Morgan Securities plc v VTB Bank PJSC [2025] EWHC 1368 (Comm)	Noted increasing frequency of injunctions in cases concerning proceedings in the State because of risks of non-discontinuance there.	Referenced to support the observation that injunctions of this type have become more common in disputes involving the State and to inform the court's practical assessment.
Alsaady v Al Hamadani [2025] EWHC 1801 (Ch)	Summarised applicable principles for anti-suit injunctions (as per Toulson LJ in Deutsche Bank v Highland Crusader), including necessity in the interests of justice, vexation/oppression considerations, comity, and caution.	Adopted as a recent authority setting out principles the court considered relevant and helpful in structuring the Irish approach.
Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP [2010] 1 WLR 1023 (Toulson LJ principles)	Articulates multi-factor principles for anti-suit injunctive relief: necessity, vexation/oppression, natural forum, comity and caution in interference with foreign courts.	Quoted and relied upon in setting out the analytical framework the court preferred to apply.
Star Reefers Pool Inc v JFC Group Co Ltd [2012] 1 CLC 294	Submission to jurisdiction is an important (though not strictly absolute) factor in the exercise of anti-suit discretion; absence of submission makes relief harder to justify.	Used to emphasise that submission to jurisdiction is a critical consideration and to distinguish cases where a defendant did not submit to jurisdiction.
Acrow Ltd v Rex Chainbelt Inc [1971] 1 WLR 1676	Authority for restraining third parties from aiding and abetting breach of injunctions where those third parties are sufficiently connected to the primary wrongdoer.	Considered by the court but regarded as inapposite for the broad form of "all persons having notice" relief sought by the Applicants; court declined to rely on it to justify binding all third parties.
Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871; Turner v Grovit [2002] 1 WLR 107; Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 All ER 749 (authorities referenced)	Authorities cited in support of the in personam nature of anti-suit injunctions and the limits of jurisdiction to bind only parties amenable to domestic courts.	Used to support the proposition that anti-suit injunctions are in personam and effective only against those subject to the court's jurisdiction.
Singularis Holdings v PriceWaterhouseCooper [2015] 2 WLR (referenced)	Referenced in the discussion of the broader public interest in the insolvency court's ability to obtain assets for the collective benefit of creditors.	Referenced in the context of the insolvency rationale articulated in Stichting Shell v Krys; supported the court's approach to protecting the orderly administration of assets.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured way. It began by identifying the legal foundations for anti-suit and anti-enforcement relief as developed in common law jurisdictions (chiefly English authorities) and by reference to the court's statutory and equitable powers. In the absence of a prior written Irish decision on this precise point, the court accepted, as a matter of principle, that an Irish court must be able to protect the integrity of its own processes and supervise liquidations to ensure orderly distribution of assets.

The court distilled the principles and articulated two principal "gateways" by which the jurisdiction may be exercised (paragraphs referenced in the judgment):

1. An in personam jurisdiction against a person who has submitted to the domestic court's jurisdiction (for example by an unconditional appearance), permitting ancillary orders to protect the court's jurisdiction and processes;
2. A liquidation gateway: where a foreign party's pursuit of foreign proceedings would undermine a liquidation opened in the domestic forum, the court has jurisdiction to intervene to protect the interests of all creditors and the proper conduct of the liquidation, even if the foreign conduct is not independently vexatious or oppressive.

Applying these principles to the facts before it, the court reasoned as follows:

• The Respondent had entered an unconditional appearance in the Irish liquidation proceedings and had its position on the jurisdiction addressed and finally determined by the domestic appellate courts. The Court of Appeal specifically found the Respondent had submitted to jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. Accordingly, the first gateway (submission to jurisdiction) was satisfied for purposes of making in personam orders against the Respondent.
• On the merits of the second gateway, the court found it unnecessary to require a further finding that the foreign proceedings were vexatious or oppressive in the insolvency context: the foreign proceedings sought to assert ownership of assets claimed in the liquidation on the basis of the very pledge agreements that had been declared void by the domestic court. Allowing the Respondent to pursue enforcement of those foreign orders and awards would risk grave prejudice to the collective interests of creditors and would undermine the Irish liquidation process.
• The court acknowledged that the Respondent's initial anti-suit proceedings in the State were commenced before its later submission to Irish jurisdiction and that, on their face, such proceedings might have been a legitimate protective step. However, once the Respondent subsequently submitted to Irish jurisdiction and the Irish proceedings produced final determinations, the Respondent's continued steps to give effect to the State orders constituted conduct that interfered with the Irish litigation and would be oppressive of the Applicants.
• The court carefully considered discretionary factors. It noted material delay by the Applicants in seeking anti-suit relief (they had not sought it at the earliest opportunity and permitted the Respondent to continue and conclude arbitration). The court treated delay as a relevant discretionary factor that might weigh against relief, but it concluded that other considerations — the risk of parallel and conflicting orders affecting neutral third parties, the need to protect the liquidation estate (which includes the aircraft at issue), and the Respondent's approach of seeking both to participate in the liquidation (by proving) and to deny or undermine its orders abroad — supported granting relief despite the delay.
• On scope, the court emphasised the in personam nature of anti-suit and anti-enforcement orders and concluded that it had jurisdiction to make orders binding the Respondent but not to make blanket orders purporting to bind "all persons having notice" of the order. The court explained concerns about attempting to bind third parties (including lawyers or persons acting in good faith) and doubted the existence of jurisdiction to impose such broad obligations in the terms sought.
• Finally, the court declined to make certain more invasive mandatory orders (requiring the Respondent to take steps to discontinue the State proceedings or blanket quia timet prohibitions against instituting similar proceedings elsewhere) for lack of sufficiently detailed evidence about the consequences or any present intention to initiate proceedings in jurisdictions beyond the State.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to grant the anti-suit and anti-enforcement relief sought and that, on the facts, relief should be granted against the Respondent in the terms sought in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Applicants' Notice of Motion, with a modification excluding any phrase purporting to bind "all other parties having notice of the said order". In short, the court ordered in personam relief binding the Respondent but declined to make the orders in terms that would attempt to bind third parties merely by notice.

CORE RULING: The court granted anti-suit and anti-enforcement in personam relief against the Respondent (with modifications excluding any attempt to bind unnamed third parties).

Implications:

• Direct effect on the parties: The Respondent is restrained by in personam order(s) of the Irish court (subject to formalisation of the final orders) from maintaining, continuing or enforcing aspects of the proceedings in the State that are inconsistent with the Irish court's orders as identified in the Notice of Motion (subject to the precise terms to be made final). The court refused to make wide third-party binding orders.
• On liquidation practice: The judgment confirms and articulates principles by which Irish courts may, in appropriate cases, grant anti-suit and anti-enforcement relief to protect the supervisory jurisdiction of the court in liquidations and the interests of the collective body of creditors. The court identified two principal gateways (submission to jurisdiction and proof in liquidation) and set out additional principles and discretionary considerations to be applied on a case-by-case basis.
• Scope and limits: The court emphasised that anti-suit relief is in personam and discretionary, that international comity and delay are relevant, and that the court will not lightly attempt to bind third parties who have merely notice of an order.
• No broader new rule beyond these principles was stated; the court framed the contours of the jurisdiction for future development and reserved certain more intrusive remedies (mandatory discontinuance orders, quia timet prohibitions beyond the State) where evidence was insufficient to justify them at this stage.

Procedure to follow: The matter was listed for the making of final orders and a hearing on costs at 10:30 am on 10 October 2025.