High Court (Anonymised) — Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from the Dublin Circuit Court concerning the assessment of damages arising from an incident on 4 January 2012 at a crèche. The plaintiff (the crèche manager and owner through a company) sued the defendant for assault, battery, negligence, breach of duty (including statutory duty), and trespass to the person by Personal Injury Summons dated 18 February 2013. The defendant was separately convicted, after a jury trial in the Circuit Court (June–July 2013), of assault causing harm arising from the same incident; that conviction was upheld on appeal and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused.

Procedurally: the defendant entered appearance in April 2013 and acted in person throughout. He did not deliver a Defence within the time permitted. The plaintiff obtained an order for judgment in default of Defence after the Circuit Court struck out the defendant’s motions to prevent judgment in default; the judge provided a fourteen‑day window for a Defence to be lodged, which did not occur. That default judgment route was affirmed on appeal. The Circuit Court therefore proceeded to an assessment of damages, and Judge Meehan made an award in January 2024 in the Circuit Court (the defendant did not attend). The defendant appealed to the High Court; at the outset he contended the appeal should not be limited to quantum but should proceed as a full hearing (i.e. to challenge liability and other issues). The High Court (Judge Dignam) ruled the matter would proceed as an assessment only and provided detailed reasons on that and on the assessment of damages.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the appeal to the High Court should be treated as an assessment of damages only (the Circuit Court having entered judgment in default of Defence) or whether the defendant is entitled to have the appeal treated as a full contested hearing (thereby permitting a Defence and full rehearing of liability).
2. Whether Updated Particulars of Injury (served 3 November 2023) amounted to new pleadings that would entitle the defendant to deliver a Defence or require the court to treat the appeal as a full hearing.
3. Whether the defendant established a basis under section 26 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 to dismiss the plaintiff's action for giving false or misleading evidence (i.e. whether the plaintiff knowingly gave materially false evidence).
4. The appropriate approach to, and quantum of, damages (general, aggravated and special) in respect of the assault/trespass and associated physical and psychological injury.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

• The defendant argued the appeal could not be confined to quantum because the plaintiff had suppressed evidence and there had been fraud discovered after the default-judgment orders (events from 2016 onwards), which, he submitted, unraveled the default-judgment orders and required a full hearing.
• The defendant contended that the Updated Particulars of Injury (3 November 2023) introduced new matters (e.g. ongoing verbal abuse in court, continuing flashbacks, a PTSD diagnosis, threats and harassment arising after the incident) which in substance were new pleadings and entitled him to a Defence and a full hearing.
• The defendant advanced a section 26 application at the conclusion of the hearing, asserting the plaintiff gave false or misleading evidence (examples relied upon: an assertion in an expert report that the plaintiff had been awarded €12,000; references to being bitten; allegations of threats/harassment which the defendant said were not proved at trial).
• In cross‑examination, the defendant challenged the plaintiff’s credibility by reference to alleged inconsistencies, statements to the psychologist, and the events of a subsequent attendance at the crèche on 26 March 2012.

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The plaintiff maintained the assault occurred as pleaded (head‑butt to the face, pushing, attempts to bite, force used to dislodge her hand from a door handle) and relied on her evidence, contemporaneous medical treatment, and psychological reports to establish injury and loss.
• The plaintiff submitted the Updated Particulars did not introduce a fundamentally new case; rather they particularised ongoing effects (psychological sequelae, flashbacks, the aggravating effect of prolonged litigation) that were already pleaded as shock and distress.
• The plaintiff opposed treating the appeal as a full rehearing given the existing default‑judgment orders, the defendant's failure to move to set them aside, and prior consideration of similar allegations in earlier appeals and proceedings.
• In opposing section 26, the plaintiff and her expert explained that the apparent inaccuracies in an expert report (e.g. a reference to an award of €12,000) likely arose from miscommunication or calculation by the expert and did not evidence deliberate falsehood by the plaintiff; the plaintiff accepted she had not corrected every detail of the expert’s draft but denied deliberate dishonesty.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent (Anonymised)	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Defendant [2017] IECA 175 (Court of Appeal)	Cited as the Court of Appeal judgment detailing the background facts and addressing disclosure issues relating to the January 2012 incident.	The High Court relied on and referred to the narrative and analysis in that appellate judgment in assessing the history of disclosure and prior consideration of alleged suppression of evidence.
Director of Public Prosecutions v Defendant (Supreme Court refuse leave) [2018] IESCDET 99	Record of the Supreme Court refusing leave to appeal the criminal conviction (procedural history).	Used to show the defendant's criminal conviction was subject to appeal and that the appellate process was completed, relevant to the context of the civil claim and credibility/contentions about prior proceedings.
Waters v Entity A [2021] IEHC 552	Referenced in relation to matters the defendant had previously raised in other proceedings.	Noted as part of the wider procedural history demonstrating the defendant had raised related points earlier; the Court used this to assess the defendant's opportunity to litigate earlier.
MN v SM [2005] 4 IR 461	Principle: awards of damages must be proportionate (fair to plaintiff and defendant and to the general scheme of awards).	The Court applied proportionality as an overarching principle in assessing damages (fairness to parties and consistency with general awards).
Alseran v Entity B [2017] EWHC 3289	Identified heads of loss in trespass to the person: (i) moral injury inherent in the wrong, (ii) physical/psychiatric injury, (iii) injury to feelings, (iv) effect of defendant's motivation/aggravation, (v) financial loss.	The Court accepted this framework as reflecting the general position and applied it when structuring the assessment (separating moral injury, psychiatric injury and financial loss, and considering aggravated damages).
Plaintiff v Chief Constable (Ashley) [2008] AC 962; Watkins v Secretary of State [2006] 2 AC 395; R v Governor of Brockhill Prison (ex p Evans) [1990] QB 1043	Authorities cited for the proposition that trespass/battery/false imprisonment are actionable for infringement of bodily integrity and liberty; moral injury distinct from physical harm.	These authorities supported the court's conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for the wrong itself (moral injury) in addition to compensatory awards for physical and psychiatric injury.
Rookes v Barnard [1964]	Discussed in relation to aggravated/exemplary damages and distinguishing aggravated (compensatory) from exemplary (punitive) damages.	Used to underline the distinction between aggravated and punitive damages when considering whether to award an uplift for aggravated conduct.
Plaintiff v Entity C (Conway v Irish National Teachers Organisation) [1991] 2 IR 305	Definition and categories of ordinary compensatory, aggravated, and punitive/exemplary damages.	The Court followed the Conway framework in analysing aggravated damages and their purpose (compensation for added hurt or insult, not punishment).
O'Donnell v O'Donnell [2005] IEHC 216	Authority recognizing defendants are entitled to require plaintiffs to prove their case; example of aggravated damages where defence conduct amounted to intimidation.	Cited to show aggravated damages may be awarded in response to abusive or intimidation-type conduct by a defendant in defending the action.
Noctor v The State [2005] 1 IR 433; Sutcliffe v Pressdram [1991] 1 QB 153	Examples of conduct in defence capable of attracting aggravated damages (e.g., conduct calculated to deter plaintiff, prolonged hostile cross-examination).	Used when considering whether the defendant's conduct in cross-examination and litigation warranted aggravated damages.
Kinsella v Company A [2019] IECA 54	Considerations on aggravated damages and the threshold for awarding them where cross-examination causes upset but not necessarily compensable additional injury.	The Court used this to caution that not every difficult cross-examination merits aggravated damages; there must be additional injury beyond ordinary upset.
O'Sullivan v Depuy International Ltd [2016] IEHC 684	Conduct of defendant in making baseless or reckless allegations may attract aggravated damages; relevance to counterweighting s.26 risks.	Applied to assess whether defendant's allegations and approach to the expert warranted an uplift.
LO'K v LH [2006] IEHC 393	Aggravated damages may take account of defendant's behaviour in defence and at trial.	Used to show the behaviour of defendants in defending an action is a relevant factor for aggravated damages.
Smith v Gilbert [2005] IEHC 275	Conduct of plaintiff or quality of evidence can affect entitlement to aggravated damages (example where plaintiff's poor record-keeping undermined claim for aggravated damages).	Referenced to remind that plaintiff conduct is also relevant when considering aggravated damages.
Farrell v Entity D [2010] IEHC 327; Georgopoulos v The Hospital [1998] 3 IR 132	Standards and approach to proof in serious allegations: although civil standard applies, the court should apply the standard proportionate to the gravity of the issue.	Used heavily in the Court's analysis of the section 26 application (burden on defendant; need for high probability for concluding deliberate falsehood).
Nolan v Attorney [reference in text]	Materiality requirement in s.26: evidence must be material to the claim and false to a material degree.	The court applied the Nolan materiality principle in evaluating whether allegedly false evidence was sufficiently substantial to warrant dismissal under s.26.
Goodwin v Entity A [2012] IESC 9	Authority on materiality and dishonesty in evidence (cited via Nolan); used to explain the concept of material falsehood.	Supported the court's approach to the materiality and required level of proof in a s.26 application.
Meehan v BKNS Curtain Walling Systems Ltd [2012] IEHC 441	Principle that a court cannot excise parts of a claim contaminated by false evidence and leave the rest to succeed under s.26; s.26 is draconian.	Referred to in the discussion on the draconian nature of s.26 and the consequences if threshold satisfied.
Keating v Mulligan [2022] IECA 257; O'Sullivan v Brozda & Ors [2022] IECA 163	Recent appellate guidance on s.26: high threshold, careful judicial approach, and warning that unsuccessful or marginal s.26 applications may attract aggravated damages.	The Court relied on these authorities in refusing the defendant's s.26 application and in concluding that the failed s.26 application justified an uplift in aggravated damages.
Vesey v Entity A [2001] 4 IR 192; Smith v HSE [2013] IECA 360; Daly v HSE [2014] IEHC 560	Context for discussion on s.26, its purpose as deterrent to fraudulent claims, and judicial caution.	Used to frame the court's cautionary approach: s.26 is a serious power and requires clear evidence of deliberate dishonesty.
Browne v Van Geene [2020] IECA 253; Lackey v Kavanagh [2013] IEHC 341; Waliszewski v McArthur & Co Ltd [2015] IEHC 264	Examples where courts addressed s.26 and the circumstances in which aggravated damages may follow an unsuccessful s.26 application.	These authorities were applied to support the proposition that a failed or unjustified s.26 application can, in some cases, justify aggravated damages.
Delaney v The Personal Injuries Assessment Board & Ors [2024] IESC 10	Discussed in submissions on whether the Personal Injuries Guidelines must be applied when an action began before the Guidelines; court considered but rejected the defendant’s interpretation.	The Court considered the decision but concluded that the Guidelines do not bind the court in the way the defendant suggested for cases commenced before the relevant date.
Shelley-Morris (Supreme Court decision) (referenced)	Referenced historically in connection with the rationale for s.26 introduction (contextual reference).	Referenced to explain legislative background to s.26; no distinct application beyond contextual background in this judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in three main phases: (A) whether the appeal should be confined to assessment of damages; (B) consideration of the defendant's section 26 application; and (C) approach to assessment and quantum of damages.

A. Whether the appeal proceeds as an assessment only

• The court emphasised procedural history: judgment in default of Defence had been ordered by the Circuit Court (Judge Linnane) and affirmed on appeal (Judge Haughton) and the defendant never applied to set those Orders aside. The defendant had ample opportunity to apply to set aside the Orders but did not.
• The court rejected an attempt to "reverse" or circumvent the default-judgment orders via the present appeal: to treat the appeal as if a Defence had been delivered would be inappropriate absent a prior application to set aside, with evidence and opportunity for reply which had not been undertaken.
• The Court noted the defendant had previously raised related points at earlier stages and in other proceedings, including in the appellate criminal process; thus the matters relied upon were not newly discovered in a manner that justified reopening the default-judgment orders.
• The court considered the defendant's contention that missing particulars prevented him delivering a Defence, but observed that a Defence can be delivered "without prejudice" and amended later, and that the particulars which were refused by the Circuit Court had been addressed and affirmed on appeal; therefore the absence of those particulars did not justify non‑delivery of a Defence.
• Conclusion on this question: the appeal would proceed as an assessment only. The Court nonetheless permitted cross‑examination on the incident and injuries insofar as the nature of the assault related to quantum.

B. Section 26 application (dismissal for false or misleading evidence)

• The Court summarised section 26 (Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004): if a plaintiff gives or causes to be adduced evidence that is false or misleading in any material respect, and knew it to be so, the court shall dismiss the action unless dismissal would result in injustice.
• The burden is on the defendant to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the evidence was false or misleading in a material respect and that the plaintiff knew it to be so. The court emphasised authorities establishing that the threshold is high and that the court must be cautious given the draconian consequences of s.26.
• The defendant's factual bases were considered: (a) an expert report recorded an alleged award of €12,000 which in fact had not been made; (b) the plaintiff was said to have told the expert she had been bitten; (c) allegations about threats/harassment referenced in reports but not given in evidence; and (d) the 26 March 2012 attendance at the crèche.
• The Court analysed each point factually against the evidence: the expert conceded the €12,000 reference was likely a miscommunication or a calculation; the expert's early report recorded that the plaintiff said the defendant "tried" to bite (not that he did bite); the plaintiff had given evidence of email and phone contact by the defendant and the defendant conceded such communications up to July 2012; and the 26 March 2012 episode was capable of an honest belief of trespass even if not a legal "breaking in".
• Applying the high threshold derived from authorities (Nolan, Farrell, O'Sullivan v Brozda and others), the Court concluded the defendant had not proved that the plaintiff knowingly gave materially false or misleading evidence. The s.26 application was refused.

C. Approach to assessment of damages and quantum

• The Court set out principles: damages must be proportionate (MN v SM). Trespass to the person can give rise to multiple heads of compensation — moral injury inherent in the wrong, physical/psychiatric injury, injury to feelings, aggravated damages for particularly egregious conduct, and financial loss (authorities including Alseran).
• The Court decided aggravated damages are compensatory in nature and must be distinguished from punitive awards. It followed Conway and later authorities on circumstances in which aggravated damages may be awarded.
• On procedural pleading of aggravated damages, the Court noted an express claim is preferable (Finlay C.J in Conway) but accepted that aggravated damages may be awarded for matters arising during preliminary proceedings or at trial even if not expressly pleaded; nonetheless the Court declined to award aggravated damages for events other than aspects of how the defendant ran the defence.
• Facts on injuries: plaintiff suffered facial and nasal injury (surgical correction under general anaesthetic in January 2012), bruising to arm, and significant psychological injury. Expert psychological assessments in 2015 (moderate PTSD range) and in 2023 (borderline mild–moderate PTSD) were relied upon. The Court accepted the plaintiff’s evidence and the expert's account overall.
• The Court explained methodology for quantification: assess damages for the dominant injury (psychological) and add uplift for the physical injury to avoid double counting. The Court considered but was not bound to apply the Personal Injuries Guidelines; it accepted the Book of Quantum as a useful reference for physical injury valuation but concluded it was not bound to apply the Guidelines given the commencement date issues.
• On aggravated damages the Court identified two aspects of the defendant's conduct that justified an uplift: (i) the defendant's sustained and impugning challenge to the plaintiff’s expert, including assertions (without supporting evidence) that the expert had "destroyed evidence" and had acted improperly; and (ii) the defendant's unfounded section 26 application which, in the Court's view, lacked merit. These items, in context and cumulatively, merited aggravated damages.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court (Judge Dignam) ruled that the appeal would proceed as an assessment of damages only (the default-judgment orders remained effective). The Court refused the defendant's application under section 26 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004. The Court assessed and awarded damages in favour of the plaintiff in the total sum of €50,868 (comprising €46,500 for general damages, inclusive of aggravated damages, and €4,368 for special damages).

Implications and immediate consequences:

• Direct effect: Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of €50,868. The defendant remains liable to this award.
• On procedure: The earlier Circuit Court orders (judgment in default of Defence) were not unset by the High Court; the defendant's remedy, if any, would have been to apply to set those Orders aside earlier, which he did not do.
• On s.26: The Court reaffirmed the high threshold for dismissal of a personal injuries claim on grounds of knowingly false or misleading evidence and signalled judicial caution about invoking s.26 without compelling proof; an unsuccessful s.26 application may, in some cases, attract aggravated damages (and here it did).
• Costs: The judge indicated a provisional view that the plaintiff is entitled to costs despite the award being lower than the Circuit Court award, given the defendant ran the appeal on a basis that the plaintiff should obtain no damages and pursued an unmeritorious s.26 application. The parties were invited to make written submissions on costs within 21 days; absent submissions the Court will make an order for the plaintiff's costs.
• Precedential effect: The judgment applies established principles (procedural finality of default-judgment orders, high standard for s.26, allocation of aggravated damages for unreasonable defence conduct, proportional assessment of damages). The Court did not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond these applications of existing authorities; it applied established authorities to the facts before it.

Judicial author: Judgment delivered by Judge Dignam on 1 May 2025.