Anonymized Summary of the Opinion (Inner House, Extra Division)

Panel: Judge Malcolm, Judge Doherty, Judge Wise. Case ID and parties anonymized. Summary prepared strictly from the provided opinion; no outside information has been added.

Factual and Procedural Background

The child at the centre of this petition (referred to in the opinion as EO; hereinafter "the Child") was born abroad and arrived in Scotland a few weeks after birth in November 2016 when his parents came from Italy while repairs were made to their home. When the Child was about five months old he and his three older brothers were taken into care on the basis of serious physical and emotional abuse found to have been perpetrated against the two older boys. Those grounds were established by a sheriff (see summary references to LO v McGinley [2022] CSIH 50; 2023 SC 39).

The Child lived with a foster carer in Scotland for almost five years. The parents did not engage with social work assessments and later returned to Italy (February 2020). In December 2021 the Child was placed with the current petitioner (the prospective adopter), resident in England, on a "foster to adopt" basis. The petitioner and the Child share ethnic origin and religion; the petitioner is resident in England and has supported continued contact between the Child and his siblings, two of whom remain in Scotland.

Following contested proof proceedings in the Outer House a judge granted the adoption order sought by the petitioner, concluding that such an order was necessary to safeguard and promote the Child's welfare throughout his life and that the court could dispense with parental consent under section 31(3) and (4) of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007. That interlocutor removed the parents' parental rights and responsibilities and vested them in the petitioner. The Child's mother reclaimed (appealed) that interlocutor to the Inner House.

The Outer House judgment ran to 158 paragraphs. Evidence led at the proof included the petitioner, multiple social workers, both parents, the eldest child, clergy and legal witnesses from Italy, a retired neuropsychiatrist, reports from the Child's curator ad litem and reporting officer, and a statutory section 17 social work report. The judge accepted the evidence of the petitioner and the social workers, rejected much of the parents' evidence and some of the eldest son's evidence, and found the parents to lack insight, to have been poor attenders at contact and to have not engaged constructively with authorities.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Outer House judge permissibly concluded that the parents' consent to adoption could be dispensed with under section 31(3) and (4) of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 on the basis that they were unable and likely to continue to be unable to discharge parental responsibilities.
2. Whether, having dispensed with consent, the judge carried out the required evaluation under sections 14 and 28(2) of the 2007 Act and applicable case law to decide whether only an adoption order ("nothing else will do") would safeguard and promote the Child's welfare throughout his life.
3. How the international dimension (in particular the likelihood that a single-person full adoption might not be recognised in Italy) should have been treated and whether it barred the making of an adoption order.
4. Whether the judge's decision was compatible with Article 8 ECHR and obligations under Articles 7, 8, 9 and 21(b) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), specifically whether Article 21(b) imposes an absolute requirement that the Child could not be cared for in his country of origin.
5. Whether the judge performed the requisite "global and holistic" evaluation of all realistic alternatives, including lesser orders that might be available in England.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Mother's) Arguments

• The judge failed to carry out a global, holistic comparison of the realistic alternatives to adoption, including the implications of a "limping" adoption (i.e. an adoption not recognised in Italy) versus lesser orders available in England.
• The judge erred in concluding adoption was preferable and proportionate; the order constituted disproportionate interference with family life under Article 8 ECHR and was inconsistent with UNCRC Articles 7, 8, 9 and 21(b).
• Because the Child was born in Italy and retains Italian nationality, the case is an intercountry adoption for the purposes of Article 21(b) UNCRC, requiring satisfaction that the Child could not be cared for in Italy before adoption is made.
• The judge did not properly consider the practical legal consequences of non-recognition in Italy (status, passport, banking, consular responsibility, tax, inheritance, military service, family membership) and the evidence on these matters was incomplete.
• Adoption should be a last resort; there was insufficient investigation of options such as English special guardianship orders; the judge adopted a "parochial" (purely domestic) approach.

Appellee's (Petitioner's) Arguments

• The Child had been habitually resident in the UK for most of his life; the adoption is therefore properly domestic rather than the sort of intercountry adoption targeted by Article 21(b) UNCRC or the Hague Convention safeguards.
• The international dimension was considered but did not outweigh the Child's welfare needs; the petitioner was particularly well matched to the Child and has provided a stable home.
• There is a significant public-law route and statutory power to make non-consensual full adoptions when necessary for the child's welfare; the judge appropriately balanced foreign-law considerations as factors relevant to welfare.
• Delay is a material factor: the Child is nine, and further procedural delay and contested applications (including applications in England) were likely and would not necessarily provide the stability the Child needs.
• The adoption order was compatible with ECHR and UNCRC as applied in the domestic statutory and case-law framework.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
LO v McGinley [2022] CSIH 50; 2023 SC 39	Background factual findings in earlier proceedings regarding abuse of the older children and the grounds of referral.	The opinion relies on those prior findings as underpinning concern about the parents' conduct and as part of the factual matrix supporting the adoption decision.
Fife Council v M [2015] CSIH 74; 2016 SC 169	Principle that the child's welfare is paramount and that the court must evaluate options (sections 14, 28(2) of the 2007 Act).	The judge applied these statutory principles in assessing whether adoption was necessary to safeguard welfare throughout the Child's life; the Inner House noted and applied the authority.
North Lanarkshire Council v KR [2018] CSIH 59; 2020 SCLR 1	Observation that delay and protracted procedure seldom promote the welfare of the child throughout life.	The judge took delay into account; the Inner House accepted delay as a relevant factor weighed against further litigation and uncertainty.
In Re N (Children) [2015] EWCA Civ 1112; [2016] UKSC 15; 2017 AC 167	Guidance on international dimension: foreign law cannot determine domestic creation of rights but foreign law is a relevant factor in welfare assessment; local authority/panel must follow domestic statute permitting non-consensual adoptions where in child's best interests.	The Inner House endorsed Sir James Munby's analysis and applied it north of the border: foreign recognition is a welfare factor but not an absolute bar to domestic adoption where only adoption will do.
Paquette v Galipeau [1981] 1 SCR 29	Canadian decision concerning cross-jurisdictional informal adoption dispute; cited in submissions about recognition in domicile country.	The court referenced it as an example relied upon by counsel for the parents but did not accept that such authority supports an absolute rule that an adoption cannot be granted unless it will be recognised in the child's country of domicile.
In Re Z [2016] EWHC 2963 (Fam); [2017] 4 WLR 20	Discussion of habitual residence and consideration of international implications; statements about no aspect of the child's background taking precedence over welfare.	Cited for the proposition that the child's habitual residence and welfare-focused approach are central; the Inner House relied on analogous reasoning (including Russell J's remarks) to treat the case as domestic and welfare-led.
Z v S [2024] EWHC 2837 (Fam); [2025] 2 WLR 357	Recent authority on intercountry adoption issues and international welfare considerations.	Referenced as supportive material for the proposition that welfare remains paramount and that international complications must be weighed but do not automatically bar adoption.
In Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146; [2014] 1 WLR 563	Authority emphasising thorough multi-faceted evaluation when international dimensions are present.	Referenced by the Appellant; the Inner House considered the judge had conducted the necessary evaluation and that the weight of evidence supported the adoption decision.
S v L [2012] UKSC 30; 2013 SC (UKSC) 20	Precedent on delay and children’s welfare where prolonged litigation affects best interests.	Used to support the petitioner's emphasis on the harm of delay; the court accepted delay as a material consideration.
Strand Lobben v Norway (App No 37283/13); (2020) 70 EHRR 14	European Court of Human Rights material cited on state obligations and children's welfare in removal/placement decisions.	Referenced in submissions on proportionality and delay; the Inner House considered ECHR compatibility and found no incompatibility.
Osborne v Matthan (No 2) 1998 SC 682	Statement that some decisions of this kind are not discretionary; emphasises statutory grant of powers in adoption law.	Cited to underline that where statutory conditions are satisfied the court is required to act in the child's best interests, which the Inner House applied in affirming the Outer House decision.
Judgment No 33 [2025] Constitutional Court of Italy	Italian constitutional ruling that exclusion of single persons from intercountry adoption violates constitutional provisions (and ECHR Article 8), recognising single person adoption in certain contexts.	The Inner House considered this judgment material to the question of likely recognition in Italy and concluded it reduced the force of the earlier evidence that Italian public policy would bar recognition; nonetheless the outcome of any Italian recognition proceedings remains uncertain and did not prevent the adoption order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Inner House undertook a structured analysis focused on statutory tests, existing authority and the international context. The court began by accepting the Outer House judge's factual findings: the grounds of referral were established (based largely on the sheriff's findings concerning abuse of the older boys), the parents had shown no meaningful insight, failed to engage with assessments and contact, and had not prioritised the Child's welfare. The judge's conclusion (under section 31(4) 2007 Act) that parental consent could be dispensed with was not challenged on appeal.

The core analytical task was whether the Outer House judge had properly performed the remainder of his duty — evaluating all realistic options in light of sections 14 and 28(2) of the 2007 Act and relevant case law — and whether international considerations (in particular possible non-recognition in Italy) should have prevented the making of an adoption order. The court considered the following strands of reasoning, as reflected in the opinion:

• Domestic statutory framework and welfare paramountcy: the judge applied the statutory checklist and principles (sections 1, 2, 14, 28 and 31 of the 2007 Act) and relevant Scottish authorities (Fife Council v M, North Lanarkshire v KR) in assessing what would best serve the Child's lifelong welfare.
• Evaluation of alternatives: the judge considered making no order (with continued compulsory supervision), residence orders and lesser orders (including potential English special guardianship), and weighed their disadvantages: ongoing parental rights retained, risk of continued disruptive litigation by the parents, limits on the petitioner's capacity to make major decisions for the Child, and the temporal limitation of some orders (e.g. ending at 16).
• International dimension — legal recognition in Italy: the Appellant relied on evidence that single-person full adoptions were contrary to Italian public policy and would not be recognised. The Inner House took account of a recent Italian Constitutional Court judgment (Judgment No 33 [2025]) that substantially undermined the contention that a prohibition on single-person intercountry adoption could be treated as an absolute bar; while recognition in Italy remained uncertain and contentious, the Italian judgment reduced the force of the argument that recognition was impossible.
• Interaction with UNCRC Article 21(b): the court rejected the submission that Article 21(b) imposes an absolute pre-condition (i.e. that the child cannot be cared for in the country of origin) before a domestic adoption can be made. The court analysed the text and purpose of Article 21 and concluded that the provision is aimed at regulating intercountry adoptions of the trafficking type and operates alongside later instruments (notably the 1993 Hague Convention and implementing domestic legislation), and that the child's habitual residence at the time of the adoption decision is central to characterising the case as domestic rather than an intercountry adoption of the Article 21(b) variety.
• Application of In Re N (and related English authorities): the Inner House accepted and applied the analytical approach in In Re N — namely that foreign law is relevant to the welfare assessment but does not prevent a domestic court from creating rights (such as an adoption) where the statutory criteria are met and the child's best interests require it. Foreign-law consequences are a factor to be weighed, not an automatic bar.
• Balancing of welfare factors: the judge was found to have properly weighed the certainty, permanence and emotional/legal benefits of adoption by the petitioner against the uncertainties of recognition abroad and the likely delay and litigation that alternative routes would involve. The judge's emphasis on freeing the Child from destabilising litigation and providing a lifetime parental bond with the petitioner was endorsed.

The Inner House reviewed criticisms about the sufficiency of the judge's reasoning (the alleged failure to set out a global, holistic analysis) and found that, on the contrary, the judge had applied the statutory tests, engaged with relevant authorities and evidence (including the international material), and properly exercised his evaluative judgment as to what would best promote the Child's welfare throughout life.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Inner House dismissed the reclaiming motion (appeal) and refused the appeal. The court ordered a minor technical correction to the Outer House interlocutor (a reference to the 2009 Regulations) but otherwise affirmed the adoption order.

DISPOSITION: The reclaiming motion is refused; the adoption order granted by the Outer House is upheld (subject to a minor technical correction).

Immediate consequences for the parties:

• The parental rights and responsibilities of the Child's mother and father are removed by the adoption order and vested in the petitioner (the adoptive parent), as provided by the Outer House interlocutor affirmed by the Inner House.
• The petitioner acquires the legal status conferred by the adoption order in Scotland; practical effects in other states (notably Italy) remain uncertain and may depend on future recognition proceedings in those jurisdictions.

Broader implications and precedent:

• The Inner House emphasised that foreign law and uncertainty about recognition are relevant welfare factors but do not constitute an absolute bar to an otherwise justified domestic adoption where the statutory conditions are met and adoption is the only order that will safeguard the child's welfare throughout life. This follows and applies the reasoning in In Re N to the Scottish context.
• The court did not purport to create a new legal principle overriding existing authorities; it applied the existing domestic statutory framework and precedent to the facts of the case.

If a section above appears brief, that reflects the content and emphasis of the provided opinion rather than omission of material. No information has been invented or inferred beyond the material in the provided judgment.