High Court — Interlocutory Application: Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a summary of a judgment delivered by Judge Barrett on 24 September 2025 concerning an interlocutory application by the Plaintiff against Company A (the online platform). The Plaintiff opened an account on the platform in or around 2012 and established a monetised presence offering cryptocurrency-related advice and related services on multiple social media channels.

In March 2022 the Plaintiff admits he impersonated a verified ("blue tick") account on the platform. On 17 July 2025 the Plaintiff's account on Company A was suspended. By ex parte motion dated 7 September 2025 the Plaintiff sought (inter alia) (a) an interim injunction restraining the Defendant from suspending his account (which in practice would require reinstatement), and (b) an interim injunction requiring Company A to suspend, block or prevent accounts impersonating or confusingly similar to the Plaintiff's account. The ex parte motion was heard on 11 September 2025 and an interim injunction was granted; that order was stayed the next day when counsel for both parties appeared. The Plaintiff issued a notice of motion for interlocutory relief on 16 September 2025, and the interlocutory application was heard on 17 September 2025. The judgment sets out reasons for refusing the interlocutory injunction and for vacating the stayed interim order.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Court should grant a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring Company A to reinstate the Plaintiff's suspended account.
2. Whether the Court should grant an interlocutory order requiring Company A to suspend, block or prevent appearance of accounts impersonating or confusingly similar to the Plaintiff's account (a proposed proactive monitoring or blocking order).
3. Whether the Plaintiff has demonstrated a "strong case" on the merits (the threshold required for mandatory interlocutory relief) and whether damages would be an adequate remedy.
4. Whether any proposed proactive or general monitoring obligation would be incompatible with Article 8 of the Digital Services Act (and related EU authorities), thereby precluding such an order.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff sought reinstatement of his account and proactive blocking/removal of impersonating accounts, asserting his X account is central to his livelihood and that suspension causes financial loss and reputational damage. The affidavit asserted losses of "€[STATED AMOUNT] per month" while the account is suspended.
• The Plaintiff argued that damages would be inadequate because suspension causes irreparable harm to his livelihood and reputation and that followers may be misled by impersonation accounts causing loss to third parties and damage to his brand.
• It was submitted that exclusion from a major social media platform can have serious free expression consequences for a person who relies on the platform for work (citing arguments akin to those in Douez v. Facebook).
• The Plaintiff contended that the burdens Company A described could be overstated and that, given Company A's technological capacity to monitor other types of unlawful content, comparable monitoring for impersonation should be feasible.

Company A's Arguments

• Company A argued the relief sought was, in substance, mandatory and would impose a broad proactive monitoring obligation that it could not realistically or lawfully comply with.
• Company A emphasised that its published Terms of Service require authenticity and prohibit impersonation and that the Plaintiff's admitted impersonation in 2022 breached those terms, entitling Company A to impose sanctions including suspension.
• Company A explained it operates designated reporting mechanisms (Impersonation Reporting Form and Post Reporting Form) which require proof of identity for each complaint; this is to manage very large volumes of daily communications and to ensure genuineness of reports.
• Company A submitted that a Proactive Monitoring Order would (i) be technically and operationally burdensome given the scale and dynamism of the platform, (ii) risk suspending legitimate accounts due to subtle variations or special characters used by bad actors, (iii) expose Company A to reputational and legal risk from wrongful suspensions, and (iv) likely amount to a prohibited general monitoring obligation under Article 8 of the Digital Services Act.
• Company A pointed out that on an exceptional basis it accepted identification via the Plaintiff's solicitor in these proceedings and that, when resources were directed at the reported impersonations, Company A was able to act quickly to remove multiple impersonating accounts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Merck Sharp and Dohme Corp. v. Clonmel Healthcare Ltd. [2020] 2 I.R. 1	Role of interlocutory injunction: to provide a just solution pending hearing of the action; principle applies with modification where mandatory interlocutory relief is sought.	The court applied the principle to emphasise that mandatory relief requires a higher threshold (a strong case on the merits) and used it when assessing the Plaintiff's application for mandatory interlocutory relief.
Maha Lingham v. HSE [2005] IESC 89	Where mandatory interlocutory relief is sought, the applicant must show at least that he has a strong case that he is likely to succeed at the hearing of the action.	The court cited this authority to reiterate the applicable high threshold and found the Plaintiff had not made out such a strong case.
Ryanair DAC v. Skyscanner Limited & Ors. [2022] IECA 64	Guidance: where all else is even, courts should lean towards preserving the status quo ante in interlocutory applications.	The court applied the principle but noted that the status quo protected by equity presupposes a lawful baseline; because the Plaintiff's position was tainted by admitted breach (impersonation), the status quo ante principle did not favour reinstatement of the Plaintiff's account.
Douez v. Facebook, Inc. [2017] 1 SCR 751	Observation (Canadian Supreme Court) that non-participation in a social media network may become important for free speech and civic participation.	The court acknowledged the argument that exclusion from a major platform can raise free expression issues, but concluded the Plaintiff had not established a strong case of disproportionate interference with such rights on the current record.
Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited (Case C-18/18) and Peterson v. Google LLC & Ors. (Joined Cases C-682/18-C-683/18)	EU case law referenced in connection with limits on general monitoring obligations and related intermediary responsibilities.	The court relied on these authorities (and the Digital Services Act) to observe that Article 8 prohibits general or proactive monitoring obligations, and considered that the proposed order would likely conflict with that prohibition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by applying established interlocutory principles, with particular attention to the heightened threshold for mandatory injunctions. The reasoning may be summarised in the following steps (reflecting the judgment's content only):

1. Characterisation of relief: The Court found that the relief sought (reinstatement and proactive removal/blocking of impersonating accounts) was, in substance, mandatory injunctions and therefore attracted the higher "strong case" threshold.
2. Admitted breach by Plaintiff: The Plaintiff admitted impersonating a verified account in March 2022. The Court treated this as a relevant equitable consideration (he who seeks equity must do equity) and as placing the Plaintiff in breach of Company A's Terms of Service, entitling Company A to sanctions including suspension.
3. Contractual and evidential assessment: The Court noted the Terms of Service provisions requiring authenticity and prohibiting impersonation and found no express contractual entitlement to reinstatement nor an identified contractual term imposing a proactive monitoring obligation on Company A. The Plaintiff did not identify a contractual term, statutory obligation, or settled duty requiring reinstatement or proactive monitoring.
4. Adequacy of damages and applicant's case on merits: The Court found that the Plaintiff had not shown a strong case on the merits and that damages would be an adequate remedy (the Plaintiff had quantified his claimed losses, implying quantifiability). The Plaintiff had alternative communication channels and diversified revenue streams; the Court concluded no strong case of irreparable harm was shown on the present record.
5. Defendant's operational and legal burden: The Court accepted uncontroverted averments by Company A (in particular, those of Attorney Paparozzi) that the operational burden of a proactive monitoring order would be substantial, that automated tools have limitations (e.g., to detect subtle permutations and special characters), and that human review would be required, exposing Company A to risks of wrongful suspension of legitimate users.
6. Digital Services Act and monitoring prohibition: The Court observed that Article 8 of the Digital Services Act prohibits general monitoring or pro-active fact-finding obligations on providers of intermediary services. The Court considered that the proposed order would, in substance, impose such a general monitoring obligation and so would likely be incompatible with Article 8. Because the Court refused the injunction on other grounds, it did not make a final determination on the Article 8 point, but it recorded that incompatibility with Article 8 is unavoidable on the evidence as presented.
7. Status quo ante and equity: The Court emphasised that preserving the status quo ante presupposes a lawful baseline; where the applicant's position results from a breach (as here), equity does not ordinarily restore that tainted position. Accordingly, reinstating the Plaintiff's account would be to reinstate a position to which he had no continuing entitlement under terms he had accepted and breached.
8. No workable narrowed order proposed: The Court noted that the Plaintiff had not put forward a workable, specific, and sufficiently narrow formulation of the proposed proactive order that might avoid the legal and practical objections identified; absent such specificity the proposed order would amount to a prohibited general monitoring obligation.
9. Procedural fairness and evidence: The Court accepted that some affidavit evidence remained unsworn due to urgency and, in fairness, treated affidavits as though sworn where appropriate. The Court disregarded a solicitors' letter from Company B that had not been exhibited on affidavit.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The Court refused the interlocutory injunction sought by the Plaintiff and ordered that the previously stayed interim injunction be vacated.

Consequences and implications (as stated in the judgment and limited to the materials):

• Direct effect: The Plaintiff's account remains suspended; the Court declined to order reinstatement or to require Company A to undertake proactive monitoring/suspension of impersonating accounts as sought.
• Legal reasoning: The refusal was principally grounded on the Plaintiff's failure to show a strong case on the merits required for mandatory interlocutory relief, the adequacy of damages, the Plaintiff's admitted past impersonation and resulting breach of Company A's Terms, and the practical and legal obstacles to the proactive monitoring order (including likely incompatibility with Article 8 of the Digital Services Act).
• Broader precedent: The Court expressly stated that nothing in the judgment should be read as indicating any view on how the substantive proceedings will be decided at trial. The judgment did not purport to establish any new legal principle beyond applying established interlocutory and statutory principles to the facts of this case.
• Further steps: The Court will hear the parties on costs during the course of the Michaelmas Term.

Notes on Material Not Included or Redacted in the Opinion

- A solicitors' letter from Company B was placed before the Court but not exhibited on affidavit; the Court disregarded it for that reason.
- The Plaintiff's affidavit quantified losses as "€[STATED AMOUNT] per month" (the figure appears bracketed in the source text); the Court treated that assertion as part of the adequacy-of-damages consideration.
- The Court noted that some affidavit evidence was unsworn at the urgent hearing and that it treated unsworn affidavits as if sworn for the purpose of fairness where appropriate.

This summary has strictly followed the text of the provided judgment and has anonymised personal and entity identifiers in accordance with the instructions. No information has been invented or inferred beyond what appears in the judgment.