Fatolahzadeh v London Borough of Barnet (Rev1)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant approached Company A in July 2022 after receiving a notice seeking possession of the accommodation in which she then lived with her adult son. Company A assigned the matter to a tenancy‑sustainment officer to explore prevention options. On 12 September 2022 the Appellant and her son completed medical self‑assessment forms and affordability assessments. On 21 September 2022 a housing worker employed by Company A conducted a telephone interview; the details were recorded in Company A's case notes ("Jigsaw notes") and a copy of that record was provided to the Appellant and her son.

Company A prepared a Personal Housing Plan ("PHP") recording a personal assessment of the Appellant's housing circumstances, needs and support requirements and setting out actions and target dates; the PHP stated it would be reviewed on 21 October 2022. On 26 September 2022 the Appellant and her son signed post‑interview declaration forms. On the same day Company A wrote to the Appellant accepting that it owed her a prevention duty under section 195(2) of the Housing Act 1996 and referring to the PHP as containing Company A's assessment of housing circumstances and needs.

Company A's internal medical team provided a short medical housing recommendation on 13 October 2022 (noting, inter alia, a preference for first‑floor maximum or lifted accommodation and a shower with a seat and indicating the Appellant's son would be vulnerable if homeless). Company A placed the Appellant in a higher priority band on its allocation scheme (Band 2) by letter dated 5 December 2022, setting suitability criteria including a limit of two bedrooms and compliance with the medical recommendations.

Company A offered an alternative property in early February 2023 but withdrew that offer after the Appellant's support worker advised it was unsuitable. By letter dated 17 March 2023 Company A made a further offer of accommodation (described in the parties' papers as "the Property"), described as a two‑bedroom, ground‑floor flat with a level‑access shower to be installed; the letter stated that acceptance would end Company A's housing duty. The Appellant accepted the offer and moved in when the Property was ready, but she requested a formal review of the suitability of the Property under section 202 of the Act.

Company A acknowledged the review request and invited further representations. The Appellant (through solicitors) submitted written representations alleging the Property was unsuitable because (1) it was too far from the Appellant's and her son's support network and (2) its location adjacent to a busy road would exacerbate the son's hearing‑related symptoms. The representations were supported by letters from third parties and the Appellant's GP/medical practitioner.

On 4 August 2023 Company A issued a detailed written review decision ("the Review decision"), addressing the suitability issues and concluding that the Property was suitable. The Appellant appealed the Review decision to the County Court pursuant to section 204 of the Act; the appeal was heard by Judge Hellman, resulting in a judgment dated 29 July 2024 and an order dismissing the County Court appeal (order dated 17 October 2024).

The Appellant then pursued a second appeal to this court advancing two primary grounds of challenge to the County Court judgment: (1) an alleged failure by Company A to discharge the assessment duty in section 189A(2) such that any purported discharge of the prevention duty by offering accommodation was invalid; and (2) that the PHP was unlawful (not kept under review and lacking reasoning) and that this rendered the decision on suitability unlawful.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a failure by a local housing authority to carry out a section 189A(2) housing needs assessment (or to record adequate reasons in that assessment) invalidates a purported discharge of the prevention duty under section 195(2) where the authority subsequently makes a section 202 review decision that concludes the accommodation offered is suitable.
2. Whether a Personal Housing Plan ("PHP") that was not reviewed at the date proposed and that is said to lack reasoning can render the authority's decision that an offered property is suitable unlawful, such that the prevention duty remains undischarged.
3. (As reformulated by the court) Whether, where a review decision addressing suitability adequately cures any substantive deficiency in an earlier assessment, a section 204 appeal to the County Court can succeed on the basis of that earlier deficiency rather than on any identified flaw in the review decision itself.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant contended that Company A failed to carry out the statutory assessment required by section 189A(2) and therefore could not lawfully discharge the prevention duty under section 195(2) by offering accommodation; the assessment duty logically precedes any decision on discharge and must comply with section 189A(2).
• The Appellant submitted that the assessment must identify the "key needs" which provide the "nuts and bolts" for any offer of accommodation and that those features were not properly recorded or reasoned in the assessment or the PHP.
• It was argued that, even if suitability was later considered in a review, a failure to carry out an adequate section 189A assessment would nonetheless invalidate any later finding of suitability; counsel (Attorney Colville) accepted that this logical consequence followed from the Appellant's primary submission.
• On Ground 2 the Appellant submitted that the PHP was unlawful (not reviewed on the date it stated it would be reviewed) and that, had it been properly reviewed, the errors in Company A's handling would have been identified and corrected; the Appellant relied also on the distance from support networks and the son's medical condition as matters the PHP should have addressed.

Company A's Arguments

• Company A maintained that it did make an assessment of the Appellant's housing needs, albeit the assessment was recorded across several documents (interview notes, the PHP, banding letter and medical advice) rather than in a single document.
• Company A relied on the contention that it substantially complied with section 189A and kept the assessment under appropriate review; it pointed to the medical team's recommendations, the banding decision (Band 2) and the withdrawal of an earlier unsuitable offer as evidence of an active, continuing process of assessment and engagement.
• Company A submitted that the review process under section 202 is the appropriate statutory route to challenge suitability and that section 202 does not permit a direct review of the section 189A assessment or PHP (the correct route to attack an assessment or PHP is by judicial review rather than by the statutory review/appeal mechanism provided in Part VII).
• Company A argued that where the review decision properly considers suitability and remedies any deficiency in the earlier assessment, it would be contrary to the statutory structure and precedent for an otherwise sound review decision to be invalidated by every previous procedural imperfection.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
UO v Redbridge LBC [2023] HLR 39	The initial assessment duty requires reasonable steps of inquiry; a local authority should adopt a positive and collaborative approach to applicants when assessing housing needs (see para [59] of UO).	The court endorsed this proposition and treated Company A's approach as requiring reasonable inquiry and engagement with the Appellant in assessing needs.
XY v Haringey LBC [2019] EWHC 2276 (Admin)	An assessment required by section 189A and the agreement under that section need not be contained in a single document; the housing officer would reasonably read the whole file (see para [54] of XY).	The court accepted that Company A's assessment could be dispersed across documents (telephone notes, PHP, banding letter and medical advice) and still amount to an assessment for statutory purposes.
R (ZK) v Havering LBC [2022] HLR 47	Determination of whether the duty to provide a lawful housing‑needs assessment (and/or lawful PHP) has been discharged requires consideration of the totality of the written housing file as it would be viewed by a reasonable and sensible housing officer (see para [39] of ZK).	The court applied this holistic approach in examining Company A's file and concluded that, on the facts, an assessment had been carried out across the material on file.
Abed v City of Westminster [2011] EWCA Civ 1406	Where a statutory review process exists under Part VII, the review is a continuation or replacement of the initial decision‑making process; a challenge that the original process was incorrect is superseded if the review properly addresses the substantive issues (see Lloyd LJ at paras cited in Abed).	The court relied on Abed to hold that a proper review decision addressing suitability can supersede earlier procedural defects in the original assessment and that the remedy for a disappointed applicant is to take the statutory review rather than treat every original defect as terminal to subsequent decisions.
Natt v Osman [2014] EWCA Civ 1520	The modern approach to consequences of non‑compliance is to treat it as an ordinary issue of statutory interpretation: analyse purpose and importance of the requirement in the statutory scheme as a whole (per Etherton C at para [25]).	The court adopted this interpretive approach when considering whether failure to comply with section 189A should invalidate subsequent decisions.
Ofori‑Addo v Haringey LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 277	Section 202 provides for review of specified decisions; it does not provide a right to review a section 189A assessment or a PHP generally—the right to request review is specific to the categories in section 202(1).	The court used Ofori‑Addo to support the view that challenges to the adequacy of an assessment or PHP are not made by the section 202 review route and that judicial review is the correct procedural vehicle for such challenges.
Hoffman‑La Roche & Co v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295	Administrative acts are valid unless and until quashed by a court (Lord Diplock at 366).	The court invoked this principle to note that Company A's earlier assessment remained valid absent any timely judicial review to quash it.
R (Noble Organisation) v Thanet DC [2005] EWCA Civ 782	Authority cited in support of the proposition that administrative acts stand until quashed.	The court cited this case in the same context as Hoffman‑La Roche to underline that existing administrative decisions remain effective unless set aside by proper proceedings.
R v Soneji [2005] UKHL 49; [2006] 1 AC 340	Soneji provides an analytical framework focusing on purpose of a procedural requirement and the consequences of non‑compliance rather than a rigid category approach.	The court used the Soneji framework as part of its assessment of whether non‑compliance with section 189A should render subsequent decisions invalid.
A1 Properties (Sunderland) Ltd v Tudor Studios RTM Co Ltd [2024] UKSC 27; [2024] 3 WLR 601	The correct approach to a failure to comply with a pre‑exercise procedural requirement is to ask whether the legislature intended that an act done in breach should be invalid; analyse statute's structure and the factual consequences (paras cited).	The court applied the A1 Properties analytical approach (as to purpose and structure) when deciding whether an inadequate or absent section 189A assessment should invalidate a subsequent suitability decision.
R v Layden [2025] UKSC 12; [2025] 2 WLR 740	Layden emphasises identifying alternatives to total invalidity and evaluating any prejudice or injustice that would follow from affirming a decision notwithstanding procedural breach.	The court relied on Layden to support a proportional evaluation of consequences rather than automatic invalidity of later acts.
Norton v LB Haringey [2025] EWCA Civ 746	The decision considered whether section 189A assessment is a condition precedent to valid suitability decisions and concluded that treating it as such would produce stark and implausible consequences; an otherwise lawful offer should not be invalidated merely for lack of a section 189A assessment.	The court treated Norton as a closely analogous and persuasive authority and followed its reasoning in concluding that Company A was not paralysed by any supposed defect in the early assessment when a thorough review decision had properly addressed suitability.
Ojuri (referenced in Abed)	Abed recorded that observations in Ojuri have no relevance where a statutory review process is available.	The court relied on Abed's treatment of Ojuri to support the proposition that a statutory review can supplant earlier procedural criticisms of the original decision.
YR (referenced in Norton)	As cited in Norton, the test for suitability is identical whether section 188 is considered alone or in light of a section 189A assessment (YR at [99] as referred to in Norton).	The court accepted Norton’s reliance on YR to show that suitability can be assessed consistently across different statutory contexts and so section 189A does not change the underlying suitability test into a precondition preventing lawful offers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by setting out the relevant statutory framework (notably sections 189A, 195 and 202 of the Housing Act 1996) and the factual matrix recorded on Company A's file. The court accepted the County Court's factual findings that Company A had accepted a prevention duty under section 195(2), had gathered medical and other relevant information, had issued a PHP and banding letter incorporating medical advice, and had ultimately made a Part 6 offer of suitable accommodation which the Appellant accepted and then asked to have reviewed.

The court addressed the two principal challenges together and proceeded in stages:

1. Finding as to existence of an assessment: the court accepted the County Court's finding that Company A had made an assessment of the Appellant's housing needs. Although the assessment was spread across multiple documents (telephone interview notes, the PHP, the banding letter and the medical team's advice) the totality of the file, viewed as a reasonable housing officer would view it, disclosed an assessment used to allocate banding and, inferentially, to make an offer of suitable accommodation.
2. Identified deficiency and remediation by review decision: the court accepted that the original assessment's reasoning on the specific point of distance from the Appellant's support network was insufficiently developed. However, the court found that the detailed Review decision of 4 August 2023 expressly addressed that point and remedied the deficiency by giving full consideration to the issue of location and the competing evidence.
3. Statutory interpretation and consequences of non‑compliance: applying the modern approach to the consequences of non‑compliance (as explained in Natt v Osman and the Soneji/A1 Properties framework), the court analysed whether Parliament intended that a failure to carry out an adequate section 189A assessment should automatically invalidate later acts (in particular, a reviewing officer's decision under section 202). The court concluded that Parliament did not intend such an outcome: where the review process exists and has been deployed and the review decision adequately addresses the substantive points, the review decision supersedes or replaces the original decision or any failure in its reasoning.
4. Procedural avenue and timing: the court emphasised established public‑law principles that administrative acts remain valid until quashed and that the appropriate vehicle to challenge the adequacy of a section 189A assessment or a PHP (as such) is judicial review. Because no timely judicial review challenge was brought to quash any earlier assessment and because the Review decision was not substantively attacked on its own terms, the court held that an appeal under section 204 could not succeed on the ground of the earlier assessment deficiency alone.
5. PHP review point: the court addressed the Appellant's contention that the PHP was not reviewed on the stated date. The court noted that section 189A does not prescribe review intervals, that the interval here (less than a year between PHP and Review decision) and the absence of a material change in circumstances meant the omission of a formal review meeting was not decisive. The court also observed that, even had the PHP been reviewed earlier, there was no reason to suppose the earlier outcome would have differed from the Review decision which concluded the Property was suitable.
6. Comparative and persuasive authorities: the court relied on the approach in Abed and the subsequent, closely analogous Court of Appeal authority in Norton to reinforce the conclusion that where a statutory review is available and has been properly carried out the review decision is the operative decision for appeal purposes; it is not overridden by every defect in the original decision‑making unless the original decision has been quashed.

On that basis the court concluded that Ground 1, as framed by the Appellant, did not accurately state the issue that arose in the case and that the Appellant's contention that an insufficient or absent section 189A assessment automatically invalidated a later review decision could not be sustained on these facts. For the same reasons the court rejected Ground 2 (the PHP point).

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The court dismissed the Appellant's appeal on both grounds. It concluded that Company A had made an assessment of the Appellant's housing needs (albeit dispersed across documents), that any identified deficiency in the original assessment's reasoning was remedied by the detailed Review decision, and that a section 204 appeal cannot prevail on the basis of an earlier assessment deficiency which has been addressed by a proper section 202 review decision when no successful judicial review quashing the earlier assessment has been brought.

Direct consequences: The Review decision that the Property was suitable stands on the facts of this case and the County Court judgment dismissing the Appellant's earlier appeal is upheld. The court indicated that where a claimant wishes to challenge the substantive lawfulness of an authority's section 189A assessment or PHP independently of a section 202 review, the appropriate remedy is judicial review; absent such a successful challenge, administrative acts remain effective.

Broader implications: The court applied and followed existing authorities (notably Abed and Norton and the analytical framework from Soneji/A1 Properties/Layden) and did not purport to establish a novel general rule that departs from those authorities. The decision therefore confirms that an adequate statutory review can cure substantive deficiencies in an earlier assessment so that the reviewing decision, if sound, will be the operative decision for appeal under the Part VII scheme; it does not create a new principle invalidating review decisions simply because an earlier assessment contained flaws.

Concurring judgments: Judge Baker and Judge Singh agreed with the leading judgment.