Anonymized Summary of Appellate Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was determined by Judge Freedman. The Appellant was convicted, following a guilty plea entered on 1 March 2024 (the morning of an intended Newton hearing when the appellant abandoned a previously-tendered basis of plea), of a single count of violent disorder contrary to section 2(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. He was sentenced on 14 March 2025 by Judge Dhir at the sentencing court to 33 months' imprisonment.

The conviction related to participation in group violence outside a late-night venue ("The Venue") on a public thoroughfare ("The Street") on 30 October 2022. The prosecution prepared and relied on a written sentencing note and an oral opening describing the appellant's movements and conduct at specific times, including that the appellant produced a knife (about 10 centimetres in length) from his waistband and that this was captured on home security footage. The prosecution did not allege that the appellant participated in any homicide; the appellant was not charged with any homicide offence.

Other participants in the incidents were convicted of more serious offences: two co-defendants were convicted of murder and another co-defendant convicted of manslaughter; those co-defendants also received concurrent sentences for violent disorder. Several other co-defendants who had been convicted of violent disorder and sentenced earlier also took part in the group violence.

At sentence the trial judge applied the applicable sentencing guidelines for violent disorder, assessing the appellant as culpability level A (targeting of an individual or individuals by the group; participation in an incident which involved widespread and/or large-scale acts of violence and serious acts of violence). The judge assessed harm as level 1 on the grounds that the incident resulted in the death of one individual and involved serious fear/distress/disruption. The judge selected a category 1A starting point of four years' custody (range 3 to 4.5 years), identified aggravating and mitigating factors, imposed a sentence of three years, and then reduced that term by three months to reflect the late guilty plea, producing an effective sentence of 33 months.

The Appellant obtained permission to appeal the sentence from the Single Judge on the ground that it was manifestly excessive. He argued, principally through Attorney Milner, that the sentencing judge erred in principle by selecting too high a starting point and that there was an unjustified disparity between his sentence and the sentences imposed on certain other defendants.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence of 33 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in principle in selecting a category 1A (four-year) starting point rather than a lower category/start point (category 2A or 1B with a three-year starting point).
3. Whether there was an unlawful disparity between the appellant's sentence for violent disorder and the sentences imposed on other defendants who were also convicted of violent disorder (but who were additionally convicted of homicide offences and sentenced concurrently).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Milner)

• The sentencing judge erred in principle by selecting too high a starting point (category 1A / four years). The appropriate starting point should have been category 2A or 1B (starting point three years; ranges two to four years), which would have allowed mitigation to reduce the sentence closer to two years.
• There was disparity in treatment between the appellant and other defendants who were sentenced for violent disorder. In particular, two co-defendants convicted of murder and one convicted of manslaughter had violent disorder starting points of three years and received reductions for guilty pleas/mitigation such that their violent disorder terms (after reduction) were lower than the appellant's effective violent disorder sentence of 2 years 9 months (33 months overall after plea reduction).
• The appellant relied on his mitigation (no relevant previous convictions, family responsibilities including a young daughter, no offending while on bail, steady employment, and walking away before the fatal stabbing) as factors that supported a lower sentence.

Prosecution's Position (as reflected in the written sentencing note and oral opening)

• The prosecution submitted that the appellant should be sentenced on the basis that he jointly participated in the group violence outside The Venue. The written note sets out a second-by-second account of movement and actions within and outside The Venue on the night in question.
• Key factual points included in the prosecution note (times and descriptions given by the prosecution):
• The appellant arrived at The Venue at 00:31:10 and was present inside when a dispute unfolded near the bar/door to the kitchen at 01:26:40.
• The appellant moved towards the toilet area with members of the defendant group at 01:33:30 and later returned inside before exiting with the group between 01:44:23 and 01:46:48.
• Outside The Venue, the appellant jointly participated in group violence: he was part of the group who chased one individual along The Street at 01:46:48 and part of the group that confronted the deceased and others at 01:47:07 near a nearby shop.
• The note records that the appellant punched one person at 01:47:04, participated in attacks on the deceased along The Street, and by 01:47:39 was seen walking away from the group. The prosecution also stated the appellant was not part of a later attack at a different nearby location.
• The appellant was seen in possession of a knife produced from his waistband, with the tip at one stage pointed towards another person; the knife was approximately 10 centimetres in length and was captured on home security footage.
• The prosecution did not contend that the appellant participated in the unlawful killing; the violent disorder case was advanced as a standalone basis for sentencing him for that offence.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Freedman considered the appellant's challenge to the sentence and the submissions made on his behalf. The court's reasoning proceeded by addressing the central complaints (starting point and alleged disparity) and applying the facts and the sentencing exercise as conducted by the sentencing judge.

The appellate court accepted the sentencing judge's characterisation of the offence as falling within category 1A for the purpose of the relevant sentencing framework. The judgment emphasised that the sentencing judge had given clear reasons supporting that categorisation: the appellant's participation involved the targeting of individuals by the group, participation in widespread and serious acts of violence, the presence of a weapon, and the overall incident resulted in death and significant fear/distress/disruption. That factual picture, as articulated at sentence and supported by CCTV/home security footage and the prosecution's account, justified the higher starting point.

The court also noted that the sentencing judge had methodically identified and weighed aggravating factors (notably bringing and producing a knife and intoxication) and mitigating factors (no relevant convictions, family responsibilities, good employment, no intervening offending while on bail, and walking away before the fatal stabbing). The judge applied a substantial mitigation allowance by imposing sentence at the bottom of the prescribed range for category 1A and then further reducing the term to reflect the late plea. The appellate court found that this demonstrated a proper balancing exercise rather than a failure to give effect to mitigation.

On the disparity argument, the court gave several distinct reasons for rejecting it:

1. The sentences imposed on the co-defendants who were convicted of homicide were, in relation to violent disorder, effectively academic because those violent disorder terms were ordered to run concurrently with much longer homicide sentences. The concurrent violent disorder terms did not operate as independent measures of punishment in the same way as a standalone violent disorder sentence would.
2. Comparisons were not like-for-like: the appellant's conviction for violent disorder was a standalone offence, whereas the others' violent disorder sentences were part of a total sentence that included conviction(s) for more serious offending. The prosecution's sentencing material for those other defendants recognised that category 1A would be appropriate for a standalone violent disorder offence; totality principles apply when offences of differing gravity are sentenced together.
3. The practical effect of sentencing the appellant at the bottom of the range for category 1A made his effective punishment for violent disorder materially similar to what would have resulted from a starting point of 3 years in a lower category after mitigation — in other words, the bottom-of-range placement achieved parity in outcome even if labels differed.
4. Even if it were the case that the trial judge in the co-defendants' hearings had adopted a lower starting point (three years) that potential error was immaterial to the fairness of the appellant's sentence: the crucial point was that the sentencing exercise in the appellant's case properly identified and applied the four-year starting point.

The appellate court also noted the sentencing judge's familiarity with the facts from her involvement in related trials and the available audiovisual evidence, reinforcing the conclusion that the judge had a sound factual grasp on the appellant's culpability and the nature of the harm.

On this basis the appellate court concluded there was no error of principle in the sentencing judge's approach and no basis to conclude that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effect: The sentence of 33 months' imprisonment imposed by the sentencing court remains in force.

Broader implications: The opinion records that the court applied the established categorical approach within the relevant sentencing framework (culpability level A; harm level 1; category 1A starting point), allowed substantial mitigation, and rejected arguments of unjustified disparity. The judgment did not purport to create a new legal principle or to modify sentencing law; no new precedent was announced and the decision turned on application of the guidelines and careful assessment of the facts and totality considerations.

This summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided opinion and uses consistent anonymized placeholders for persons and locations.