Court Opinion – Structured, Anonymised Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This hearing concerned an application for an extension of time of 129 days and for leave to appeal against conviction. The single judge referred two grounds of appeal to the full court; a third ground was not pursued orally at the hearing on the day.

On 19 September 2023 the Appellant was convicted of two counts of rape in the Crown Court at The City following a trial before Judge Burgess and a jury. On 20 September 2023 the Appellant was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment on both counts, to run concurrently.

The underlying factual matrix at trial (as summarised by the court) is as follows. Two groups of nationals met at a nightclub in The City on 24 November 2022 and a WeChat group was formed. The Complainant disclosed that it was her birthday in that group and the Appellant sent money via WeChat which the Complainant did not accept. The Appellant discussed the Complainant with a friend, Witness Y, bought presents, and arranged to meet the Complainant for lunch; the meeting took place in a private room in a restaurant in The City. Thereafter there were disputes between the parties about whether certain sexual acts were consensual.

In the early hours of 28 November 2022 the Appellant went to the Complainant's residence and messaged her asking to meet. The Complainant spoke to a friend, Witness W, and then met the Appellant. They went to the Appellant’s home where another person was present but asleep. It was common ground that oral and vaginal sex took place and that the Appellant bit the Complainant’s neck leaving a mark described in the record as a "strawberry" (a "love bite"). The Complainant's case was that the Appellant pinned her down, ripped her top, had sexual intercourse without her consent, and forced oral intercourse; she gave evidence of force, photographic evidence of marks, and expressed concern that the Appellant had mentioned filming her. The Appellant's case was that all sexual activity was consensual; expert evidence about the marks was consistent with the Complainant's account but could not exclude the Appellant's account.

The Complainant reported the matter to the police on 29 November 2022. The Appellant was arrested, interviewed (repeating the account of consensual activity), and refused bail pending trial.

At an earlier listing in April 2023 there were exchanges on WeChat involving an account using the name "Strawberry". The record includes a sequence where a friend managing the Appellant's account accepted a friend request and messages followed including an offer of "20,000 RMB" on terms of not showing material in court. After arrest, two four‑minute videos deleted from the Appellant's phone could not be recovered by the police.

At trial the Complainant and Witness Y gave evidence. Witness W had provided a statement and had returned abroad; objection was taken to reading that statement and the judge admitted it, producing a ground of appeal that was ultimately not pursued. Defence requests were made for investigation into the "Strawberry" WeChat conversation; the trial judge declined to permit a broad or speculative ("fishing") cross-examination of the Complainant on the contents of the WeChat messages because, on the material then available, there was no evidence linking the WeChat messages to the Complainant.

The two grounds referred by the single judge and argued before the full court were (1) that the trial judge should not have prevented cross-examination of the Complainant about the WeChat message from the account using the name "Strawberry" (which, it was argued, sought money to stop the proceedings) and (2) that the judge should have reminded the jury about evidence from Witness Y that parts of her witness statement (concerning dates of complaints) were wrong.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to allow cross‑examination of the Complainant about the contents of a WeChat message (from an account using the name "Strawberry") that allegedly demanded money to stop the proceedings, when that evidence might bear on the Complainant's credit and the safety of the conviction.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in failing to remind the jury about the fact that Witness Y said parts of her witness statement (specifically dates of an earlier complaint) were wrong, and whether that omission rendered the conviction unsafe.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The judge should have permitted cross‑examination of the Complainant about the WeChat message from the account using the name "Strawberry" to put to the Complainant that she (or someone acting for her) sought money to withdraw the complaint; that material, if linked to the Complainant, could undermine her credibility and render the conviction unsafe.
• The judge erred in not reminding the jury about the fact that Witness Y had stated that parts of her witness statement (specifically dates) were incorrect; that failure may have prevented the jury from properly assessing the timing and credibility of earlier complaints.

Respondent (Prosecution) Arguments

• There was no evidence linking the WeChat message or the "Strawberry" account to the Complainant; permitting the proposed cross‑examination would have been a fishing expedition without an evidential foundation and the trial judge was right to refuse it.
• On the Witness Y point, the statements of Y indicated a mistake on dates and the prosecution could not adduce evidence of an earlier complaint; the jury did not see the witness statement and the judge was entitled to decide what comments to make to the jury, so there was no basis to disturb the trial judge's approach.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis addressed each referred ground in turn and proceeded on the material that was before the trial judge and before the full court.

1. On the WeChat message ground, the court accepted the trial judge's characterization of the defence requests as proposing a "fishing expedition" because, on the material available at trial, there was no evidence tying the WeChat message (from the account using the name "Strawberry") to the Complainant. The judge therefore properly refused to permit cross‑examination on its contents. The court emphasised that cross‑examination as to credit requires a proper evidential basis: without any evidence connecting the message to the Complainant, putting it to her as if she authored or was responsible for it would have been impermissible.

2. The court acknowledged a distinct, unresolved issue: that prosecutors had not followed up by asking the Complainant whether she operated, or was involved with, the "Strawberry" account, despite defence requests for such investigation after disclosure of the messaging. The court observed that, had the Complainant accepted that she was the operator or involved, then cross‑examination on the contents of the message would have been permissible and the trial judge's refusal in those circumstances could have rendered the conviction unsafe. However, on the facts before the trial judge there was nothing to show such a link.

3. The court noted candidly that the Appellant's counsel (Attorney Cadman) acknowledged that the application had not been formulated so as to ask the Complainant the necessary questions at trial to establish whether she had operated the account or sent the messages. Consequently, the Appellant had not established the factual basis that would have made the cross‑examination admissible; on that footing the trial judge's refusal could not be faulted.

4. On the witness statement/dates point relating to Witness Y, the court examined the transcript. Witness Y, when giving evidence, said there was a mistake in her statement about the dates; the prosecution was unable to adduce evidence of any earlier complaint. The court explained that the jury had not seen the witness statement and, more fundamentally, that it is for the judge to decide what observations or reminders to give to a jury. Given the lack of evidential foundation to support an assertion that an earlier complaint had been made, and the judge's discretion about comments to the jury, the court concluded that there was no basis to interfere.

5. Having rejected both grounds on the basis above, the court nonetheless acted to address the outstanding procedural issue of the unasked question about the "Strawberry" messaging. The court directed the Appellant's attorney to draft a ground of appeal complaining that the requested investigation (to establish whether the Complainant operated or was connected to the account) had not been carried out in response to defence requests following disclosure of the messaging. This direction recognises the potential centrality of that factual question to the safety of the convictions if the Complainant were to concede involvement.

6. Procedural directions were given: Attorney Cadman was to draft that new ground of appeal by 1:00 pm on the day of the hearing, and Attorney Rouch (for the Respondent) was to have 21 days to respond by way of a Respondent's Notice. The court explained the binary consequences: if the Complainant denies any involvement or connection to the messaging, there will likely be no viable ground on that issue; if the Complainant concedes that she operated or was involved with the account or message, that might make the appeal difficult for the Respondent to resist.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Both referred grounds of appeal were dismissed by the full court on the material before the trial judge and the full court.

Direct consequences for the parties:

• The two grounds referred by the single judge — (1) prohibition of proposed cross‑examination about the WeChat message and (2) failure to remind the jury about Witness Y's correction to her statement — were rejected and do not, on the available material, render the convictions unsafe.
• The court directed a further procedural step: the Appellant may pursue a drafted ground complaining of the failure to carry out an investigation (or to ask the Complainant whether she operated the "Strawberry" account). The Appellant's attorney was directed to draft that ground by the specified short deadline, and the Respondent was given 21 days to reply. Those steps preserve the possibility of further challenge if the factual situation shows the Complainant was involved with the messages.
• If the additional inquiry establishes that the Complainant had no involvement with the account or messages, the court indicated that the new ground will probably not be viable; if the Complainant admits involvement (or is otherwise shown to have been involved), that may materially affect the safety of the conviction and could be difficult for the Respondent to resist.

Broader legal implications:

• The decision turned on the evidential foundation required to permit cross‑examination on matters bearing on credit and on the judge's discretion about what to say to a jury; the court applied those principles to the facts before it and did not purport to create a new legal principle.
• No new precedent was stated in the opinion; the court's ruling was fact‑specific and procedural directions were given to address an outstanding factual issue that may or may not affect the safety of the convictions.

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Note: This summary has been prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and is fully anonymised. All personal names and precise locations appearing in the original opinion have been replaced with consistent placeholders (for example, "Appellant", "Complainant", "Witness Y", "Witness W", "Judge Burgess", "Attorney Cadman", "Attorney Rouch", and "The City").