Appeal against Conviction by Thomas John Lamont against HMA (High Court of Justiciary)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 4 September 2024 the Appellant was convicted after trial at the High Court in The City of a series of offences alleged to have been committed against two former partners (referred to here as Complainant A and Complainant B) between 2017 and 2022. The indictment comprised a mix of non-sexual domestic-abuse related charges and multiple sexual offences, including rape, anal rape and sexual assault; several counts were pleaded as aggravated (including aggravation under the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 and the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018), and some were aggravated by breaches of bail or involvement of a child.

At sentence on 25 November 2024 the trial judge imposed an extended custodial sentence: a 9-year custodial term with a 2-year extension period (11 years in total).

Leave to appeal against conviction was granted on three specified grounds: (1) that the judge's directions failed to explain adequately how the doctrine of mutual corroboration should be applied where some charges were sexual and others non-sexual; (2) that the judge misdirected the jury in relation to the requirement for similarities in time when applying mutual corroboration; and (3) that the judge misdirected by not making clear that the jury had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt before applying the doctrine of mutual corroboration.

The trial judge was unable to provide a report for the appeal; the Appellant, through Attorney Ogg, indicated a willingness to proceed. No issue of sufficiency of evidence was raised on appeal. At trial both Complainant A and Complainant B gave evidence describing sustained patterns of coercive and controlling behaviour including repeated sexual violence; the Crown's case depended upon the jury accepting both witnesses and on the application of the doctrine of mutual corroboration.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge failed to give clear directions that evidence supporting sexual charges must be treated separately from evidence supporting non-sexual charges for the purpose of mutual corroboration.
2. Whether the judge misdirected the jury as to the requirement for temporal similarity (similarity in time) as an element of mutual corroboration.
3. Whether the judge misdirected the jury by not making clear that the jury had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt before concluding that the doctrine of mutual corroboration applied.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The judge did not make sufficiently clear that sexual and non-sexual charges (and their supporting evidence) must be assessed separately when considering mutual corroboration; reliance was placed on authority to the effect that sexual allegations cannot be corroborated by non-sexual allegations alone (cited: Duthie v HM Advocate).
• The judge risked usurping the jury's role by describing the timeframe as "very limited" and by focusing the jury unduly on similarities in character and circumstance while downplaying the temporal similarity requirement.
• The judge's direction that it was not necessary to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on each and every allegation (the passage in issue) was a material misdirection: the jury might accept particular allegations yet still have a reasonable doubt whether the accused pursued a single course of criminal conduct; if so, they should have been directed to acquit.

Respondent's (Crown's) Arguments

• The Crown accepted that a passage in the judge's charge (as quoted in the appeal) was erroneous in suggesting that a rape charge could be corroborated by a non-sexual charge, but submitted that, read as a whole, the judge made clear that sexual conduct had to be considered separately for corroboration purposes (and directed that only certain sexual charges could corroborate other sexual charges).
• The judge's description of the timeframe as "very limited" was accurate contextually and did not remove temporal similarity from the jury's consideration; the crucial direction requiring similarity in time, character and circumstance (cited from Adam v HM Advocate) was given and repeated.
• The Crown submitted that the judge's directions on burden and standard of proof were adequate and that the doctrine of mutual corroboration is concerned with whether sufficient similarities exist; the jury did not need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the doctrine applied as a separate preliminary matter, provided they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of guilt in accordance with the usual burden and standard of proof.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by recalling foundational propositions (notably from Sim v HM Advocate) that a judge's directions must be read as a whole and in the context of the evidence and speeches heard by the jury, and not examined in isolation. Applying that approach informed the court's assessment of the three grounds of appeal.

First, the court observed that the advocate depute (Crown) had clearly presented the case to the jury as involving two separate courses of conduct — one sexual, one non-sexual — and that senior defence counsel had not contested that framing. Against that undisputed context, the court examined the judge's charge and concluded that the judge had, particularly in the passage referred to by paragraph [14] of the opinion, made clear that sexual and non-sexual evidence should be evaluated separately for the purpose of mutual corroboration. The judge explicitly told the jury that they would need to be satisfied on at least one sexual charge for each complainer before considering cross-corroboration between complainers, and that he was addressing the sexual charges specifically at that stage before turning to non-sexual charges. While the court accepted that some earlier passages could, if read alone, appear to blur the distinction, those passages had to be understood in the wider context of the charge and the prior speeches. For these reasons the first ground was rejected.

Second, the court addressed the complaint about the judge's reference to the timeframe as "very limited" and the suggestion that the judge had downplayed temporal similarity. The court noted that the judge expressly directed the jury that similarity in time, as well as character and circumstance, was a necessary element to establish a single course of conduct. The judge repeatedly required the jury to be satisfied of such similarities and emphasised the point. Accordingly, describing the timeframe as limited did not remove the temporal requirement from the jury's consideration and the second ground failed.

Third, on the contention that the judge had not made clear that the jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt before applying mutual corroboration, the court noted that the judge had given standard and repeated directions on the burden and standard of proof, both in opening remarks and during the charge. The court accepted that a passage in the charge (quoted in paragraph [17] of the opinion) might have been clumsily expressed and may have referred to the wrong charge number, but it interpreted that passage in context as attempting to explain that the Crown need not prove every individual sub‑allegation within a charge beyond reasonable doubt provided that the charge regarded as a whole was established beyond reasonable doubt. The court concluded that, although the judge could have expressed that point more clearly, there was no material misdirection: the jury could not have been left in doubt about the conventional requirement that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In short, reading the charge as a whole and in the context of the speeches and evidence, the court concluded that the judge's directions were adequate and that none of the three grounds of appeal identified any material misdirection requiring the conviction to be disturbed.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL REFUSED

Implications: The appellate court refused the Appellant's appeal. The court's decision was limited to the correctness of the judge's directions as given at trial; the opinion contains no extended discussion of broader doctrinal changes or new legal principles. No new precedent was declared by the court beyond its application of existing authorities to the facts and directions in this case.