Application for Leave to Appeal under Section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 by Przemyslaw Lukasz Pojda against the Lord Advocate, representing the Republic of Poland (High Court of Justiciary)

Factual and Procedural Background

By a European arrest warrant dated 13 June 2016, replaced by a warrant dated 15 July 2019, the Republic of Poland sought the extradition of the Appellant to serve a prison sentence of four years, with approximately three years and eight months outstanding. The convictions related to supply of controlled drugs, fraud, and threatening a witness.

After a protracted process, the sheriff ordered the Appellant's extradition on 6 March 2025. The Appellant appealed, citing his long residence in Scotland since 2006, settled immigration status, family ties including a seven-year-old son, and arguing that extradition would violate his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). He also contended that the passage of time barred extradition under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, given the offences dated from 1999 and the enforceable judgment from 2003.

The Appellant was sentenced in Poland in 2003 with a suspended sentence conditionally suspended for five years. He breached this suspension in 2004 by committing further offences, leading to additional convictions and the activation of the original sentence in 2008. The Appellant was aware of these proceedings but did not appear at key hearings. He relocated to the United Kingdom in late 2006 and lived there until his arrest on the European arrest warrant in 2016. During this time, he worked as a fitness instructor, formed a family relationship, and had a son born in 2017.

The sheriff found that the Appellant was a fugitive who had lived in the UK in full knowledge of his legal situation. The sheriff rejected the Article 8 claim, holding that the interference with family life was proportionate given the seriousness of the offences and the international obligation to extradite convicted criminals.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Appellant’s extradition would violate his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, considering his family life and settled status in the United Kingdom.
2. Whether the passage of time barred extradition under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.
3. Whether the sheriff erred in law or fact in ordering extradition.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Extradition would be incompatible with his Article 8 rights due to his established family life in Scotland, including a partner and son.
• He had lived in Scotland since 2006 with settled immigration status.
• Extradition was barred by the passage of time under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, as the offences occurred in 1999 and the judgment dated 2003.
• He contended he was not fleeing justice, believing only a suspended sentence applied.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Appellant was a fugitive who came to the UK fully aware that his sentence was to be served.
• Passage of time was not oppressive given the Appellant’s fugitive status and the gravity of his offences.
• To succeed on Article 8 grounds, exceptional circumstances must be established; inevitable family separation due to extradition is not exceptional.
• The sheriff did not err in fact or law in ordering extradition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
H(H) v Italy [2012] UKSC 25; [2013] 1 AC 338	Balancing extradition interference with family life against public interest; grave interference can be justified by international obligations.	The court cited this case to support that extradition, though a serious interference with family life, can be proportionate and justified.
Lagunionek v Lord Advocate [2015] HCJAC 53; [2015] JC 300	Passage of time as a ground to bar extradition is limited where the person is a fugitive; exceptional circumstances required.	The court noted this principle but found it unnecessary to discuss it in detail, as the appeal did not raise passage of time as a ground.
RF v Lord Advocate [2024] HCJAC 46	Article 8 claims require showing of "exceptionally severe" consequences to outweigh public interest in extradition.	The court applied this test, finding no exceptional severity in this case to outweigh extradition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the Appellant’s situation, recognising that extradition interferes with family life under Article 8 ECHR but must be balanced against public interest in fulfilling international obligations and preventing the UK from becoming a refuge for convicted criminals. The Appellant was found to be a fugitive who knowingly evaded serving his sentence. His family life and settled status were developed with full knowledge of the extradition risk, negating claims of oppression or exceptional circumstances.

The court acknowledged the serious interference extradition would cause but held it proportionate and justified. The Appellant’s appeal did not identify any error in the sheriff’s reasoning or application of the law. The court also noted that inevitable family separation does not constitute an exceptional circumstance sufficient to bar extradition.

Consequently, the court found no arguable ground of appeal on the basis of Article 8 or delay and refused leave to appeal.

Holding and Implications

The court REFUSED LEAVE TO APPEAL.

The effect of this decision is that the Appellant’s extradition order stands and will proceed. The ruling confirms the principle that extradition, even when interfering with family life, is permissible absent exceptional circumstances, particularly where the individual is a fugitive. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing case law.