GBE, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

An application was made by His Majesty's Solicitor General seeking leave to refer a sentence considered unduly lenient. The victim, granted lifelong anonymity under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, was in a relationship with the Respondent, a 34-year-old man with prior convictions including driving with excess alcohol, battery reprimand, and a battery caution. The Respondent faced charges of two counts of rape, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and controlling or coercive behaviour, with offences alleged between October 2017 and October 2020.

The Respondent was arrested in March 2021 and denied all offences. The case proceeded from Hastings Magistrates' Court to Lewes Crown Court, where after trial between February and March 2025, he was acquitted of rape but convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and controlling/coercive behaviour. On 2 May 2025, the Respondent received a 2-year imprisonment sentence suspended for 2 years alongside unpaid work and rehabilitation requirements.

The factual background involves a relationship beginning in October 2017, deteriorating by October 2020, marked by aggressive, violent, and controlling behaviour by the Respondent. The victim lived intermittently with the Respondent and her daughter from a previous relationship. The Respondent’s behaviour included accusations of infidelity, phone monitoring, restrictions on social interactions and appearance, verbal abuse, and physical assaults including strangulation causing unconsciousness, kicking, and other violent acts. The victim suffered psychological harm and physical injuries such as a black eye and bruising.

The Respondent’s actions extended to controlling behaviour over the victim and her daughter, with multiple incidents witnessed by family and friends. The relationship ended in October 2020, but contact continued for the sake of their daughter. Post-sentencing reports indicate partial acceptance of wrongdoing by the Respondent, engagement with probation, and ongoing family responsibilities.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the judge’s notional sentence of 3 years 4 months was too low.
2. Whether the reduction of the sentence from 3 years 4 months to 2 years (over 40% reduction for delay) was unjustified and too substantial.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Timpson [2023] EWCA Crim 453	Reduction of sentence due to delay and the limits on how much reduction is appropriate.	The court considered Timpson's principle that a 40% reduction for delay was too much in that case, but recognized that each case is fact-specific. The court found the reduction from 3 years 4 months to 2 years in the present case was unduly lenient.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged the judge was entitled to an overall sentence of about 3 years 4 months reflecting all offending, considering the severity of the offences and available mitigation such as the Respondent’s family responsibilities and first custodial sentence status. However, the court found the reduction of this sentence to 2 years suspended—over 40%—was not justified and amounted to undue leniency.

Despite finding the sentence unduly lenient, the court exercised its discretion not to increase the sentence. Factors influencing this decision included a recent probation report evidencing the Respondent’s progress, partial acceptance of offending, completion of some rehabilitation requirements, the support given to his mother, and changes in his personal circumstances including a new relationship and child.

Holding and Implications

The court allowed the reference on the basis that the sentence was unduly lenient but exercised discretion to not increase the sentence.

The direct effect is that the original 2-year suspended sentence with requirements remains in place. No new precedent was established, and the decision primarily addresses the application of sentencing principles and discretion in the context of delay and mitigation.