Anwar v London Borough of Ealing Council

Factual and Procedural Background

This case concerns a dispute between two neighbours regarding a vehicular crossover constructed on the public highway in front of their properties, which allows access across the footway and verge to their respective driveways. The Appellant, referred to as the Plaintiff, holds a long leasehold interest in a property owned by Company A, and the Defendant neighbour owns the adjacent detached property. The crossover was constructed by the local highway authority (the Respondent) following an application by the Defendant neighbour, despite the absence of the Plaintiff's consent, which the Council had initially requested.

The Plaintiff and Company A sought removal of the crossover and reinstatement of the kerb, but the Council's Chief Executive refused this request in 2021. The Plaintiff, initially acting in person, filed for judicial review of that decision. Permission was initially refused but later granted on the narrow ground that the Chief Executive had failed to have adequate regard to the alleged unlawful construction of the crossover. However, the court found that the 2015 decision to construct the crossover was not lawfully challenged within the required time limits and remained valid and unquashed.

A deputy High Court Judge subsequently considered the statutory interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Highways Act 1980, concluding that the Council acted lawfully in constructing the crossover without requiring the Plaintiff's consent. The Plaintiff appealed with permission granted on the basis of public importance of the statutory interpretation issues. The appeal court was invited to determine the proper construction of section 184 of the Highways Act 1980 and related human rights arguments.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the highway authority was required by law to obtain the consent of the owner or occupier of adjoining premises before constructing a vehicle crossover under section 184 of the Highways Act 1980.
2. The proper interpretation of the phrase "any person" in section 184(11) and whether it is limited to owners or occupiers of premises adjoining the highway.
3. Whether the statutory scheme provides a right of objection to persons not served with a notice under section 184(1) or (3).
4. Whether the statutory construction of section 184(11) engages or breaches Article 1 of Protocol 1 (A1P1) of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
5. The extent of the highway authority’s discretion in approving, modifying, or rejecting requests for vehicle crossings under section 184(11).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant contended that "any person" in section 184(11) should be interpreted restrictively to mean only owners or occupiers of premises adjoining or accessing the footway or verge, not any member of the public.
• The Appellant argued that a "vehicle crossing" must serve a single premises, meaning a single estate in land, and thus the highway authority had no power to construct a crossover serving multiple premises without each owner’s request or consent.
• It was submitted that the statutory scheme intends to protect owners and occupiers from unwanted vehicle crossings adjoining their property, and allowing any person to request a crossing would undermine these protections.
• The Appellant raised human rights arguments under A1P1, asserting that the construction of the crossover without consent deprived her of peaceful enjoyment of her property.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent argued that the statutory language is clear that "any person" in section 184(11) includes persons other than owners or occupiers of adjoining premises, allowing a wider public to request a vehicle crossing.
• The highway authority has discretion to determine the design, dimensions, and location of the crossover, which is constructed on public highway land, not private property.
• The statutory scheme provides a right of objection only to persons served with notices under subsections (1) and (3), who may be required to contribute financially; no right of objection exists under subsection (11) because it concerns discretionary requests rather than compulsory works.
• The Respondent maintained that the crossover does not interfere with the Appellant’s property rights or access and that the private law rights regarding trespass remain unaffected.
• Human rights arguments were rejected on the basis that the works were lawful exercises of statutory powers on public highway land and did not involve expropriation or deprivation of property.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by emphasizing that the crossover was constructed on the public highway, maintained at public expense by the highway authority, and not on private land. It held that the 2015 decision to construct the crossover was lawful and unchallenged within the statutory time limits, meaning it remained valid and binding on the parties.

In interpreting section 184 of the Highways Act 1980, the court applied well-established principles of statutory construction, including purposive and contextual interpretation, supported by recent Supreme Court authority. The court rejected the Appellant’s narrow interpretation that “any person” in subsection (11) must be limited to owners or occupiers of adjoining premises. Instead, it found that Parliament deliberately used broader language to allow a wider public to request crossovers, including persons without a direct proprietary interest.

The court explained that subsections (1) and (3) impose statutory obligations on the highway authority to notify owners and occupiers who may be required to contribute financially and afford them rights of objection. By contrast, subsection (11) grants the authority discretion to approve or reject requests without such notification or objection rights, reflecting the different nature of compulsory versus discretionary powers.

The court further reasoned that the highway authority has autonomy to design and specify the location and dimensions of the crossing, consistent with its statutory duty to maintain the highway. It is not required to obtain consent from neighbouring owners or occupiers before constructing a crossover following a request under subsection (11).

Regarding human rights, the court held that the statutory scheme does not engage or breach the Appellant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1 because the works are carried out on public highway land and do not interfere with the Appellant’s ownership or control of her property. The private law rights against trespass remain unaffected.

The court also dismissed hypothetical concerns about misuse of the request power, noting that the financial cost of construction acts as a practical deterrent against officious or vindictive applications.

In sum, the court concluded that the statutory provisions were correctly interpreted by the lower court, the crossover was lawfully constructed, and the highway authority acted within its powers in refusing to remove it.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the Appellant’s appeal.

The holding confirms that under section 184(11) of the Highways Act 1980, the highway authority has discretion to approve vehicle crossing requests from any person, without requiring the consent of adjoining landowners or occupiers. The statutory scheme provides no right of objection to persons not served with notices under subsections (1) or (3), and the authority is not obliged to obtain neighbour consent before construction on public highway land. The decision clarifies the scope of highway authority powers and limits the ability of neighbours to challenge crossovers on grounds of lack of consent or alleged unlawful construction once the statutory challenge period has expired.

No new precedent was established beyond the interpretation of section 184 and the confirmation of existing principles on judicial review time limits and statutory discretion. The direct effect is to uphold the validity of the crossover and the Council’s decision to retain it, with no breach of human rights found.