Jones v Obisesan (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

These judicial review proceedings arise from earlier debt proceedings initiated by the Respondent against Company A in the District Court. The District Court ruled in favour of the Respondent, awarding a judgment debt of €1,250 on 19 February 2024. Company A appealed this decision to the Circuit Court, but the appeal was struck out on 14 May 2024 due to Company A's failure to appear. Subsequently, a decree after appeal was entered on 2 July 2024 by the District Court Office.

Company A filed two motions in the Circuit Court seeking to set aside the striking out of the appeal and to stay enforcement of the judgment debt. These motions were heard on 5 November 2024, and the Circuit Court refused the relief sought, indicating that the appropriate remedy might be judicial review before the High Court.

The Applicant, who asserts he is a director and shareholder of Company A, filed judicial review proceedings in his own name instead of the company’s, after being advised that a company must generally be represented by a solicitor. The relief sought was to set aside the Circuit Court's 14 May 2024 order. The proceedings faced procedural difficulties, including non-compliance with the three-month time limit and issues of standing. The Applicant later arranged for Company A to be represented by solicitor and counsel and sought to substitute the company as applicant and amend the statement of grounds.

The leave application was ultimately heard on 4 June 2025, with judgment reserved to 18 June 2025.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the application for leave to apply for judicial review was brought within the prescribed three-month time limit under Order 84, rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
2. Whether the Applicant had the requisite "sufficient interest" or standing to maintain the judicial review proceedings.
3. Whether the substitution of Company A as applicant in lieu of the Applicant was permissible despite the delay.
4. Whether leave to amend the statement of grounds to add new relief related to the Circuit Court hearing on 5 November 2024 should be granted.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Applicant contended that he had standing as a director and shareholder of Company A to bring the judicial review proceedings in his own name, given procedural restrictions on companies filing without solicitors.
• The Applicant sought to remedy procedural deficiencies by substituting Company A as applicant and amending the statement of grounds to include additional relief related to the Circuit Court hearing on 5 November 2024.
• The Applicant argued implicitly for an extension of time or acceptance of the late substitution and amendment to allow the matter to proceed on its merits.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Allied Irish Bank plc v. Aqua Fresh Fish Ltd [2018] IESC 49, [2019] 1 IR 517	Requirement that companies be represented by solicitors in judicial review proceedings.	Explained why the Applicant, as an individual, was named due to procedural advice, but emphasized that the company is a separate legal entity requiring representation.
Shields v. Central Bank of Ireland [2022] IECA 250	Prohibition on substituting an applicant in judicial review proceedings for the purpose of circumventing the three-month time limit.	Supported refusal of the application to substitute Company A as applicant due to the delay and attempt to circumvent the time limit.
Keegan v. Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission [2012] IESC 29, [2012] 2 IR 570	Principles governing leave to amend statements of grounds in judicial review, including considerations of delay and fairness.	Applied to refuse leave to amend due to lack of explanation for delay, extensive new relief, and unfair prejudice to the Respondent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first identified two fundamental procedural deficiencies in the original leave application: non-compliance with the three-month time limit for judicial review under Order 84, rule 21, and lack of standing by the Applicant, who was not a party to the underlying debt proceedings. The Court emphasised that Company A, as a separate legal entity, alone had standing to pursue judicial review of the debt proceedings.

The Court acknowledged the Applicant's attempt to cure these defects by substituting Company A as applicant and amending the statement of grounds to add relief concerning the Circuit Court's refusal to set aside the striking out of the appeal. However, the Court found that such substitution was impermissible as it would circumvent the statutory time limit, citing the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Shields v. Central Bank of Ireland.

Regarding the application to amend the statement of grounds, the Court applied the Supreme Court’s principles from Keegan v. Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission, requiring a good explanation for delay and absence of unfair prejudice. The Court found no adequate explanation for the delay or omission of the new relief in the original grounds, and that allowing the amendment would be unfair to the Respondent, especially considering the disproportionate costs relative to the debt amount.

Consequently, the Court refused both the substitution and amendment applications and dismissed the leave application for judicial review on grounds of delay and lack of standing.

Holding and Implications

The Court REFUSED the application for leave to apply for judicial review.

The Court also refused the application to substitute Company A as applicant in lieu of the Applicant and refused leave to amend the statement of grounds. The direct effect is that the judicial review proceedings cannot proceed. No costs order was made as the leave application was heard ex parte, and the Respondent did not incur costs in respect of the application. No new legal precedent was established by this decision.