Vince, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Transport

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant challenges the Secretary of State's decision dated 2 October 2023 to withdraw guidance titled "Traffic Management Act 2004: Network Management to Support Active Travel" (the "2022 Guidance"), which was issued under section 18 of the Traffic Management Act 2004 ("TMA 2004"). The 2022 Guidance focused on promoting active travel, referring to cycling and walking. Permission to apply for judicial review was initially refused by Lang J on 29 May 2024 and subsequently by Heather Williams J on 7 November 2024, who also ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent's costs related to the preparation of her Acknowledgement of Service. The Appellant appeals against this refusal.

The TMA 2004 imposes duties on local traffic authorities and strategic highways companies ("network management authorities") to manage road networks with the objective of securing the expeditious movement of traffic, which includes pedestrians and cyclists. Section 18 empowers the Secretary of State to issue guidance to such authorities, which they must have regard to, but does not impose an obligation to issue guidance.

The 2022 Guidance was supplementary to the original 2004 Guidance and set out high-level principles and nine specific measures aimed at reallocating road space to support active travel. The 2022 Guidance cross-referred to other government policies and documents, such as "Gear Change" and the Transport Decarbonisation Plan, which remained in place after its withdrawal. The decision to withdraw the 2022 Guidance followed a review process considering concerns about certain traffic management schemes, including low traffic neighbourhoods ("LTNs"), and broader policy priorities.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the withdrawal of the 2022 Guidance unlawfully undermined or thwarted an objective of the TMA 2004 relating to active travel.
2. Whether the Secretary of State acted disproportionately and/or irrationally in withdrawing the entire 2022 Guidance rather than only parts related to LTNs.
3. Whether the Secretary of State failed to have regard to material considerations, including the wider role of the 2022 Guidance in embedding active travel measures, addressing climate change, and improving air quality.
4. Whether the decision to withdraw the 2022 Guidance was founded on an error of logic or lacked evidential support for a key step in the reasoning.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The withdrawal of the 2022 Guidance removed a key part of the statutory framework supporting active travel, creating a policy lacuna and undermining statutory objectives.
• The decision was disproportionate as concerns related only to LTNs, yet the entire Guidance was withdrawn.
• The Secretary of State failed to consider the wider role of the Guidance in promoting active travel and related environmental objectives.
• The decision was irrational, based on a misunderstanding of the Guidance's purpose and lacking evidential support for the reasoning.

Respondent's Arguments

• The objectives of the TMA 2004 focus on the expeditious movement of traffic and do not mandate or prefer active travel specifically.
• Issuing or withdrawing s.18 guidance is a discretionary power; the withdrawal does not alter statutory duties or objectives.
• The 2022 Guidance was high-level and cross-referenced other policies that remain in place, so no policy gap arose from its withdrawal.
• The decision was based on broader policy considerations beyond LTNs, including the desire to encourage well-designed traffic management measures with community support.
• The withdrawal was lawful and rational, reflecting a change in political priorities and policy approach rather than an error of law or logic.
• The briefing to ministers was legally adequate and did not omit any material considerations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R (Palestine Solidarity Campaign Limited) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2020] UKSC 16; [2020] 1 WLR 1774 at [26]	Interpretation of statutory guidance in line with primary and secondary legislation	Rejected Appellant's reliance, noting that the case involved guidance aligned with legislation, unlike the discretionary s.18 guidance here.
For Women Scotland Limited v Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16; [2025] 2 WLR 879 at [8]-[11]	Statutory interpretation principles	Rejected Appellant's approach to interpreting s.18 guidance as creating statutory objectives.
R (Save Stonehenge World Heritage Site Limited) v Secretary of State for Transport [2024] EWCA Civ 1227; [2025] PTSR 726 at [91]-[97]	Requirement to consider material considerations in decision-making	Found briefing to ministers was not legally deficient and adequately considered relevant issues.
Reid v Secretary of State for Scotland [1999] 2 AC 512, 541G	Proportionality in judicial review and its relation to irrationality	Referenced in discussion of disproportionality as a ground supporting irrationality.
McGrath v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2012] EWHC 1042 (Admin) at [33]	Proportionality and irrationality in judicial review	Supported the principle that disproportionality may underpin irrationality challenges.
Humber Landlords Association v Hull City Council [2019] EWHC 332 (Admin) at [57]	Manifestly disproportionate weight as a form of irrationality	Applied to illustrate that disproportionality depends on irrationality principle.
R (Packham) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 1005; [2021] Env. L.R. 215 at [47]-[51]	Judicial review of national policy decisions requires a "light touch" or "low intensity" review	Guided the court’s approach to review of ministerial policy decisions in the macro-political field.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory framework under the TMA 2004, emphasizing that the statutory objectives focus on securing the expeditious movement of traffic without prioritizing any particular mode, including active travel. The power to issue or withdraw section 18 guidance is discretionary and does not create or alter statutory objectives.

The court analyzed the content and context of the 2022 Guidance, noting it was a high-level document relying heavily on cross-references to other policies and guidance that remained effective after withdrawal. Thus, no policy lacuna arose from its removal.

Regarding the decision-making process, the court accepted that the Secretary of State's concerns extended beyond LTNs to a broader range of traffic management measures restricting vehicular movement. The withdrawal was part of a wider policy shift to promote sustainable transport in a manner less hostile to motorists and to encourage community engagement in scheme development.

The court rejected the Appellant’s proportionality argument, noting that disproportionality is not a standalone ground of judicial review and that national policy decisions require a low intensity of review. The withdrawal did not constitute irrationality given the broader policy considerations.

The court also dismissed the claim of an error of logic or lack of evidential basis, concluding that the Secretary of State was entitled to treat the 2022 Guidance as outdated in light of changed policy priorities. The Appellant’s disagreement was essentially with the merits of the policy change, not its legality.

Holding and Implications

The court REFUSED the Appellant's applications for permission to appeal and for permission to apply for judicial review.

The decision confirms that the withdrawal of discretionary statutory guidance under section 18 of the TMA 2004 is lawful when based on legitimate policy considerations and does not alter statutory duties. It underscores the limited scope of judicial review over national policy decisions of this nature, applying a low intensity of scrutiny. No new precedent was established beyond affirming established principles of statutory interpretation, rationality, and judicial review in the context of transport policy guidance.