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Y & anor v The Health Service Executive (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
A minor child (“Minor Appellant”) was diagnosed with global developmental delay and autism spectrum disorder. Her mother (“Appellant”) applied in April 2019 for an assessment of need under the Disability Act 2005. Although the Act requires commencement within three months, the assessment did not begin until November 2020 and concluded with a multidisciplinary report in December 2020 recommending speech and language therapy (“SLT”), occupational therapy (“OT”) and psychology.
An assessment officer issued a statutory assessment report in January 2021 confirming the disability and recommending that SLT, OT and psychology commence immediately. A liaison officer then produced a service statement in February 2021 on behalf of Company A (the Health Service Executive) specifying only the future development of an “Individual Family Service Plan” (“IFSP”) and giving September 2022 as the anticipated start date; no timeframes were provided for SLT, OT or psychology.
The Appellant complained that the service statement failed to comply with section 11 of the Act and the 2007 Regulations. A complaints officer rejected the complaint; an appeals officer also upheld the service statement. The Appellant then appealed to the High Court on a point of law. Judge Bolger allowed the appeal, holding that (i) the statutory requirement to specify services and timeframes had not been met and (ii) the appeals officer’s reasons were inadequate. Company A appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. While the litigation progressed, a revised service statement (January 2023) recorded that an IFSP had been completed and some therapeutic interventions had begun, but psychology remained outstanding.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Disability Act 2005 requires every health service identified in an assessment report to be specified in the subsequent service statement.
- Whether identifying the development of an IFSP as the sole service—with its own timeframe—satisfies the statutory obligations in section 11 and Regulation 18 to specify “the health services … and the period of time within which such services will be provided.”
Arguments of the Parties
Company A’s Arguments (Appellant)
- The Act draws a clear distinction between the “resource-blind” assessment report and the resource-constrained service statement; the latter need not list every service recommended in the assessment.
- An IFSP is itself a “health service” within the statutory definition; specifying its start date therefore satisfies section 11.
- The High Court wrongly introduced a requirement to include all assessed services in a service statement, thereby rewriting section 14’s complaint mechanism.
- The comparison with C.T.M. is misplaced because an IFSP is not a further assessment but a practical intervention while a child awaits multidisciplinary services.
Respondents’ Arguments (Mother and Minor Appellant)
- The liaison officer’s role is to state when and where the services already identified as appropriate will be provided, not to substitute different services.
- Resource or staffing constraints may affect timing but cannot justify omitting assessed services from the statement.
- The IFSP duplicates the completed assessment, provides no clinical intervention itself, and deprives the child of enforceable timelines for SLT, OT and psychology.
- Failure to list the assessed services undermines the statutory enforcement scheme and the purpose of sections 13 and 14.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| J.N. v. Harraghy [2023] IESC 9 | Recognised the distinction between assessment reports and service statements under the Act. | Cited to support Company A’s position that not all assessed services must appear in the service statement. |
| E.L.G. v. Health Service Executive [2022] IESC 14 | Same principle as J.N. regarding the differentiated stages of the statutory scheme. | Referenced in affirming the separation of “resource-blind” and “resource-constrained” stages. |
| C.T.M. v. Assessment Officer [2022] IEHC 131 | An additional procedural layer cannot displace statutory assessment requirements. | High Court used it by analogy; Supreme Court distinguished it because an IFSP is a service, not a substitute assessment. |
| A.B. v. Health Service Executive [2023] IECA 275 | Confirmed C.T.M. in the Court of Appeal. | Mentioned in discussion of how interim procedures can undermine statutory safeguards. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge O’Malley, delivering the unanimous judgment, addressed each legal issue in turn.
1. Must every assessed service be specified? The Court answered “no.” The statute “very clearly distinguishes” between the aspirational assessment and the practical service statement. Nonetheless, a rational connection must exist; a service statement listing a service unrelated to assessed needs could still be open to complaint.
2. Is an IFSP a valid service for specification? After reviewing national guidance on IFSPs and their family-centred philosophy, the Court held that an IFSP is “a health service” under section 7 because it is delivered by or on behalf of Company A and is the gateway through which multidisciplinary supports are organised.
However, the original service statement failed to: (i) explain the pivotal role of the IFSP to the family; (ii) link the IFSP process to the assessed needs; and (iii) set measurable, goal-oriented actions and review criteria. Consequently, while the concept of listing an IFSP is permissible, the execution in this case was inadequate.
The Court identified a tension between the family-centred IFSP model and the individual-centred enforcement architecture of the Act. To reconcile the two, future service statements must:
- Describe the IFSP process in plain language.
- Show how IFSP goals relate to each assessed need.
- Include measurable actions, timelines and review mechanisms.
- Record, for section 13 purposes, any assessed needs not yet matched with specific services.
Because one ground of the High Court’s order (adequacy of reasons) was unappealed, and because the original service statement fell short of statutory detail, the Supreme Court affirmed the remittal to the appeals officer. The Court noted that circumstances and subsequent reviews may have overtaken the original statement and directed that any further consideration be informed by the present judgment.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s order remitting the matter to the appeals officer.
Implications: Company A must enhance the specificity and transparency of service statements, especially when using the IFSP model. While the Court confirmed that not all assessed services must be listed, any service statement must clearly connect listed services to assessed needs and provide enforceable, measurable timelines. The decision clarifies administrative obligations but does not establish a new doctrinal test; it reinforces existing statutory requirements and emphasises procedural rigor.
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