Costin, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, aged 59 at the time of sentencing, was convicted and sentenced on 24 July 2024 in the Crown Court at Snaresbrook for 22 offences of indecent assault committed across two distinct periods. The first set of offences occurred in the 1980s when the appellant was a young leader in a scout group in Essex, abusing victims aged between 11 and 15. The second set occurred primarily in the 1990s while the appellant was a teacher and scout leader in Suffolk, abusing victims aged approximately 12 to 14. The appellant pleaded guilty to some offences and was convicted after trial for others. Sentences for the first set were concurrent terms of five years and three months for five offences; for the second set, concurrent terms of 10 years for 16 offences, with one sentence ordered to run consecutively, resulting in a total term of 15 years and three months imprisonment.

The appellant had previous convictions for sexual offences, including a 1992 sentence of two years for indecent assault and a 2011 indeterminate sentence for public protection (IPP) with a minimum term of 1,456 days for further sexual offences against children. The appellant had been serving the IPP sentence since 2010 and had made regular parole applications. The present offences were investigated starting in 2017, with the appellant remanded in custody in 2022 for these charges. He now seeks leave to appeal his sentence on one ground related to the punitive impact of the IPP sentence on his current sentencing.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the punitive impact of the appellant’s ongoing IPP sentence when imposing the current sentence.
2. Whether the sentencing judge properly applied the principle of totality in ordering concurrent and consecutive sentences for multiple offences.
3. Whether any delay in bringing the appellant to trial was undue and warranted adjustment to the sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The appellant contended that the sentencing judge failed to adequately account for the punitive effect of the IPP sentence, which had caused the appellant to remain in custody for many years before the current sentence commenced.
• It was argued that the appellant’s parole prospects had been extinguished due to the ongoing investigation and charges, resulting in prolonged incarceration under closed conditions, and that this should have been reflected in sentencing.
• The appellant also suggested that any delay in trial and sentencing compounded the punitive impact and warranted a further reduction.

Respondent's Arguments

• The respondent emphasized the lawful nature of the IPP sentence and that the time spent in custody under it could not count towards the current sentence, which only began to run at sentencing.
• It was submitted that the delay in investigation and trial was attributable to the complexity of the case, the number of victims, and late admissions by the appellant, and thus was not undue.
• The respondent argued that any speculation about parole decisions under the IPP sentence was impermissible and that the sentencing judge’s refusal to adjust the sentence for the IPP impact was reasonable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Kerrigan and Walker [2014] EWCA Crim 2438	Section 240 ZA of the Criminal Justice Act 2003: Time spent in custody while recalled on licence does not count towards new sentence.	Used to illustrate the principle that time in custody under a prior sentence or recall is generally not credited towards a new sentence.
R v Ashley [2024] EWCA Crim 1456	Discretion to adjust sentence in cases of excessive delay or where recall is solely due to the conduct of the current offence.	Referenced to explain the residual discretion judges have to make allowances, but that this discretion is limited and does not create an entitlement to credit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that the appellant was serving a lawful IPP sentence at all relevant times and that the current sentence only began to run upon imposition in July 2024. The court noted the legal principle, supported by precedent, that time spent in custody under a prior sentence or recall does not generally count towards a new sentence. While there is a limited judicial discretion to adjust sentences in cases of excessive delay or where the recall is triggered solely by the conduct of the current offence, the court found no error in the sentencing judge’s decision not to exercise this discretion.

The court emphasized that the appellant’s continued incarceration under the IPP sentence was a consequence of the historic sexual offences coming to light and the resulting risk assessment, which would have influenced parole decisions. The judge had carefully considered totality, ordering concurrent sentences within each temporal grouping of offences and consecutive sentences between the two groups, reflecting the seriousness and distinct circumstances of each set of offences.

The court also found no undue delay in the investigation or trial process given the complexity, number of victims, and late admissions by the appellant. The judge had appropriately made a modest allowance for delay between trial and sentencing but was right to decline further reductions.

Overall, the court concluded the sentencing judge’s approach was reasonable, well-informed, and within the proper exercise of judicial discretion.

Holding and Implications

The appeal against sentence is DISMISSED.

The court upheld the sentencing judge’s decision not to reduce the sentence to account for the appellant’s time served under the IPP sentence. The sentences imposed for the historic sexual offences remain as ordered, with concurrent sentences within each set of offences and consecutive sentences between the two sets. No new legal precedent was established; the decision reinforces established principles regarding the treatment of prior custody under indeterminate sentences and the limited scope for judicial discretion to adjust sentences in these circumstances. The direct effect is that the appellant will serve the full sentence imposed starting from the date of sentencing, with no credit for prior custody under the IPP sentence.