Mobile Telecommunications Company KSCP v HRH Prince Hussam Bin Saud Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

Factual and Procedural Background

The Petitioner, a public telecommunications company incorporated in Kuwait, presented a bankruptcy petition against the Defendant, a member of a foreign royal family, on 1 June 2022. The petition was based on arbitral awards totaling approximately US$885 million and £3.3 million, arising from a loan agreement dispute and subsequent arbitration proceedings. Prior to this, the Petitioner had presented an earlier bankruptcy petition in 2020 based on costs orders, which was dismissed after the Defendant paid the debt. The Defendant challenged jurisdiction on the basis that he did not have a place of residence in England and Wales during the relevant three-year period preceding the petition, as required by section 265(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1986. The Chief Insolvency and Companies Court Judge dismissed the petition, concluding the jurisdictional test was not met. The Petitioner sought permission to appeal that decision, which was refused following a hearing in February 2025.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Defendant had a "place of residence" in England and Wales during the relevant three-year period (1 June 2019 to 1 June 2022) sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional test under section 265(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
2. Whether the Judge erred in requiring a "settled purpose" or "sufficient connection" with the jurisdiction as part of the test for residence.
3. Whether the Defendant's intention and the need to seek permission to stay at family-owned properties should be considered in determining residence.
4. Whether, having found residence until 1990, jurisdiction continues unless the Defendant had "abandoned" the property.
5. Whether the Judge's factual findings regarding the availability of certain properties and the Defendant's knowledge of council tax registration were correct and could be challenged on appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

• The Defendant had a place of residence in England and Wales during the relevant period because family-owned properties, including York House, would have been made available to him if he had asked, irrespective of whether he actually stayed there or intended to do so.
• The Judge wrongly introduced a requirement that a debtor must have a "settled purpose" or "sufficient connection" with the jurisdiction to establish residence, which is not supported by the statute.
• The Defendant's intention not to reside and the fact that he needed permission to stay at family properties were irrelevant to the jurisdictional question.
• Once residence was established prior to 1990, it should be presumed to continue unless the Defendant had abandoned the property, and the Judge erred in not applying this principle.
• The Judge's factual findings about the Defendant's lack of knowledge of council tax registration and the availability of certain properties were incorrect and should be overturned.

Court's Response to Arguments

• The Petitioner's factual challenges had no realistic prospect of success given the Judge's findings based on live evidence and credibility assessments.
• The Judge's legal analysis, while somewhat discursive, was consistent with established case law and correctly required a meaningful connection with the jurisdiction for residence.
• The Petitioner's expansive interpretation of residence was rejected as effectively trivializing the statutory test and was inconsistent with precedent, notably the decision in Lakatamia Shipping v Su.
• There is no legal principle that residence continues indefinitely unless expressly abandoned; rather, residence must be established during the relevant period as a matter of fact.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Re Nordenfelt [1895] 1 QB 151	Definition of "dwelling-house" and the concept of abandonment of residence for bankruptcy jurisdiction.	The Court explained that abandonment is a descriptive factual finding, not a legal requirement, and rejected the Petitioner's argument that residence continues unless abandonment is shown.
Fox v Stirk [1970] 2 QB 463	Temporary presence at an address does not constitute residence.	Applied to support the conclusion that short or intermittent stays do not establish residence.
Lakatamia Shipping v Su [2021] EWHC 1866 (Ch)	Interpretation of "place of residence" requiring a meaningful connection and settled purpose; rejection of trivial entitlement as sufficient.	Strongly relied upon to reject Petitioner's broad interpretation and to affirm the requirement of a meaningful and settled connection to establish residence.
Roth J [2022] EWHC 744 (Ch)	Assessment of evidence on place of residence for jurisdictional purposes.	Referenced to show earlier provisional findings and significance of council tax registration, though later findings differed based on live evidence.
ICCJ Barber [2023] EWHC 1144 (Ch)	Jurisdictional test under section 265(2)(b)(i) and evaluation of evidence on residence.	Her factual findings and approach to jurisdiction were endorsed by the Court as reasonable and not subject to successful appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed review of the statutory framework under section 265 of the Insolvency Act 1986, focusing on the jurisdictional test requiring a debtor to have had a "place of residence" in England and Wales during the relevant three-year period. The Court examined established case law interpreting this phrase, noting that it requires a meaningful, settled, and continuous connection with the jurisdiction, rather than mere physical presence or entitlement to occupy property.

The Court emphasized that residence is a factual determination involving an assessment of the debtor's pattern of life, intentions, and the nature of their connection to any premises. It rejected the Petitioner's argument that a mere moral or potential entitlement to stay at a property owned by another could establish residence, as this would trivialize the statutory test and conflict with precedent.

The Court found that the Judge had properly assessed the credibility of witnesses and weighed the evidence, including the Defendant's lack of actual occupation or intention to reside at the family properties during the relevant period. The Defendant's registration for council tax and prior residence during studies were relevant but insufficient to establish residence during the relevant period.

The Court also clarified that the concept of "abandonment" from Re Nordenfelt is a descriptive factual finding and not a legal prerequisite to losing residence. Since the Defendant never owned the properties in question, the notion of abandonment was inapplicable.

In sum, the Court concluded that the Judge's decision was legally sound and factually supported, and that the Petitioner's appeal had no realistic prospect of success.

Holding and Implications

The Court REFUSED PERMISSION TO APPEAL the decision dismissing the bankruptcy petition due to lack of jurisdiction under section 265(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1986.

This decision directly affects the parties by affirming that the Defendant did not have a qualifying place of residence in England and Wales during the relevant period, thereby precluding jurisdiction for the bankruptcy petition. No new legal precedent was established; the ruling confirms and applies existing principles regarding residence and jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters.