Perry, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was convicted in The Crown Court of collecting or making a record of information likely to be useful to a terrorist, contrary to section 58(1)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000. During a police search on 20 February 2018, officers discovered coded notes written on cigarette papers hidden in a perfume box near the Appellant’s computer workstation. The prosecution alleged that the notes recorded a de-briefing by dissident republicans following a 2015 arms seizure that had led to the conviction of Individual A.

The Appellant accepted authorship of the handwritten notes but claimed they were anonymously delivered through her letterbox shortly before Christmas 2017 in connection with her activities as a writer, commentator and member of Political Party A. She asserted that she merely copied pre-existing material, did not “collect” information herself, and believed the contents were obsolete when received.

A non-jury trial commenced on 30 January 2023 before Judge O’Hara pursuant to a certificate under section 1 of the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007. On 15 March 2023, the Appellant was convicted; the judgment is reported as R v Perry [2023] NICC 7. She appealed, arguing principally that the trial judge had misinterpreted paragraph 4(n) of her defence statement and wrongly treated discrepancies as undermining her credibility. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 10 November 2023: [2023] NICA 74. It certified a question of general public importance concerning whether construction of a defence statement is a question of law for the trial judge. The present Supreme Court proceedings address that certified question and the concomitant challenge to the findings of fact.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the construction (interpretation) of a defence statement provided under Part I of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 is, in a jury trial, a question of law for the trial judge.
2. Whether, on the facts of this case, paragraph 4(n) of the defence statement raised a question of law or one of fact.
3. In what circumstances an appellate court may interfere with a trial judge’s findings of fact in a non-jury criminal trial, particularly where those findings have been upheld by an intermediate appellate court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• The trial judge erroneously interpreted paragraph 4(n) of the defence statement by linking two separate sentences and thereby concluding that the Appellant knew the notes related to Individual A’s conviction.
• Any inference adverse to the Appellant drawn from the defence statement should only be relied upon if it was the sole reasonable interpretation, analogous to the principles governing reliance on an alleged confession.
• Because the issue involved drawing inferences from written material, the appellate court was in as good a position as the trial judge to evaluate its meaning.

Respondent’s Arguments

• The meaning attributed by the trial judge to paragraph 4(n) was “obvious” and supported by the evidential context, including the Appellant’s inability to explain how she concluded the information was obsolete.
• The interpretation issue was factual, not legal; therefore, appellate intervention required demonstration of perversity or legal misdirection, neither of which was established.
• The trial judge’s broader credibility assessment was based on multiple factors, rendering the disputed interpretation non-determinative of the conviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Hamblen, delivering the judgment of the Court, began by noting that both parties accepted the certified question could not be answered in the abstract; its resolution depended on the character of the particular statement and the purpose for which it was adduced. The Court endorsed Professor Sir John Smith’s distinction between questions of law (legal effect of a document) and questions of fact (meaning intended or understood) and held that paragraph 4(n) fell into the latter category because it concerned what the Appellant meant and how a reader would understand it.

Consequently, the Supreme Court’s task was to consider whether the lower courts were entitled to treat the interpretation of paragraph 4(n) as a factual issue and whether any ground existed to disturb concurrent findings. Applying the four principles from Thain/Tweed, the Court reasoned:

• The trial judge’s interpretation was one facet of an overall credibility assessment, informed by live testimony and contextual evidence about the notes’ alleged obsolescence.
• No legal misdirection was shown; the Appellant’s challenge was therefore limited to demonstrating that the finding was perverse or plainly wrong.
• The juxtaposition of the two sentences in paragraph 4(n) naturally suggested a causal link; the absence of the word “therefore” did not negate that inference, and no alternative explanation had been offered in evidence.
• Even if the interpretation were debatable, it was not central to the conviction, which rested on multiple independent credibility factors enumerated by the trial judge and endorsed by the Court of Appeal.
• Given the strong policy reasons against unsettling concurrent factual determinations, there was no basis for interference.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court confirmed that, where the issue concerns the meaning intended or understood by the defendant, construction of a defence statement is a question of fact for the tribunal of fact. Appellate courts will only revisit such findings if there is legal misdirection or perversity. The decision affirms the high threshold for overturning concurrent findings of fact and clarifies the factual–legal distinction in interpreting defence statements, but it sets no new substantive precedent beyond restating existing appellate principles.